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Abstract 
 
Accurate predictions are essential in many areas such as business and sports 
forecasting. Prediction markets are a promising approach for predicting uncertain 
future events and developments. To give a few examples, prediction markets have been 
employed successfully to aggregate information on the expected outcome of elections, 
sports events, and Oscar winners. This work studies the prediction accuracy of markets 
in the field of sports forecasting as well as the impact of traders’ biases on their 
trading behavior. Traders indeed exhibit a substantial amount of biases in markets 
which were run for predicting the outcome of the FIFA World Cup 2006. Despite these 
biases, an empirical comparison of the markets and predictions derived from the FIFA 
world ranking, i.e. historic data, and betting odds shows that prediction markets are 
more accurate predictors than the FIFA world ranking and as accurate as betting odds 
from professional bookmakers. Betting odds, in turn, are known to predict extremely 
accurately. Traders’ biases thus do not necessarily lead to poor predictions in case of 
prediction markets.  
Another focus of this work is to study the impact of different monetary incentive 
schemes for play-money prediction markets on the accuracy of predictions. In order to 
do so, predictions from three groups of traders, corresponding to three treatments with 
different and widely-used incentive schemes, are compared with regard to their 
prediction accuracy in a field experiment. Subjects of the first group were paid a fixed 
amount, subjects of the second group were paid according to their ordinal rank within 
the group, and in case of the third group the subjects’ payments depended linearly on 
their deposit value in the prediction market. The highest correlation between the 
relative frequency of outcome and trading prices is found in case of the second group, 
the rank-order tournament. Somewhat surprisingly, the rank-order tournament seems 
to beat the third incentive scheme where the traders’ payments are based linearly on 
their return in the market.  
Overall, this work demonstrates that markets are accurate predictors beyond the field 
of political stock markets. Moreover, the findings on traders’ biases and incentive 
schemes are valuable for designing future prediction markets.   
  III 
Table of Contents 
 
ABSTRACT ............................................................................................................................... II 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ......................................................................................................... III 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS .................................................................................................. VI 
LIST OF FIGURES .............................................................................................................. VIII 
LIST OF TABLES .................................................................................................................... X 
1. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1 
1.1. MOTIVATION ............................................................................................................... 1 
1.2. RESEARCH QUESTIONS ............................................................................................... 4 
1.3. OVERVIEW AND STRUCTURE ...................................................................................... 5 
1.4. RELATED PUBLICATIONS ............................................................................................ 7 
2. PREDICTION MARKETS .............................................................................................. 9 
2.1. FUNDAMENTALS OF PREDICTION MARKETS ............................................................... 9 
2.1.1. Definition of Prediction Markets ............................................................................ 9 
2.1.2. Operational Principle of Prediction Markets ....................................................... 11 
2.1.3. Hayek and Efficient Market Hypotheses .............................................................. 12 
2.2. KEY DESIGN ELEMENTS OF PREDICTION MARKETS ................................................. 14 
2.2.1. Contracts .............................................................................................................. 15 
2.2.2. Trading Mechanisms ............................................................................................ 16 
2.2.3. Incentives .............................................................................................................. 19 
2.2.4. Traders ................................................................................................................. 20 
2.3. FIELDS OF APPLICATION ........................................................................................... 21 
2.3.1. Political Stock Markets ........................................................................................ 24 
2.3.2. Sports Prediction Markets .................................................................................... 25 
2.3.3. Other Applications ............................................................................................... 25 
2.4. SUMMARY ................................................................................................................. 27 
3. STOCCER – A 2006 FIFA WORLD CUP PREDICTION MARKET ...................... 29 
3.1. THE FIFA WORLD CUP 2006 .................................................................................... 29 
3.2. THE STOCCER EXCHANGE ..................................................................................... 30 
3.2.1. Contracts .............................................................................................................. 31 
3.2.2. Trading Mechanisms ............................................................................................ 36 
  IV 
3.2.3. Incentives .............................................................................................................. 37 
3.2.4. Traders ................................................................................................................. 37 
3.3. THE TRADING SOFTWARE ......................................................................................... 39 
3.4. SUMMARY ................................................................................................................. 43 
4. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF PREDICTION ACCURACY ..................................... 44 
4.1. RELATED WORK ....................................................................................................... 46 
4.1.1. Non-Sports Prediction Markets ............................................................................ 46 
4.1.2. Sports Prediction Markets .................................................................................... 51 
4.2. DESCRIPTION OF THE DATA ...................................................................................... 53 
4.2.1. STOCCER Match Markets ................................................................................... 53 
4.2.2. STOCCER Championship Market ........................................................................ 54 
4.2.3. Betting Odds ......................................................................................................... 56 
4.2.4. FIFA Ranking ....................................................................................................... 59 
4.2.5. Random Draws ..................................................................................................... 60 
4.3. RESULTS .................................................................................................................... 60 
4.3.1. Evaluation of the Prediction Accuracy ................................................................. 60 
4.3.2. Arbitrage Opportunities ....................................................................................... 64 
4.3.3. Market-Making Traders ....................................................................................... 66 
4.4. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS .......................................................................................... 70 
4.5. SUMMARY ................................................................................................................. 71 
5. INCENTIVE SCHEMES FOR PLAY-MONEY PREDICTION MARKETS .......... 73 
5.1. RELATED WORK ....................................................................................................... 74 
5.1.1. Real-money vs. Play-money Prediction Markets .................................................. 74 
5.1.2. Experimental Studies on Monetary Incentives ..................................................... 77 
5.2. A FIELD EXPERIMENT ON MONETARY INCENTIVES IN PREDICTION MARKETS ....... 79 
5.2.1. Basic Setup ........................................................................................................... 79 
5.2.2. Incentive Schemes ................................................................................................. 80 
5.2.3. Expected Results ................................................................................................... 82 
5.3. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS ......................................................................................... 84 
5.3.1. Trading Activity .................................................................................................... 84 
5.3.2. Trading Prices ...................................................................................................... 85 
5.3.3. Prediction Accuracy ............................................................................................. 87 
5.4. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS .......................................................................................... 90 
5.5. SUMMARY ................................................................................................................. 93 
  V 
6. TRADERS' BIASES IN PREDICTION MARKETS ................................................... 94 
6.1. RELATED WORK ....................................................................................................... 96 
6.1.1. Home Bias in Financial Markets .......................................................................... 96 
6.1.2. Biases in Prediction Markets ............................................................................... 98 
6.2. DESCRIPTION OF THE DATA .................................................................................... 101 
6.3. RESULTS .................................................................................................................. 102 
6.3.1. Traders’ Nationality and Shareholdings ............................................................ 103 
6.3.2. Traders’ Nationality and Trading Behavior ....................................................... 105 
6.3.3. Target Groups and Trading Prices .................................................................... 108 
6.4. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS ........................................................................................ 110 
6.5. SUMMARY ............................................................................................................... 112 
7. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK ................................................................... 113 
7.1. SUMMARY OF CONTRIBUTIONS AND REVIEW OF WORK ........................................ 113 
7.2. FUTURE WORK ........................................................................................................ 116 
APPENDIX A ......................................................................................................................... 119 
APPENDIX B ......................................................................................................................... 127 
APPENDIX C ......................................................................................................................... 134 
BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................................................................................. 136 
  
  VI 
List of Abbreviations 
 
CA  Call auction 
CDA  Continuous Double Auction 
DPM  Dynamic pari-mutuel market 
DV  Deposit value 
ESA  Economic Science Association 
EU  European Union 
FIFA  Fédération Internationale de Football Association 
FP  Fixed payment 
GDP  Gross Domestic Product 
HP  Hewlett-Packard 
HSX  Hollywood Stock Exchange 
IEM  Iowa Electronic Markets 
MM  Market maker 
MSR  Market scoring rule 
NBA  National Basketball Association 
NFL  National Football League 
PSM  Political Stock Market 
RO  Rank-order tournament 
UBC  University of British Columbia 
UK  United Kingdom 
  VII 
US  United States 
USA  United States of America  
  VIII 
List of Figures 
 
Figure 1: Number of research papers per term (Tziralis and Tatsiopoulos, 2007a) ...... 10 
Figure 2: Operational principle of prediction markets .................................................. 12 
Figure 3: Information of insiders is revealed in trading prices (Plott, 2000) ................ 14 
Figure 4: Knock-out stage of the FIFA World Cup 2006 .............................................. 30 
Figure 5: Number of users and trading activity over time ............................................. 31 
Figure 6: Number of trades in the championship market .............................................. 33 
Figure 7: Trading activity in the match markets ............................................................ 34 
Figure 8: Distribution of trades per day over time ........................................................ 35 
Figure 9: Traders’ country of origin .............................................................................. 38 
Figure 10: Trading screen of STOCCER ....................................................................... 41 
Figure 11: Hardware and software architecture of STOCCER ..................................... 42 
Figure 12: Information revelation through time (Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2004) ........... 47 
Figure 13: Predicted vs. actual outcomes in political markets (Berg et al., 2001) ........ 48 
Figure 14: Political stock markets compared to polls (Berg et al., 2001) ..................... 49 
Figure 15: Prediction accuracy of HSX (Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2004) ....................... 50 
Figure 16: Prediction accuracy for NFL games (Servan-Schreiber et al., 2004) .......... 52 
Figure 17: Typical screen of a fixed-odd betting site .................................................... 58 
Figure 18: Sum of bid/ask prices in championship market over time ........................... 65 
Figure 19: Correlation between number of market makers and number of trades ........ 69 
Figure 20: Correlation between number of market makers and trading volume ........... 69 
Figure 21: Distribution of trading prices in the three treatments ................................... 86 
Figure 22: Market forecast probability and actual probability ...................................... 88 
Figure 23: Ten paired lottery-choice decisions (Holt and Laury, 2002) ....................... 91 
Figure 24: Proportion of safe choices in each decision ................................................. 92 
Figure 25: Rate of return at different odds (Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2006b) ................. 99 
Figure 26: Shareholdings in home country and across all teams (July 9th 2006) ........ 104 
Figure 27: Trading prices of contract “Germany” ....................................................... 108 
Figure 28: Trading prices of contract “UK” ................................................................ 109 
Figure 29: Trading prices of contract “France” ........................................................... 110 
Figure 30: Lottery-choice decisions in the field experiment ....................................... 133 
  IX 
Figure 31: Shareholdings in home country and across all teams (June 23rd 2006) ..... 135 
  
  X 
List of Tables 
 
Table 1: Comparison of trading mechanisms ................................................................ 16 
Table 2: Fields of application of prediction markets ..................................................... 22 
Table 3:  Markets operated during the FIFA World Cup 2006 ..................................... 32 
Table 4:  Age distribution of traders .............................................................................. 38 
Table 5: 1988 US presidential elections and forecasts (Forsythe et al., 1992) .............. 47 
Table 6: Trading prices of STOCCER match markets .................................................. 54 
Table 7: Trading prices of the STOCCER championship market ................................. 55 
Table 8: Comparison of prediction accuracy (all matches) ........................................... 61 
Table 9: Comparison of prediction accuracy (all matches without draws) ................... 62 
Table 10: Comparison of prediction accuracy (final rounds) ........................................ 63 
Table 11: Number and share of market-making traders per contract ............................ 67 
Table 12: Traders acting as market makers for multiple contracts ................................ 68 
Table 13: Trading activity and trading success of market makers ................................ 70 
Table 14: Trading activity in the three treatments ......................................................... 84 
Table 15: Preferences and expectation in elections (Forsythe et al., 1992) ................ 100 
Table 16: Traders’ nationality and shareholdings in teams (July 9th 2006) ................. 103 
Table 17: Traders’ nationality and proportion of buyers ............................................. 105 
Table 18: Traders’ nationality and proportion of sellers ............................................. 106 
Table 19: Traders’ nationality and proportion of traders with net purchases .............. 107 
Table 20: Betting odds from wetten.de ........................................................................ 119 
Table 21: Betting odds from ODDSET ....................................................................... 121 
Table 22: Positions of competing teams in the FIFA ranking (May 2006) ................. 123 
Table 23: Trading activity of market makers relative to all traders ............................ 125 
Table 24: Number of market makers and trading activity per contract ....................... 126 
Table 25: Distribution of trading prices in the three treatments .................................. 131 
Table 26: Relative frequencies of outcome of contracts ............................................. 132 
Table 27: Traders’ nationality and shareholdings in teams (June 23rd 2006) .............. 134 
Introduction  1 
1. Introduction 
Uncertainty and doubt are seen to be major challenges for management in the 21st 
century (Nohria and Stewart, 2006). Considering the environment in which 
organizations are acting today, this is not surprising: Increasing speed of innovation and 
thus shorter product life cycles as well as the globalization of markets make our world 
increasingly complex and unpredictable. Hence, for organizations it is more important 
than ever to develop foresight capabilities to better foresee future developments, trends, 
potentials, challenges, and risks.  
Predicting the future is an integral part of corporate decision making. Inaccurate or 
delayed predictions can result in substantial costs for a company. Improving foresight 
capabilities, on the other hand, helps to strengthen the position of a company in global 
competition. Most business challenges related to, for example, demand forecasting and 
new product development require information which is dispersed among many people. 
However, these people cannot be easily identified in most cases. But more and more 
companies recognize the potential of collective intelligence and try to leverage the 
wisdom of crowds1 through technologies such as wikis, blogs, or reputational systems. 
All of these technologies help to aggregate information and gain a better understanding 
of the future by collecting knowledge of as many people as possible.  
1.1. Motivation 
Over the last couple of years, interest in prediction markets as a forecasting method has 
continuously increased in the scientific world and in industry. Markets provide 
incentives for information revelation and can be used as a mechanism for aggregating 
information. So far, prediction markets have done well in every known comparison 
with other forecasting methods (Hanson, 2006). Racetrack odds beat horse experts 
consistently (Figlewski, 1979), orange juice futures have proven more accurate than the 
National Weather Service of the US Department of Commerce (Roll, 1984), and stock 
prices determined the company responsible for the explosion of the Challenger 
spacecraft within 13 minutes – four months before a panel of experts published its 
                                                 
1 Surowiecki (2004) created public interest in collective intelligence with his bestselling book “The 
Wisdom of Crowds”.  
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official report (Maloney and Mulherin, 2003). Whereas information aggregation is only 
a byproduct of most traditional markets, prediction markets are set up with the explicit 
purpose of soliciting information. Engineering carefully, prediction markets can 
directly guide decision making.  
The basic idea of prediction markets is to trade contracts whose payoff depends on the 
outcome of uncertain future events. Although the final payoffs of the contracts are 
unknown during the trading period, rational traders should sell contracts if they 
consider them to be overvalued and buy contracts if they consider them to be 
undervalued (Glosten and Milgrom, 1985). Until the outcome is finally known, the 
trading prices reflect the traders’ aggregated beliefs about the likelihood of the future 
events. In informationally efficient markets, all the available information is reflected in 
the trading prices at any time (Fama, 1970a, Fama, 1991).  
Examples of prediction markets that are open to the public include the Iowa Electronic 
Markets2, the Political Stock Market PSM3, TradeSports4, NewsFutures5, the Hollywood 
Stock Exchange6, and STOCCER7. Several major companies such as Hewlett-Packard, 
Google, or Microsoft are also using internal prediction markets for company-specific 
predictions. The results of recent studies on these prediction markets are encouraging. 
One of the main reasons for their dissemination is that they have shown a high 
prediction accuracy compared to traditional forecasting methods such as polls, expert 
predictions, or surveys (Berg et al., 2001, Servan-Schreiber et al., 2004, Spann and 
Skiera, 2003). Good performance has also been demonstrated in corporate 
environments (Chen and Plott, 2002, Ortner, 2000, Plott, 2000). Beyond prediction 
accuracy, markets also provide considerable advantages in terms of continuous 
forecasting, participation, and cost efficiency compared to other widespread forecasting 
methods.  
Continuous scanning of ongoing developments as an input to strategic planning may be 
difficult to implement with traditional forecasting methods such as brainstorming 
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techniques, Delphi studies, and scenario workshops. The results of suchlike approaches 
usually have to be manually analyzed, evaluated, and summarized. All of this has to be 
performed at a certain point in time. In contrast, all the traders’ information is 
aggregated by the price mechanism of a prediction market. This has two positive 
effects: First, the information aggregation by the price mechanism reduces the 
workload compared to traditional forecasting methods. Second, the price mechanism 
ensures that trading prices continuously reflect the totality of previously revealed 
knowledge and immediately respond to new information (Hanson, 1999). This means 
that information aggregated via prediction markets is available in the market and 
always up-to-date (Berg et al., 2003).  
Concerning participation in foresight studies, it is a well-known problem that people 
generally refuse to participate or drop out early due to other commitments they consider 
more important (Cuhls, 2003). Therefore, it makes sense to provide incentives for 
participation. With proper incentive schemes traders do not necessarily state their 
individual preferences but their true beliefs (van Bruggen et al., 2006). Prediction 
markets allow for rather sophisticated incentive schemes as traders can be rewarded 
based on their performance, i.e. the quality of their contributions. This can happen in 
different ways. The market operator can for instance award prizes or money to the best 
traders or traders can be asked for investing some of their own money in a market. Yet, 
it is sometimes not even essential to provide monetary incentives or prizes to motivate 
participation. Prediction markets have also shown to perform well without providing 
any monetary incentives, e.g. by publicly announcing a ranking based on the traders’ 
success in the market (Christiansen, 2007).  
The implementation of a foresight activity is often restricted due to tight budget 
constraints and other resource limitations (Salo and Cuhls, 2003, Clar, 2003). As 
described above, the information aggregation process in prediction markets is carried 
out via the price mechanism and does not require any manual intervention. Prediction 
markets are highly scalable as the workload of the operators is almost independent from 
the number of traders and the time horizon (Chan et al., 2002). Furthermore, the 
hardware costs for running a market are negligible once the market platform has been 
designed and developed (Spann et al., 2007).  
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To sum up, evidence so far suggests that prediction markets are at least as accurate as 
traditional forecasting methods. Furthermore, they provide considerable advantages in 
terms of continuous forecasting, participation and information revelation as well as 
scalability and cost efficiency. This also explains why prediction markets currently 
receive a lot of attention in research.  
This work studies the prediction accuracy of markets in the field of sports forecasting 
as well as the impact of traders’ biases on their trading behavior. Data from predictions 
markets which were run for predicting the outcome of the FIFA World Cup 2006 is 
used to find out whether traders’ biases lead to poor predictions. Furthermore, the 
markets’ predictions are empirically compared to predictions derived from historic data 
and betting odds. Another focus of this work is to explore the impact of different 
monetary incentive schemes on the prediction accuracy of play-money markets. In 
order to do so, predictions from three groups of traders, corresponding to three 
treatments with different and widely-used incentive schemes, are compared with regard 
to their prediction accuracy in a field experiment.   
1.2. Research Questions 
The main objective of this work is to demonstrate the predictive power of markets in 
general and in the field of sports forecasting in particular. Moreover, the research on 
traders’ biases and incentive schemes is valuable for designing future prediction 
markets. Within the scope of this work, the following research questions are addressed:  
(I) How well do markets predict the future? 
As was already mentioned prediction markets seem to outperform traditional 
forecasting methods in many cases. An evaluation of their prediction accuracy relative 
to traditional forecasting methods such as expert opinions or polls is required to answer 
the first research question. Earlier empirical research on prediction markets 
substantiates their predictive power in several fields of application. In this work, data 
collected from prediction markets for the FIFA World Cup 2006 is used to demonstrate 
their predictive power in the field of sports forecasting. For the first time, the prediction 
accuracy of play-money markets is compared to predictions based on historic soccer 
data as well as betting odds from professional bookmakers.  
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(II) How to design incentive schemes for play-money prediction markets? 
Prediction markets can be used to provide incentives for information revelation. In real-
money prediction markets you have to “put your money where your mouth is” 
(Hanson, 1990a). However, real-money prediction markets are illegal or at least highly 
regulated in most countries. Moreover, potential traders might be unwilling to invest 
their own money in prediction markets. Well-designed incentive schemes are thus 
needed to encourage participation and information revelation in play-money prediction 
markets. In this work, three different incentive schemes are compared with regard to 
their impact on the accuracy of predictions in a field experiment. In order to do so, 
predictions from three groups of traders with different and widely-used incentive 
schemes are compared with regard to their prediction accuracy in a field experiment. 
Subjects of the first group were paid a fixed amount, subjects of the second group were 
paid according to their ordinal rank within the group, and in case of the third group the 
subjects’ payments linearly depended on their deposit value in the prediction market.  
(III) How do traders’ biases impact their trading behavior? 
Prediction markets aggregate and reveal the information traders have. Individuals, 
however, exhibit substantial information processing or judgment biases. Markets which 
require probabilistic calculations and forecasts of future outcomes are particularly 
challenging with regard to the traders’ information processing capabilities. Traders’ 
biases may thus also affect their trading behavior in prediction markets and in doing so 
influence predictions based on trading prices. In financial markets, biases such as the 
home bias where investors allocate only a small fraction of their portfolio to foreign 
investments are a well-known phenomenon (e.g. French and Poterba, 1991). Traders in 
political stock markets are also buying and selling in a manner which is correlated with 
their party identification (Forsythe et al., 1992). This work studies how the traders’ 
nationality impacts their holdings and their trading behavior in a FIFA World Cup 2006 
prediction market.   
1.3. Overview and Structure 
The work at hand is structured into seven chapters. After the present introduction to this 
work, Chapter 2 gives a definition of prediction markets and explains their operational 
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principle as well as their theoretical foundations. It also briefly discusses the key design 
elements of prediction markets which have to be considered by market engineers. 
Moreover, Chapter 2 presents current fields of application of prediction markets.  
Chapter 3 describes a 2006 FIFA World Cup prediction market called STOCCER. 
Most of the data which is used to answer the research questions raised in the previous 
section comes from the STOCCER market. For this reason the FIFA World Cup 2006 
itself, the contracts that were traded, the trading mechanisms, the incentive schemes, 
the group of traders, as well as the software platform are described in detail.  
Chapter 4 examines the accuracy of prediction markets in general and in the field of 
sports forecasting in particular, more precisely for predicting the outcomes of soccer 
matches during the FIFA World Cup 2006. It thus answers the first research question 
raised in the previous section. The results show that play-money prediction markets 
outperform a random predictor and forecasts that are based on historic data about the 
success of national soccer teams. Moreover, prediction markets are on a level with 
betting odds from professional bookmakers which are known to be very accurate. 
Beyond the comparison of prediction accuracy, Chapter 4 also studies whether pure 
arbitrage opportunities existed in these markets and whether traders try to exploit 
illiquidity by taking on the role of market makers in prediction markets.  
Afterwards, Chapter 5 studies the impact of different incentive schemes on prediction 
accuracy and thereby answers the second research question raised in the previous 
section. It elaborates on the question whether or not prediction markets with 
performance-related incentives perform better than markets with flat payments and how 
these performance-related incentives should be designed. This is of special interest 
when traders need to get paid for taking part in a prediction market, e.g. in the case of 
an internal market for company-specific predictions. The results show that the highest 
correlation between the relative frequency of outcome and trading prices is found in 
case of a rank-order tournament where traders are paid depending on their ordinal rank 
in a group of traders. Thus, tournaments with a handful of big winners winning big 
prizes work well. Somewhat surprisingly, the rank-order tournament even seems to beat 
the incentive scheme where the traders’ payments are based linearly on their return in 
the market.  
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Chapter 6 analyzes how the traders’ nationality impacts their holdings and their trading 
behavior in a FIFA World Cup 2006 prediction market. In doing so it answers the third 
research question from the previous section. Firstly, the chapter examines whether there 
is a correlation between the traders’ nationality and the number of contracts they hold 
of different national teams. The results suggest that such a correlation does indeed 
exist. Secondly, it shows that traders tend to buy more contracts of their home country 
than traders from other countries do. In spite of these results predictions from these 
markets were surprisingly accurate.  
Chapter 7 summarizes the contributions and discusses implications of this work. 
Finally, it proposes promising future fields of application for prediction markets and 
sketches future research questions that are closely related to those addressed in the 
work at hand.  
1.4. Related Publications 
Parts of this work have already been published and presented at research conferences. 
Concerning the results presented in Chapter 4, the comparison of play-money 
prediction markets to a random predictor and forecasts based on the historic data about 
the success of national soccer teams has already been published in Luckner et al. 
(2007).  
Parts of Chapter 5 which examines the impact of different incentive schemes on 
prediction accuracy have already been published in Luckner and Weinhardt (2007). 
Furthermore, drafts and ideas of this research have been presented at various 
conferences: Dagstuhl Seminar “Negotiation and Market Engineering” 2006, Schloss 
Dagstuhl, Germany (Luckner, 2006b); 2nd Workshop on Prediction Markets, San 
Diego, USA (Luckner, 2007a), Doctoral Consortium of the 8. Internationale Tagung 
Wirtschaftsinformatik 2007, Karlsruhe, Germany (Luckner, 2007b); European 
Regional Meeting of the Economic Science Association (ESA), Nottingham, UK 
(Luckner, 2006a). 
First ideas of the work on traders’ biases discussed in Chapter 6 have been presented at 
the Group Decision and Negotiation Conference 2007, Mt. Tremblant, Canada 
Introduction  8 
(Luckner, 2007c) and the 2007 Growth of Gambling and Prediction Markets 
Conference, Palm Desert, USA. 
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2. Prediction Markets 
This chapter provides an overview of prediction markets. First, Section 2.1 explains 
what prediction markets are and how they work. Furthermore, the theoretical 
foundations of prediction market are outlined. Section 2.2 describes their key design 
elements before Section 2.3 gives an overview of several fields of application that have 
been reported in literature. Finally, Section 2.4 briefly summarizes the chapter.  
2.1.  Fundamentals of Prediction Markets 
Throughout history business people have always tried to forecast the future to improve 
the performance of their companies. Commodity futures can be traced back to the 
Middle Ages when farmers and merchants faced the risk of price changes as a result of 
weather conditions or wars. In recent years, a relatively new approach for information 
aggregation has gained importance in the area of forecasting, namely prediction 
markets. Prediction markets bring a group of participants together and let them trade 
contracts whose payoff depends on the outcome of uncertain future events. The 
contracts thus represent a bet on the outcome of those future events. Once the outcome 
is known traders receive a cash payment in exchange for the contracts they hold.  
Several studies describe how such markets have been applied for predicting future 
events or developments in the field of politics (Forsythe et al., 1992), sports (Luckner et 
al., 2007), medicine (Polgreen et al., 2007), or entertainment (Pennock et al., 2000). 
Moreover, companies like Siemens or Hewlett-Packard have employed prediction 
markets in order to improve their decision making (Chen and Plott, 2002, Ortner, 
1997). This section contains a definition of what prediction markets are (2.1.1), a 
description of the operational principle of prediction markets (2.1.2) as well as the 
theoretical foundations of prediction markets (2.1.3). 
2.1.1. Definition of Prediction Markets 
In the academic literature, there is no universal definition of the term “prediction 
market”. Alternative terms used for the same concept include information markets, 
decision markets, idea futures, forecasting markets, artificial markets, electronic 
markets, and virtual stock markets. Figure 1 shows the number of research papers for 
different terms that are used to denominate the concept of prediction markets. The 
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definition of prediction markets used in this work is based on Berg et al. (Berg and 
Rietz, 2003, Berg et al., 2003). According to this definition, prediction markets are 
defined as markets that are run for “the primary purpose of aggregating information so 
that market prices forecast future events” (Berg and Rietz, 2003, p. 3). Moreover, 
prediction markets can also serve as decision support systems by providing information 
about the current situation or by evaluating effects of decisions over time (Berg and 
Rietz, 2003, Hanson, 1999).  
 
Figure 1: Number of research papers per term (Tziralis and Tatsiopoulos, 2007a) 
Although prediction markets that are designed for information aggregation and 
revelation are at the focus of this work, the distinction between these markets and stock 
markets or betting markets can become fuzzy. In contrast to prediction markets, 
however, stock markets are established with the primary purpose of allocating 
resources, trading risk, and raising capital. Information aggregation is only a pleasant 
byproduct of stock markets while prediction markets are usually not substantial enough 
in size to allow for a considerable extent of risk sharing even though they may take on 
this role as interest and depth increase (Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2004). Whereas 
contracts in stock markets are based on an underlying real asset, prediction markets 
create contracts which are linked to the outcomes of events but do not have any value 
by themselves. Betting markets, on the other hand, are first and foremost set up for 
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entertainment and tend to trade risk that is intrinsically enjoyable. Thus, the primary 
purpose of a market can probably be seen as the main distinctive feature between 
prediction markets, betting markets, and stock markets.  
2.1.2. Operational Principle of Prediction Markets 
Prediction markets are a new form of financial markets where contracts whose payoff 
depends on uncertain future events are traded. Traders buy and sell contracts based on 
their expectations regarding the likelihood of future events. Trading prices thus reflect 
the traders’ aggregated expectations on the outcome of uncertain future events and can 
be used to predict the likelihood of these events. The basic idea is that according to the 
efficient market hypothesis (Fama, 1970b) trading prices reflect all available 
information and the price mechanism serves as a means of aggregating the traders’ 
collective expectations.  
An example for the operational principle of prediction markets is shown in Figure 2. 
Suppose that the board of directors of a small deluxe car manufacturer needs reliable 
sales forecasts to adapt operational processes and minimize operational costs. All 
employees who have access to relevant information are given an initial endowment and 
access to the prediction market. Several contracts can be traded on this market. For 
example, the contract “500-600 cars in 2008” pays off 100 € if the company actually 
sells 500 to 600 cars in 2008; otherwise the pay-off is 0 €.  
Assume that at a certain point in time the contract trades at a price of 45 €. In this case 
the trading price denotes that the probability that the car manufacturer will sell 500 to 
600 cars in 2008 is assumed to be 45%. If a trader believes that the likelihood of selling 
500 to 600 cars in 2008 is 70%, he should buy (sell) contracts for any price lower 
(higher) than 70 €. Thus, the trader would buy contracts at a price of 45 €. 
As can be seen in this example a trader’s dissent from the aggregated expectation 
would provoke a transaction and consequently usually change the trading prices. The 
trading mechanism automatically executes matching orders, i.e. buy and sell orders that 
are overlapping or placed at the same price. It is natural to assume that the higher a 
trader considers the probability of an event, the higher is both his reluctance to sell and 
his willingness to pay. Hence, the trading price gives some indication of how likely the 
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traders as a group consider the event to occur.
contract “500-600 cars in 
be interpreted as the probability of 
Figure 2: Operational p
Depending on their performance, 
mentioned example, the trader bought 20 contracts 
45 € and finally received a payment of 100 € per contract since the company indeed 
sold between 500 and 600 cars in 2008.
participation and well-designed 
beliefs instead of their preferences. 
of a deluxe car among the employees 
rather not try to boost the sales forecasts of his favorite car since he would lose money 
in case he was overestimating sales figures. 
2.1.3. Hayek and Efficient 
The idea that trading mechanisms 
among traders traces back to Hayek 
centrally-planned economies do not have enough information to 
solution for resource allocation since
available resources and the preferences of people. 
 In this way, the trading price of the 
2008” should reflect all the traders’ information and can 
selling 500 to 600 cars in 2008.  
rinciple of prediction markets 
traders can either win or lose money. 
“500-600 cars in 2008”
 Therefore, prediction markets 
incentive schemes motivate traders
To give an example, even an enthusiastic 
of the above-mentioned car manufacturer 
 
Market Hypotheses 
could be used to aggregate information dispersed 
(Hayek, 1945). Hayek argued that planners in 
calculate an optimal 
 central planners need information about all 





 at a price of 
motivate 
 to reveal their 
supporter 
would 
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distribution of resources can only be maintained through the use of price signals in 
open markets. Accordingly, Hayek hypothesized that markets are the most efficient 
instrument to aggregate all the dispersed information of traders. Prices thus help to 
coordinate the separate actions of people.  
“While the exact method by which information gets into the market is unknown” (Plott, 
2000, p. 8), both theoretical and empirical research have found evidence that this 
process takes place. The efficient market hypothesis formulated by Eugene Fama states 
that stock “prices at any time ‘fully reflect’ all available information” (Fama, 1970b, p. 
383). This implies that no additionally available information can be combined with 
efficient prices to improve the prediction accuracy of a market. Moreover, in financial 
markets it is impossible to consistently outperform the market by using any information 
that the market already knows. There are three common forms of market efficiency 
(Jensen, 1978). While the weak form efficient market hypothesis asserts that prices 
reflect all information contained in historic prices of the market, the semi-strong form 
efficient market hypothesis asserts that prices reflect all publicly available information. 
Of course, this also includes the past history of prices. Finally, the strong form efficient 
market hypothesis suggests that all relevant information known to anyone is reflected 
by the prices. The semi-strong form of the efficient market hypothesis is the accepted 
paradigm whereas there is evidence inconsistent with the strong form (Jensen, 1978).  
Much of the enthusiasm for prediction markets derives from the efficient markets 
hypothesis due to the fact that contract prices reflect all information on the 
corresponding future event in an efficient prediction market and thus are the best 
predictor of future events. Information aggregation occurs when people can infer 
something from observing other traders’ believes and add that information to their own 
prior beliefs until there is a common knowledge equilibrium (McKelvey and Page, 
1990).  
Experimental research has tested the information aggregating properties of markets 
(e.g. Plott, 2000, Plott and Sunder, 1982, Plott and Sunder, 1988). In an experiment 
subjects traded contracts which paid 200 if the state was Y and 400 if the state was X 
with probabilities of 0.75 and 0.25. During so called informed states, some insiders 
knew the state of the world. As can be seen in Figure 3 prices in these markets 
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converged to the correct value when insiders were present and for the most part to the 
expected value of 250 if none of the traders were insiders. Thus, these markets were 
able to collect and broadcast information held by some of the traders (Plott, 2000).  
 
Figure 3: Information of insiders is revealed in trading prices (Plott, 2000) 
In real-world scenarios, however, knowledge is usually dispersed among traders. 
Consequently, the question arises whether markets can aggregate this dispersed 
information. Therefore, in another experiment every subject was given partial, private 
information. Collectively, the traders had almost perfect information regarding the 
correct state. The results show that information aggregation did also occur in this case 
(Plott, 2000).  
2.2. Key Design Elements of Prediction Markets 
Before studying more advanced applications of prediction markets, it is necessary to 
gain a basic understanding of their key design elements. Like any market, prediction 
markets have to be designed and implemented very carefully in order to ensure that 
they are suitable for aggregating traders’ information (Weinhardt et al., 2003, 
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Weinhardt et al., 2006a). The key design elements comprise the specification of 
contracts traded in a prediction market, the trading mechanism, and the incentives 
provided to ensure information revelation (Spann and Skiera, 2003). Moreover, 
diversity of information is required in order to provide a basis for trading (Wolfers and 
Zitzewitz, 2004). Disagreement among traders is desirable and the selection of traders 
is thus also considered a key design issue (Tziralis and Tatsiopoulos, 2007b). The 
following subsections describe these design elements in more detail.  
2.2.1. Contracts 
Prediction markets can be used to predict absolute numbers such as sales in a fiscal 
year, relative numbers such as market share, and the occurrence or non-occurrence of a 
particular event such as a natural disaster in a certain geographic region. The 
transformation of the forecasting goals into contracts should be carried out in a way 
that the contracts are clear and easily understood. Wolfers and Zitzewitz distinguish 
three basic types of contracts, namely “winner-take-all”, “index”, and “spread” 
contracts (Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2004).  
A winner-take-all contract pays of certain sum of money if an event occurs and doesn’t 
pay anything otherwise. As a result, the price of a winner-take-all contract can be 
interpreted as the traders’ aggregated expectation of the probability of the occurrence of 
a future event, for example the probability of a team winning a soccer match (Wolfers 
and Zitzewitz, 2006a).  
Index contracts link the payoff directly to a number such as the percentage of the 
popular vote that a candidate will receive in a political election. Thus, the trading price 
for such a contract represents the mean value that the market assigns to an outcome. 
Spread betting establishes a cutoff that defines the occurrence of an event such as 
whether a candidate receives more than a certain percentage of the popular vote. In 
consequence it reveals the market’s median expectation if contracts are designed in 
such a way that winners double their money while losers do not receive any payment. 
This is only a fair bet in case the payoff is as likely to occur as not.  
These are only the basic types of contracts and real-world prediction markets are 
making use of all kinds of variations of them. One important aspect with regard to the 
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design of contracts is to provide contingency resolutions if the underlying facts that 
determine the contract change or if the results become non-verifiable. To give an 
example, a prediction market could be employed to predict product sales in an 
accounting year. What happens if the company decides to stop selling the product due 
to a liability suit before the end of the year? Suchlike cases have to be considered when 
setting up a market.  
2.2.2. Trading Mechanisms 
The most integral aspect of any trading platform is how buyers and sellers are matched. 
The most widely used trading mechanism in the field of prediction markets is the 
continuous double auction (CDA). Alternative mechanisms are call auctions (CA), 
dynamic pari-mutuel markets (DPM), as well as market scoring rules (MSR). These 
mechanisms are briefly described in the following. Table 1 summarizes their 
advantages and disadvantages with regard to three desirable properties of trading 
mechanisms for prediction markets, namely continuous incorporation of information, 
guaranteed liquidity, and avoidance of financial risk for the market operator (Pennock, 
2004).  
Table 1: Comparison of trading mechanisms 
 CDA CA DPM MSR 
Continuous information 
incorporation 
Yes No Yes Yes 








Continuous Double Auction (CDA) 
So far, the continuous double auction (CDA) is the most commonly used trading 
mechanism in prediction markets. In case of a CDA, as known e.g. from continuous 
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trading at the electronic financial trading system Xetra of Deutsche Börse AG8, traders 
submit buy and sell orders which are executed immediately if they are executable 
against orders on the other side of the order book (Madhavan, 1992); if not, orders are 
queued in an order book and remain there until they expire, are matched with a 
counteroffer, or are removed. Usually, orders are executed according to price/time 
priority, i.e. buy orders with a higher limit and vice versa sell orders with a lower limit 
take priority. In case several orders were placed with the same limit the orders which 
were submitted earlier are executed first.  
One of the main advantages of using a CDA is the fact that markets with a CDA pose 
no financial risk for the market operators. Since it only matches willing traders all 
markets can be implemented as a zero-sum game (Spann and Skiera, 2003). As a 
consequence, this mechanism is especially popular among real-money exchanges. The 
Iowa Electronic Markets (IEM), for example, have started using the CDA in their 
markets in the late 1980ies (Forsythe et al., 1992). Moreover, the CDA allows for 
continuous information incorporation into prices and consequently traders are capable 
of quickly reacting to events in case of liquid markets. 
However, with few traders the markets may suffer from illiquidity, e.g. when many 
shares are traded or few traders are active in the market. Offers can then not be matched 
with counteroffers and therefore the bid-ask spread can be huge or order queues are 
empty (Hanson, 2003). Since most prediction markets have fewer participants than 
traditional financial markets, this limitation is particularly relevant for them. The 
trading mechanisms that are discussed in the following draw on different approaches to 
address the thin market problem.  
Call Auction (CA) 
In financial markets call auctions are used as an alternative trading mechanism. The 
electronic trading system Xetra of Deutsche Börse AG, for instance, uses a hybrid 
system of continuous double auctions and call auctions. While orders are executed 
immediately in continuous markets they are accumulated for simultaneous execution at 
a pre-determined point in time according to a priority rule, e.g. the principle of the 
highest executable volume, in call auctions (for an overview, see (Madhavan, 1992)). 
                                                 
8 http://www.xetra.com 
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Liquidity in illiquid low-volume markets can consequently be accumulated and focused 
on pre-determined execution times. Although trading in illiquid markets is also not 
possible as long as there is no matching counter offer, call auctions make it more 
difficult to move trading prices and thus influence the price formation with small 
transactions compared to continuous markets. Just like the CDA mechanism call 
auctions also pose no financial risk for the market operator. Due to periodic trading in 
call auctions, however, new information is not reflected immediately in trading prices.  
STOCCER9 was one of the very few prediction markets implementing call auctions. 
Thus, it remains an open question whether call auctions are suitable trading mechanism 
for prediction markets. Results from the STOCCER market suggest that traders prefer 
to trade in continuous markets. The trading activity measured by the number of trades 
per day was higher in case of the CDA than in the call auction market (Geyer-Schulz et 
al., 2007). This result is in line with the findings in financial markets where traders that 
are faced with the decision of choosing either form of market also prefer continuous 
markets (Kalay et al., 2002).  
Dynamic Pari-Mutuel Market (DPM) 
Dynamic pari-mutuel markets (DPM) are a hybrid between the above-mentioned 
continuous double auction and pari-mutuel markets which are e.g. traditionally 
employed for horse-race betting. In pari-mutuel markets money goes into a central pool 
and is later divided among the winners. This provides infinite liquidity and circumvents 
the thin-market problem of double auctions. There is no need for a matching offer from 
another trader. But one shortcoming of pari-mutuel markets is that there is no incentive 
to buy contracts early, especially not if new information is expected before the market 
closes. Purchasing contracts will also inform other traders. As a result, it is the best 
strategy to wait until the last possible moment to buy. “Prices” in consequence cannot 
be considered a reflection of current information.  
Pennock has developed the DPM mechanism in order to combine the infinite liquidity 
of pari-mutuel markets with a trading mechanism in which prices continuously react to 
new information (Pennock, 2004). The DPM offers infinite buy-in liquidity and thus 
acts as a one-sided market maker always offering to sell at some price and moving the 
                                                 
9 http://www.stoccer.com 
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price according to demand. Prices are computed using a price function which can differ 
depending on the properties that are desired. The DPM also does not exhibit any risk of 
losses for the market operator due to its redistribution of money. Moreover, it allows 
traders to lock in gains or limit losses by selling contracts in a CDA market. Selling still 
has to occur through a CDA mechanism because there is no market maker accepting 
sell offers. Nevertheless, traders can always “hedge-sell” by buying the opposite 
outcomes (Pennock, 2004).  
The DPM has been implemented in Yahoo’s Tech Buzz game10, a prediction market for 
high-tech products, concepts, and trend (Mangold et al., 2005). 
Market Scoring Rules (MSR) 
Hanson’s market scoring rule (MSR) acts like a two-sided market maker that also 
provides infinite liquidity for the sell side of the market with a variable but bounded 
maximum loss that can be regarded as a subsidy for the market (Hanson, 2003). Market 
scoring rules can be thought of as sequentially used proper scoring rules. An MSR 
maintains a probability distribution over all events. Any trader who believes the 
probabilities are wrong can change the current prediction by replacing it with a new 
prediction as long as the trader agrees to pay off the most recent person. If traders 
improve the prediction by moving the prices into the right direction they can expect a 
positive payoff, otherwise they will lose money. New information is hence reflected 
immediately.  
This MSR has already been implemented by exchanges such as InklingMarkets11 or the 
Washington Stock Exchange12.  
2.2.3. Incentives 
Appropriate incentives schemes are required to motivate participation and to ensure 
information revelation in prediction markets. The traders’ remuneration is crucial for 
the success of a market and consequently a key design element.  Previous research in 
the field of prediction markets has shown that play-money as well as real-money 
markets can predict future events to a remarkable degree of accuracy. One relevant 
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question is how much difference it actually makes whether markets are run with real 
money or with play money (Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2004). Even though one might 
intuitively expect the performance of play-money markets to be worse than the 
performance of real-money markets, some have argued that “play money exchanges 
may even outperform real-money exchanges because ‘wealth’ can only be accumulated 
through a history of accurate predictions” (Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2004). A study of the 
predictions of the 2003 NFL football season has shown that the real-money market 
TradeSports and the play-money market NewsFutures predicted outcomes equally well 
(Servan-Schreiber et al., 2004). 
Due to the legal restrictions on gambling many prediction markets nowadays rely on 
play money. Some traders may be intrinsically motivated but even in play-money 
markets the market operators can provide incentives such as a flat fee for participation 
or prizes for the largest play-money fortunes to remunerate traders. Chapter 5 discusses 
selected incentive schemes for play-money markets and their impact on the accuracy of 
prediction in more detail.  
2.2.4. Traders 
In the end, prediction markets only work if traders with relevant information join the 
market and trade. Market operators in consequence have to make sure they select 
traders with relevant information. One straightforward approach could be to invite 
experts who have access to information concerning the under study claims. This was 
usually done in corporate prediction markets, e.g. by Hewlett-Packard and Siemens 
(Chen and Plott, 2002, Ortner, 1997). These markets had only between 20 and 60 
traders and companies have repeatedly cited motivating employees to participate as an 
obstacle to a more wide-spread use of prediction markets (Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 
2004). However, inviting experts only has at least two downsides.  
Firstly, most prediction markets have very few participants compared to traditional 
financial markets. As a result, it is hard to fill an order book in a CDA market. The lack 
of offers to buy and sell limits the incentive for traders to reveal new information 
because they will have difficulty finding a trading partner. Replacing the widespread 
CDA by another trading mechanism is one approach to ensure that traders can profit 
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from new information without having to find a trading partner. This downside can 
therefore be by-passed with a suitable market design.  
Secondly and even more important, it is rather unlikely that there is a lot of 
disagreement among fully rational experts trading in a market. Disagreement about 
likely outcomes, however, is required to encourage trading (Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 
2004). Overconfident traders as well as an increase in noise trading should actually 
improve the accuracy of trading prices because this increases the rewards to informed 
trading – provided informed traders have deep pockets relative to the volume of noise 
trading. This is consistent with earlier research on prediction markets demonstrating 
that markets aggregate information and produce efficient outcomes despite biased 
individual traders (Forsythe et al., 1999). Also, experimental results confirm that 
manipulators in prediction markets are unable to distort price accuracy (Hanson et al., 
2006).  
Instead of limiting the pool of traders to knowledgeable experts one should thus try to 
attract more traders. If traders self-select to join a market they usually have relevant 
information about and considerable interest in the under study claims. Nevertheless, 
one should avoid running markets on topics where insiders may possess substantially 
superior information or where information is concentrated on very few people. Such 
markets have historically attracted very little attention (Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2004). 
Equilibrium prices may in this case not accurately reflect the true probabilities because 
informed traders do not completely reveal their information. This can be explained by 
the fact that few informed traders can frequently benefit from fluctuating trading prices 
repeatedly and thus do not reveal their information at once. The example shows that 
trading mechanisms such as the CDA may be ill-suited for small scale markets because 
the market design is not incentive compatible (Ledyard, 2006).  
2.3. Fields of Application 
This section gives an overview of previous fields of application of prediction markets 
that have been reported in the literature. Since it is all but impossible to consider the 
totality of earlier applications, the list of applications given in Table 2 was compiled 
based on an extended literature review which was recently published in the Journal of 
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Prediction Markets in an attempt to collect the totality of academic work related to 
prediction markets (Tziralis and Tatsiopoulos, 2007a).  
Table 2: Fields of application of prediction markets 








elections (e.g. Austria, 
France, Korea, 
Germany) 
Berg et al. (2001), Berg et al. 
(1996), Berg et al. (1997), Berg 
and Rietz (2003), Berg et al. 
Berg and Rietz (2006), 
Bondarenko and Bossaerts 
(2000), Erikson and Wlezien 
(2006), Forsythe et al. (1994), 
Forsythe et al. (1992), Forsythe 
et al. (1999), Fowler (2006), 
Kou and Sobel (2004), Oliven 
and Rietz (2004) 
UBC election 
stock market 
Provincial and federal 
elections in Canada 
Antweiler and Ross (1998),  
Forsythe et al. (1995), Forsythe 
et al. (1998) 
Swedish EU 
PSM 
Swedish 1994 EU 
referendum 
Bohm and Sonnegard (1999) 
GEM 90, GEM 
91, GEM 94, 
GEM 98 
Federal and regional 




State elections in 
Germany 
Hansen et al. (2004) 
Passauer 
Wahlbörse 
Federal elections in 
Germany 
Beckmann and Werding (1996) 
The Political 
Stock Market 
Federal and provincial 
elections in Germany 
Franke et al. (2006), Franke et 
al. (2005) 
NP02, TE03 National assembly and 
regional elections in 
Austria 




Elections for the 
national assembly in 
Filzmaier et al. (2003) 
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Austria’s membership in 
the EU, federal 
elections, governing 
coalition 
Ortner et al. (1995) 
PAM94 European Parliament 
and municipal councils 
in the Netherlands 




TradeSports Worldwide sports 
prediction market, e.g. 
baseball, soccer, 
football 
Chen et al. (2005), Rosenbloom 
and Notz (2006) , Servan-
Schreiber et al. (2004) 
NewsFutures Sports (e.g. baseball, 
football, soccer), 
political elections 
Chen et al. (2005) , 
Rosenbloom and Notz (2006), 




hockey, basketball etc. 
Debnath et al. (2003) 
Betfair Soccer, tennis, horse 
racing, etc. 





Box office performance 
of movies 
Gruca et al. (2003), Pennock et 
al. (2001b), Pennock et al.  
(2001a) 
CMXX Success of movies, 
music CD’s and video 
games in Germany 
Skiera and Spann (2004) 
Economic 
Derivatives 
Retail sales, GDP, 
international trade 
balance, growth in 
payrolls 




concepts, and trends 
Mangold et al. (2005) 
Foresight 
Exchange 
Future developments in 
science and technology 
Pennock et al. (2001b), 
Pennock et al.  (2001a) 
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Table 2 comprises all applications of the prediction market concept that were reported 
in journal articles, books or book chapters, and conference proceedings papers 
referenced in the aforementioned literature review. Pure lab experiments where signals 
are e.g. drawn from an urn were not taken into consideration. The applications were 
grouped into three categories: political stock markets, sports prediction markets, and 
other applications. Due to the fact that most of the longest running prediction markets 
were originally set up to forecast political elections or the outcome of sports 
tournaments, academic research has largely concentrated on political stock markets and 
sports prediction markets. The following subsections provide some more information 
on the three categories of applications.  
2.3.1. Political Stock Markets 
Beside early introductory articles by Hanson (Hanson, 1990a, Hanson, 1990b, Hanson, 
1992), most of the literature on prediction markets up until 1998 is on political stock 
markets. The most cited and earliest application of a political stock market on the 
internet, the Iowa Electronic Markets (IEM 13 ), was established in 1988 by the 
University of Iowa. The IEM were designed to give students a hands-on experience in 
trading and to study market dynamics. The first academic article on the IEM was 
published in 1992 (Forsythe et al., 1992). IEM focussed on US presidential and state 
elections, but the platform was also used to run political stock markets on elections e.g. 
in Austria, France, Korea, and Germany. Predictions derived from IEM trading prices 
have been more accurate than their natural benchmark, namely polls, although traders 
exhibit biases (Berg et al., 2001, Forsythe et al., 1999). Moreover, trading prices react 
extremely quickly to new information (Berg and Rietz, 2006). In the meanwhile the 
IEM are not only used for predicting the outcome of political elections but also in order 
to predict e.g. economic indicators. Beside predicting uncertain future events the IEM 
were also studied as a decision support system where decisions are made based on 
trading prices (Berg and Rietz, 2003).  
Other political stock markets in Canada (e.g. Antweiler and Ross, 1998), Sweden 
(Bohm and Sonnegard, 1999), Germany (e.g. Beckmann and Werding, 1996), and 
Austria (e.g. Ortner et al., 1995) have been set up with a similar research focus. 
                                                 
13 http://www.biz.uiowa.edu/iem/ 
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Furthermore, these markets were also used to study manipulation in prediction markets 
(Hansen et al., 2004). All in all, political stock markets have in many cases 
outperformed traditional polls (Berg et al., 2001). Due to this reason they have received 
quite a lot of attention in the media and several publishing houses have already been 
running their own markets (Filzmaier et al., 2003).  
2.3.2. Sports Prediction Markets 
Sports prediction markets like Betfair.com 14 , the World Sports Exchange 15 , 
NewsFutures 16 , and TradeSports 17  are among the most popular prediction markets. 
These markets focus on forecasting the outcome of sports tournaments and events. 
Among popular sports are e.g. baseball, soccer, football, hockey, basketball, tennis, and 
horse racing. Although NewsFutures, for instance, does also operate markets on 
politics, financial markets, or the movie business, contracts on sports events are usually 
the most popular topics. Earlier studies on sports prediction markets show that these 
markets provide at least as accurate predictions as experts (Chen et al., 2005, Servan-
Schreiber et al., 2004). In accordance with the efficient market hypothesis game events 
are quickly resulting in changes of trading prices. Smith et al. (2006) find that markets 
on UK horse racing exhibit both weak and strong form of market efficiency.  
One precondition for exploiting the potential of prediction markets is to provide 
incentives for participation and information revelation. Therefore, prediction markets 
such as the IEM require real-money investment from traders. In case of the IEM these 
investments are limited to a maximum amount of US$ 500. As was already mentioned 
in Section 2.2.3 two articles in the field of sports prediction markets, however, show 
that there is no significant difference in terms of prediction accuracy between play-
money and real-money prediction markets (Rosenbloom and Notz, 2006, Servan-
Schreiber et al., 2004).  
2.3.3. Other Applications 
Nowadays, prediction markets are increasingly employed in innovative fields of 
application beyond political stock markets and sports prediction markets. One popular 
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example is the Hollywood Stock Exchange (HSX18), a prediction market where traders 
forecast box office revenues of films, both for opening weekends and beyond. 
CMXX.com was a similar market operated in Germany to predict the success of 
movies, music CD’s, and video games (Skiera and Spann, 2004). Pennock et al. 
(2001a) demonstrate that trading prices in the HSX movie markets are good predictors 
of the box office performance of movies. Based on these forecasts the movie industry 
can then make decisions on how to allocate advertising based on expected box office 
revenues. This demonstrates how companies can use prediction markets to make better 
informed decisions.  
Apart from predicting box office revenues markets can be used broadly for predicting 
the success of all kinds of new products (Gruca et al., 2003). Successful examples for 
such markets are the simExchange 19 , a market for predicting the sales of console 
hardware and upcoming video games, or an internal market run by Eli Lilly to find out 
which drugs will be most successful (Kiviat, 2004). Prediction markets can thus be seen 
as an alternative to traditional marketing research techniques. Spann et al. (2007) show 
that prediction markets are also useful for identifying lead users with superior abilities 
to forecast the market success of new products. Their idea is that lead users perform 
better than average traders on prediction markets. The percentage of lead users among 
the best performing traders is similar to the percentage found in survey-based 
screening.  
Another interesting field of application is the prediction of macroeconomic data such as 
retail sales, GDP, international trade balance, and the growth in payrolls. For this 
purpose a market called “Economic Derivatives 20 ” was launched in 2002. A first 
analysis shows that the expectations reflected in trading prices are similar to survey-
based predictions (Gürkaynak and Wolfers, 2006).  
Up to now, prediction markets were mostly applied to forecast events in the near future. 
Determining the payoff of a particular contract is then straightforward as soon as the 
outcome becomes known. Yet, some of the earlier research also proposes the use of 
prediction markets for forecasting events in the distant future (Hanson, 1992). One 
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market for predicting long-term developments in science, technology, and other fields 
of public interest is the Foresight Exchange21 (Pennock et al., 2001a). Contracts traded 
in this market range from technical to socio-political issues. Another market for long-
term predictions which is exploiting the potential of prediction markets to continuously 
update trading prices is the Tech Buzz Game22. Yahoo Research sponsors this market 
which lets traders predict the technologies that internet users will be searching the web 
for in the future (Mangold et al., 2005). One market could be trading contracts on rival 
technologies such as web browsers. These contracts then pay a weekly dividend 
relative to the number of search requests. In the long term, the market closes if the topic 
becomes uninteresting and the contracts will then be liquidated for cash. One of the 
goals of the Tech Buzz Game is to test dynamic pari-mutuel markets which were 
discussed in Section 2.2.2 in the field.  
Other prominent examples of companies using prediction markets internally are 
Hewlett-Packard where traders produced more accurate forecasts of printer sales than 
the company’s forecasting team (Chen and Plott, 2002) or Siemens where software 
developers predicted the completion date of a huge software project (Ortner, 1997).  
2.4. Summary 
This chapter gave a short introduction to the field of prediction markets. The term 
prediction market as it is understood in this work was defined. Moreover, the 
theoretical foundations as well as the operational principle of prediction markets were 
described.  
Like any other market, prediction markets have to be designed carefully. The key 
design elements, namely the contracts traded in a market, the trading mechanisms, 
incentives for traders to participate and reveal their expectations, as well as the 
selection of traders have been introduced. In addition, several design alternatives for 
each of these design elements have been briefly discussed.  
At the end of the chapter, the main fields of application of prediction markets that have 
been reported in literature were presented. So far, academic literature for a large part 
                                                 
21 http://www.ideosphere.com 
22 http://buzz.research.yahoo.com 
Prediction Markets 28 
focussed on political stock markets although numerous companies have already made 
use of internal corporate prediction markets. This can probably be explained by the fact 
that companies do oftentimes not want to make their experiences public. Concerning 
the field of sports prediction markets there are up to now only very few research 
papers.  
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3. STOCCER – A 2006 FIFA World Cup Prediction 
Market 
This chapter describes a 2006 FIFA World Cup prediction market called STOCCER. 
Most of the data which is used to answer the research questions in the following three 
chapters comes from the STOCCER prediction market. Section 3.1 describes the FIFA 
World Cup 2006 itself before Section 3.2 presents the STOCCER exchange including 
its key design elements as well as information about traders and the trading activity. 
Section 3.3 outlines the trading software which was used as the basis of the STOCCER 
prediction market. Finally, Section 3.4 briefly summarizes the chapter.  
3.1. The FIFA World Cup 2006 
The most important soccer tournament worldwide in 2006, the FIFA World Cup, was 
held in Germany from June 9th to July 9th 2006 with 32 participating national teams 
which had qualified for the tournament. The tournament was organized in two stages – 
a group stage and a knock-out stage. All in all, 48 matches were played in the group 
stage and 16 in the knock-out stage, resulting in a total of 64 matches.  
In the group stage the teams played round robin in eight groups of four to qualify for 
the knock-out stage. The winning team of a match received three points, the losing 
team received zero points, and in case of a draw after 90 minutes each team received 
one point. The two most successful teams in each group advanced to the knock-out 
stage. If two or more teams achieved the same number of points the direct comparison, 
i.e. the results of the match(es) against each other, was used as a tie-breaker. Further 
subordinate tie-breakers are the difference between the numbers of goals scored and 
received, the total number of goals scored in the group stage, the FIFA country 
coefficient from the FIFA world ranking, and finally tossing a coin.  
In the knock-out stage, which started on June 24, the winning team of a group played 
the second of one of the remaining groups. All the matches in the knock-out stage were 
played in a sudden death system. Additionally, one game was played for the third place 
between the losers of the two semi-final games. In case of a draw after regular time in 
the knock-out stage the match was continued for an extra time of two times fifteen 
STOCCER – A 2006 FIFA World Cup Prediction Market 30 
minutes. If a match was still not decided after extra time, there were penalty shootouts. 
The winner of a match in the knock-out stage advanced to the next round. Figure 4 
shows all the 16 matches from the knock-out stage of the FIFA World Cup 2006. 
 
Figure 4: Knock-out stage of the FIFA World Cup 2006 
The tournament was won by Italy, defeating France in a penalty shootout after extra 
time finished in a draw. Germany defeated Portugal to finish third. After the sometimes 
surprising 2002 tournament, the FIFA World Cup 2006 was dominated by traditional 
soccer powers. Six former champions took part in the quarter finals with Ukraine and 
Portugal remaining as the only relative outsiders.  
3.2. The STOCCER Exchange 
STOCCER was operated before and during the 2006 FIFA World Cup in order to 
predict the outcome of the tournament, the outcome of particularly exiting matches, and 
the tournament’s top goal scorer. In total, more than 1.700 traders registered with the 
play-money prediction market STOCCER23. The first market started on May 15th 2006 
and ran until the end of the FIFA World Cup on July 9th 2006. The trading platform 
                                                 
23 http://www.stoccer.com. The STOCCER project was funded by the German Federal Ministry for 
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was open to the public 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. On average, there were more 
than 1,600 trades per day with a total number of about 90,000 trades. The continuous 
increase in the number of registered users as well as the development of the trading 
activity through time is illustrated in Figure 5. The upsurge in the number of users and 
the number of trades per day around June 9th 2006 can without much doubt be 
explained as follows. First of all, the opening match took place that day and 
consequently there was a lot of interest in the tournament. Furthermore, several 
newspaper articles on the STOCCER exchange were published at that time and the 
markets were thus made known to a larger audience.  
 
Figure 5: Number of users and trading activity over time 
The following subsections describe the key design elements of our markets, i.e. the 
contracts that were traded, the trading mechanisms, the incentive schemes, and the 
group of traders, in more detail.  
3.2.1. Contracts 
In total, we ran 19 markets – 16 markets for the 16 matches in the final rounds starting 
with the round of sixteen, two markets to predict the tournament’s top goal scorer, and 
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in the FIFA World Cup 2006 were traded. These three types of markets are also shown 
in Table 3 with some more information on the number of contracts that were traded in 
each of the markets, market start and end time, as well as information on how the 
contracts were valued at the close of the market.  
Table 3:  Markets operated during the FIFA World Cup 2006 
Type Number of 
contracts 
Payoff Start time End time 
Championship 1 per country 
(32) 
World champion: 50 
Vice-WC: 30 
Semi finals: 20 
Quarter finals: 10 




July 9th 2006 
Match 3 per match: 
team A wins, 
team B wins, tie 
after 2nd half 





At the end 
of the 
matches 




July 9th 2006 
 
In case of the first type of markets, namely the championship market, the 32 contracts 
of the national soccer teams were valued as follows at the close of the market: 50 
virtual currency units for the world champion, 30 for the runner-up, 20 for all the teams 
dropping out in the semi finals, 10 for those dropping out in the quarter finals, and 5 for 
all those dropping out in the round of 16. All shares of the remaining 16 teams were 
worthless in the end. The championship market started about three weeks before the 
first match of the FIFA World Cup 2006 and was closed immediately after the final on 
July 9th 2006. It was the only market which was online for the complete time period of 
the world championship.  
More than 1,260 traders submitted orders to this market and in total there were more 
than 80,000 trades. The total number of trades per contract is depicted in Figure 6. 
Among the most heavily traded contracts are mainly traditional soccer powers such as 
France, Germany, Brazil, and Argentina. One reason for the relatively high number of 
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trades in case of “Angola” could be that contracts in the order input mask were sorted 
alphabetically and the contract of Angola was thus listed first.  
 
Figure 6: Number of trades in the championship market 
The second type of markets, namely the match markets, focused on predicting the 
outcome of matches in the final rounds. For the 16 matches in the final rounds there 
were three contracts per match. This is because the following three possible outcomes 
for every match were defined: Either one of the two national teams won or there was a 
draw after the second half. The third contract (“draw”) was introduced although there 
were no draws possible in the final rounds of the tournament. The reason for this was 
that overtimes and penalty shootouts were not considered as their outcomes can be 
regarded as more or less unpredictable. This is also rather common in case of sports 
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betting with professional bookmakers. Trading started two days before the matches and 
was stopped immediately after the second half of the matches. The contract 
corresponding to the event that actually occurred was valued at 10 virtual currency 
units after the match; the other two contracts were worthless. 
Data on the trading activity in the 16 match markets is given in Figure 7 which shows 
the number of traders as well as the number of trades per match market. On average, 
there were about 110 traders per market who submitted orders during the two days the 
markets were open. With 120 trades only “Switzerland-Ukraine” was the match with 
the smallest number of trades. The most liquid market was the semi final “Portugal-
France” with nearly 900 trades. On average, there were about 450 trades per match 
market.  
 
Figure 7: Trading activity in the match markets 
The idea behind the third type of markets, namely the two goal scorer markets, was to 
predict the top goal scorer of the whole tournament. The contract of the top goal scorer 
was valued at 100 virtual currency units; all other contracts were valued at 0. If there 
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at 100 virtual currency units divided by the number of those players. Initially, the goal 
scorer market was started with a pre-determined set of players on June 6th 2006. 
Additionally, there was a contract "other", which was split into two contracts as soon as 
a player which had so far not been traded in the market scored his third goal. In this 
case, a contract corresponding to the new player was introduced to the market. If a 
trader had shares in "other" in his deposit at this point in time, he received an additional 
contract of the new player automatically.  
In order to study the impact of the trading mechanism on the prediction accuracy and 
the trading behavior there were two goal scorer markets – one market with a continuous 
double auction and a second market with a call auction. Traders were free to choose 
any of the two markets for buying and selling their contracts in individual players. 
Figure 8 depicts the number of trades over time in both markets.  
 
Figure 8: Distribution of trades per day over time 
It is obvious that the trading activity measured by the number of trades per day was 
higher in case of the CDA market than in the call market. On average, there were more 
than 78 trades per day in the CDA compared to 31 trades per day in the call auction. In 
total, there were 1886 trades in the CDA market compared to 738 trades in the call 
market. For some reason traders seem to prefer trading in the CDA market. Looking at 
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the number of traders that had at least one trade in the respective market the CDA 
market with 197 traders also outnumbers the call market with 179 traders.  
3.2.2. Trading Mechanisms 
Concerning the financial market design, two different trading mechanisms were used in 
STOCCER – continuous double auctions (CDA) and a call auction. These two trading 
mechanisms were already roughly explained in Section 2.2.2. The only non-CDA 
market was one of the two goal scorer markets. Since this market is of no particular 
importance for answering the research questions addressed in this work it is not 
described in more detail. All of the other markets, i.e. the championship market, the 16 
match markets, as well as the second goal scorer market, employed a CDA in 
combination with limit orders.  
Upon registration each trader was assigned 100 shares of each contract traded in any of 
the markets as well as a cash account of 100,000 virtual currency units and was thus 
able to trade instantly. Additional shares were issued by means of so called basic 
portfolios (Forsythe et al., 1992). A basic portfolio contains one share of every contract 
which is traded in the respective market. The portfolio price equals the sum of the 
payoffs for one share of every contract in a market and was e.g. 10 virtual currency 
units in case of the match markets. It thus corresponded to the payoff for correctly 
predicting the outcome of a match. Buying and selling portfolios from and to the 
market operators was therefore risk free for traders and possible at any time while the 
markets were operating. 
Traders submitted offers to buy (bids) or offers to sell (asks). Bids and asks were 
maintained in queues with a price/time priority, i.e. they were first ordered by price and 
then by time. Offers remained in the queues until (i) they were withdrawn by the 
traders, (ii) their lifetime as defined by the trader had expired, or (iii) they were 
matched with a counter offer. The trades were automatically executed as soon as bid 
and ask prices in the respective queues were overlapping. When a bid was submitted at 
a price equal to or exceeding the current minimum price in the ask queue, a trade was 
executed at the ask price. Analogously, when a sell offer was submitted at a price equal 
to or less than the current maximum price in the bid queue, a trade was executed at the 
bid price. In case there were two or more offers at the same price, the earliest offer 
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submitted to the market was executed first. Since the system did not analyze the 
traders’ identities a trader could also trade against himself. Short sales were disallowed 
by the system. Moreover, submitting offers with insufficient funds in the cash account 
as well as offers to sell when the trader’s portfolio did not contain the corresponding 
number of shares in a contract were prevented.  
3.2.3. Incentives 
In contrast to traditional betting exchanges for sports events the prediction market 
STOCCER was operated as a play-money market. Setting up a real-money sports 
prediction markets is currently not legal in Germany. Instead of investing real money 
every trader had an initial endowment of 100,000 virtual currency units as well as 100 
shares of each contract. The only extrinsic incentives for traders to join the market and 
reveal their expectations were a ranking of their user names on the STOCCER web 
page and a lottery of prizes. The overall TOP-100 traders, i.e. the 100 traders with the 
highest deposit value after the final of the FIFA World Cup on July 9th 2006, took part 
in a final lottery where the first prizes were shares of the “Garantiefonds UniGarant 
Deutschland (2012)” investment fund with a value of 3,000, 2,000, and 1,000 Euro. 
Traders thus had a rather strong incentive to be among the 100 traders with the highest 
deposit value. In addition, we weekly raffled an iPod among the 20 most active traders 
of the preceding week.  
The most successful trader was able to increase his deposit value by almost 900% 
between May 15th 2006 and July 9th 2006. At the other extreme, several traders lost 
almost 100% of their initial deposit value. General terms and conditions were used to 
prevent traders from creating multiple user accounts and trading against themselves in 
order to transfer cash from one account to another. Traders were not allowed to register 
more than once. Furthermore, the use of any kind of software for automated actions 
was prohibited. Several traders violated these terms and conditions and were 
disqualified.  
3.2.4. Traders 
Participation in STOCCER was voluntary. In total, more than 1,700 traders enrolled in 
the prediction market. During the registration process traders provided information 
about their gender, age, and country of origin. Traders were predominantly male and 
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quite young compared to the total population of their countries of origin. Almost 89% 
of the traders were male. Table 4 shows the traders’ age distribution. Traders of age 30 
and younger account for almost 57% of the total number of traders. 
Table 4:  Age distribution of traders 
Age Number of traders Proportion of traders Year of birth 
<= 20 96 5.26% >= 1987 
20-25 486 26.64% 1982-1986 
26-30 454 24.89% 1977-1981 
31-35 232 12.72% 1972-1976 
36-40 155 8.50% 1967-1971 
41-45 137 7.51% 1962-1966 
46-50 111 6.09% 1957-1961 
51-55 69 3.78% 1952-1956 
51-60 38 2.08% 1947-1951 
>= 60 46 2.52% <= 1946 
 
Since STOCCER was operated and made known in Germany traders coming from this 
country also formed the largest group of traders. Overall, traders originated from 72 
different countries around the world. As can be seen in Figure 9 about two thirds of the 
traders were German.  
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Other countries with a substantial number of traders were Switzerland (235 traders), 
USA (56 traders), Belgium (55 traders), Austria (33 traders), UK (20 traders), China 
(15 traders), and Italy (15 traders). 
After the FIFA World Cup all of the traders were asked to complete a brief web-based 
survey to provide descriptive information amongst others about their knowledge and 
interest in soccer as well as their experience in securities trading. 74 traders completed 
this survey. Three quarters of these traders saw 16 or more matches during the FIFA 
World Cup live on TV. 13 out of the 74 traders saw even more than 45 matches on TV 
during a period of four weeks only. Thus, they seem to be rather enthusiastic about 
soccer. Several traders also appear to be rather experienced in securities trading. More 
than 55% of the traders who completed the survey hold a portfolio of securities and 
about 10% of them trade quite a lot in financial markets, i.e. they conduct more than 20 
transactions per year. 27% of the traders completing the survey were even familiar with 
the concept of prediction markets and had already participated in other prediction 
markets. 
3.3. The Trading Software 
In addition to the key design elements of the STOCCER prediction market described in 
the previous section one also has to design the web-based trading software as well as 
the facilities provided for obtaining information about the traders’ accounts, the 
different markets, offers, and trades from a technical point of view. STOCCER had to 
meet numerous functional and non-functional requirements such as running several 
prediction markets simultaneously, each of them in multiple languages, or enabling 
different trading mechanisms for different markets. A fairly flexible platform was 
needed since it should be easy to reuse in other fields of application such as e.g. market 
research. Due to the large number of users the software platform also had to be 
scalable.  
In order to fulfill all the requirements the STOCCER trading software was based on 
two existing trading platforms and thus integrated the functionality of these systems. 
The two platforms were the political stock market PSM24, a field-tested platform which 
                                                 
24 http://psm.em.uni-karlsruhe.de 
STOCCER – A 2006 FIFA World Cup Prediction Market 40 
was in the past primarily used for predicting the outcomes of political elections (Franke 
et al., 2005), and meet2trade 25 , a generic electronic trading platform that realizes 
innovative trading features such as bundle trading and enables traders to individually 
configure their own electronic market (Weinhardt et al., 2006b, Weinhardt et al., 2005). 
The most liquid market, i.e. the championship market, was operated based on the PSM 
while all the match markets and the goal scorer markets were run with the meet2trade 
trading platform. Depending on the market a user wanted to trade in he was forwarded 
to a trading screen provided by either of the two trading platforms.  
The traders of course should not take notice of the fact that STOCCER was built on 
two existing platforms. Thus, a web interface with exactly the same look and feel for 
both trading platforms was implemented. An example of the main trading screen is 
shown in Figure 10.  
Market information available to traders included the accumulated bids at the highest 
three bid prices, the accumulated asks at the lowest three ask prices, the last trading 
price, and charts showing the price history of all contracts. Moreover, a short 
description of the market comprising the respective payoff function was shown as part 
of the trading screen. An alert service informed traders via e-mail in case individual 
price limits which had been predefined by the respective trader were exceeded. 
Available account information for individual traders included the number of shares held 
in each contract, the balance of the cash account, the total value of their deposit, a list 
of outstanding buy and sell orders, as well as a list of trades.  
A ranking of all the traders sorted by their deposit value, i.e. the balance of their cash 
account plus the value of the contracts they held at the specific point in time, was not 
part of the trading screen but was separately displayed on the STOCCER web portal 
www.stoccer.com. This portal also provided more information on the prizes traders 
could win, the operational principle of the prediction market including a tutorial and 
frequently asked questions, as well as up-to-date soccer news related to the FIFA 
World Cup 2006. All the information from the trading screen and the portal was 
available in four languages, namely German, English, French, and Spanish. 
                                                 
25 http://www.meet2trade.com 
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Figure 10: Trading screen of STOCCER 
Because the PSM and meet2trade are not based on the same technology, the two 
trading platforms were integrated on the database level. As can be seen in Figure 11 
both systems accessed the same PostgreSQL database. All the required data such as 
user data was shared by the PSM and meet2trade, so that a trader had to register only 
once and was then granted access to both of the underlying trading platforms. The 
dividing rule between the two platforms was the type of contract which was traded. 
This means that contracts traded in the championship market – which was operated 
based on the PSM – were not at the same time traded in other markets run by 
meet2trade and vice versa. Nevertheless, the traders’ deposits had to be integrated 
because both platforms made use of the same cash account. Coordinating the trading 
activity was consequently required in the sense that e.g. the total volume of a trader’s 
buy orders in both systems was not allowed to exceed the amount of money in his cash 
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account. Both trading platforms 
adding new markets and contracts
As Figure 11 shows the common PostgreSQL database
machine and was accessed from the two machines which were used to run the two 
trading platforms PSM and meet2trade (m2t). The STOCCER web portal was bu
using the TYPO3 Content Management System
separate MySQL database
Figure 11: Hardware and software architecture of STOCCER
Running these software systems on four different machines was required to cope with 
the system load. In order to guarantee the continuous operational availability of the 
STOCCER trading software a fifth machine was ready to take over the tasks performed 
by one of the forth other machines at any time. 
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databases had to be replicated on the fifth machine because the data might otherwise be 
lost forever or at least be temporarily unavailable.  
3.4. Summary 
This chapter described the sports prediction market STOCCER which was operated by 
the Universität Karlsruhe (TH) in collaboration with the University of Frankfurt before 
and during the FIFA World Cup 2006 in Germany. Most of the data which is used to 
answer the research questions in the following three chapters comes from the 
STOCCER markets. 
STOCCER was presented along the lines of the key design elements that have already 
been introduced in Chapter 2. Markets were run in order to predict the outcome of the 
tournament as a whole, the outcome of specific matches, and the tournament’s top goal 
scorer. All but one market were using a continuous double auction trading mechanism. 
In general, one can presumably say that the markets did not suffer from illiquidity 
compared to other prediction markets run by academic institutions. In order to provide 
incentives for traders from all over the world – with the largest share coming from 
Germany – prizes were raffled among the most successful and the most active traders. 
The chapter concluded with a brief description of the trading software which was used 
for running the markets and which has in the meanwhile also been used in other fields 
of application.  
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4. Empirical Evidence of Prediction Accuracy 
Accurate forecasts are essential in various fields of application such as supply chain 
management, technology forecasting, economic forecasting, or product forecasting. 
Product forecasting which aims at predicting the level of success of a new product is 
particularly suitable to demonstrate the importance of accurate predictions for 
corporations. Predictions in this context must take into account aspects like product 
awareness, distribution channels, prices, competitive alternatives, and consumer 
behavior. Inaccurate predictions can result in considerable costs for a company and 
may weaken its position compared to its competitors in the market. In particular, 
predicting demands for products with short product life cycles or predicting sales in 
unstable market situations is challenging (Spann and Skiera, 2003). In the past, flop 
rates of new products were high, oftentimes surpassing 50% (e.g. Urban and Hauser, 
1993). Thus, reducing flop rates by means of more accurate predictions can have a 
huge impact on the profits and increase the competitive advantages of a company.  
The application of prediction markets is a new approach which can be used for product 
forecasting and beyond. One of the main reasons for the emergence of prediction 
markets is that markets have done well in comparison with other forecasting methods 
(Hanson, 2006). Horse race markets, for instance, beat horse race experts (Figlewski, 
1979) and Oscar markets beat columnists (Pennock et al., 2001b). Usually, prediction 
markets tend to perform at least as well as the single best individual, without requiring 
a priori knowledge of whom that individual is (Surowiecki, 2004). Prediction markets 
are thus considered to provide a method to improve prediction accuracy compared to 
traditional forecasting methods.  
This chapter provides evidence of their prediction accuracy in general and in the field 
of sports forecasting in particular. Earlier empirical research substantiates the predictive 
power of markets relative to traditional forecasting methods such as expert opinions or 
polls in various fields of application. Data collected from the play-money prediction 
market STOCCER for the FIFA World Cup 200629 is used to empirically compare the 
prediction accuracy of sports prediction markets to (i) random predictors, (ii) 
                                                 
29 STOCCER was presented in detail in the chapter 3.  
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predictions that are based on historic soccer data about the success of national soccer 
teams, as well as (iii) betting odds from professional bookmakers. Thus, this chapter 
contributes to the literature by providing the first empirical comparison of play-money 
prediction markets with predictions based on historic data or betting odds in the field of 
sports forecasting.  
The idea behind using these three benchmarks is the following: Forecasts of prediction 
markets are driven by the traders’ information and expectations. These forecasts are 
worthless if they do not result in better predictions than randomly drawing possible 
outcomes. Thus, random predictors are used as a first benchmark to evaluate the 
prediction accuracy of the STOCCER markets. Beside historic data, traders also 
consider current information available to them as well as ongoing developments within 
the course of the tournament. Using predictions based on the historic success of 
national soccer teams as a second benchmark allows for examining whether markets 
are superior to these predictions by incorporating additional information. Within the 
scope of this research, the FIFA world ranking30 is used as it is calculated based on pure 
historic data. Betting odds serve as a third benchmark since they are well-established in 
sports and known for being very efficient (cp. Gandar et al., 1998, Pope and Peel, 
1989). Fixed-odds betting differs from prediction markets since the odds are 
determined by experts, i.e. the bookmakers, and bettors can only decide whether or not 
to place a bet at the given price. In prediction markets, in contrast, prices reflect the 
traders’ aggregated expectations and can be changed by any trader with deviating 
expectations.  
Prediction markets should work well if they are efficient, and in efficient markets, one 
does not expect arbitrage opportunities to be persistent. Beyond the comparison of 
prediction accuracy, this chapter therefore also studies whether pure arbitrage 
opportunities existed in STOCCER. Moreover, market liquidity can become an issue in 
prediction markets since new information is potentially not immediately reflected in 
trading prices and traders might also lose interest in the markets if those are illiquid. It 
is therefore analyzed whether traders try to exploit illiquidity by taking on the role of 
market makers in prediction markets.  
                                                 
30 http://www.fifa.com/worldfootball/ranking/ 
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The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.1 presents related work 
on the analysis of the prediction accuracy of markets in general as well as markets for 
sports forecasting in particular. Section 4.2 then describes how predictions for the 
outcome of specific soccer matches are derived from trading prices in the STOCCER 
markets. It also presents the data which is used to compare play-money prediction 
markets to alternative forecasting methods. In Section 4.3, the prediction accuracy of 
the STOCCER prediction markets is analyzed by comparing the predictions to a 
random predictor, predictions derived from the FIFA world ranking, and betting odds. 
Furthermore, it is analyzed whether pure arbitrage opportunities existed and whether 
traders acted as market makers. Section 4.4 discusses the results before Section 4.5 
briefly summarizes the main findings of this chapter.  
4.1. Related Work 
A large body of earlier research in the field of prediction markets focuses on evaluating 
their prediction accuracy in absolute terms or relative to alternative forecasting 
methods. The results reported in Section 4.1.1 are at large convincing and provide 
evidence that non-sports prediction markets do well in comparison with other 
forecasting methods. Since the focus of this chapter is on the prediction accuracy of 
sports prediction markets, previous studies from this field of application are discussed 
separately in Section 4.1.2.  
4.1.1. Non-Sports Prediction Markets 
As already mentioned in Section 2.3.1, a large share of the literature on prediction 
markets treats political stock markets. It is thus not surprising that several articles on 
the prediction accuracy of political stock markets in absolute terms and relative terms 
compared to opinion polls have been published since 1988. In 1988, prediction markets 
were for the first time introduced as an alternative to traditional opinion polls in order 
to predict the outcome of the presidential election in the US. The 1988 US-presidential 
market almost perfectly predicted the candidates’ vote share (Forsythe et al., 1992). 
The actual vote share and the vote share predicted via the market are depicted in Table 
5 31 . Bush’s vote share was predicted accurately to a tenth. Moreover, the market 
underestimated the Dukakis vote share by two tenths of a percentage point and 
                                                 
31 The last column contains the predicted shares of the vote as predicted by the IPSM market. 
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overestimated the combined strength of all remaining candidates by six tenths of a 
percentage point. Altogether, this prediction was almost perfect.  
Table 5: 1988 US presidential elections and forecasts (Forsythe et al., 1992) 
 
Since then, over the last four presidential elections prior to 2004 the Iowa Electronic 
Markets (IEM) have predicted vote shares with an average absolute error of around 1.5 
percentage points while the final Gallup poll erred by 2.1 percentage points (Wolfers 
and Zitzewitz, 2004). In addition, using data from four US presidential elections, 
Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2004) showed how prediction accuracy improves over time. 
The horizontal axis of Figure 12 shows the number of days until the election and the 
vertical axis quantifies the average absolute forecast error, i.e. the average absolute 
deviation between predicted and actual vote share. Accordingly, prediction accuracy 
improves as information is revealed and reflected in trading prices prior to the election.  
 
Figure 12: Information revelation through time (Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2004) 
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Concerning the prediction accuracy of political stock markets in absolute terms, Berg et 
al. (2001) compared the predicted to the actual outcomes for vote-share and seat-shares 
markets. Figure 13 plots the predicted versus the actual election outcomes for 49 
markets run in 13 countries. As can be seen, most of the elections are close to the 45-
degree line which represents perfect accuracy. Predictions are consequently often very 
close to the actual outcome.  
 
Figure 13: Predicted vs. actual outcomes in political markets (Berg et al., 2001) 
However, political stock markets are not only accurate in absolute terms but also 
relative to election polls. They beat election polls in many cases. Figure 14 compares 
the mean absolute error of political stock markets and election polls for a total of 15 
political elections in the United States and several European countries. Errors of polls 
in this case are average errors across major polls from the last week before the election. 
Berg et al. (2001) found that predictions of markets are closer to the actual outcome 
than polls in 9 out of 15 cases. The average poll error is 1.93 percentage points across 
all elections while the average error of the market is only about 1.5 percentage points. 
In a more extensive study, Berg et al. (2003) compared the accuracy of the Iowa 
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Electronic Markets IEM to traditional polls by analyzing 596 national polls between 
1988 and 2000. The survey reveals that the prices of the IEM outperform polls in 76 
percent of the time.  
 
Figure 14: Political stock markets compared to polls (Berg et al., 2001) 
Other studies present similar findings from other domains beside political stock 
markets, demonstrating that prediction markets perform well compared to traditional 
forecasting methods like surveys, opinion pools, or expert judgments. In case of an 
internal market at Hewlett-Packard (HP), for example, Chen and Plott (2002) found out 
that the prediction market beat the official sales forecasts of the company in 6 out of 8 
cases for which official forecasts were available. Hence, the markets performed better 
than traditional methods employed inside HP. It is noteworthy to mention that, in 
contrast to the IEM, only a small number of people were selected for participating in 
the HP markets. Additionally, markets were operated over short periods of time only. 
Prediction markets consequently seem to work even under these circumstances.  
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Another well-known prediction market which was already mentioned in Section 2.3.3 
is the Hollywood Stock Exchange (HSX). The HSX allows traders to trade on, for 
instance, the opening weekend performance and total box office returns of movies. 
Figure 15 shows that the predictions of the opening weekend box offfice success of the 
HSX have been remarkably accurate (Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2004) in the past. 
Pennock et al. (2001a) also find that the HSX forecasts are a good predictor for the 
opening weekend and the four week box office returns. In 2007, the HSX correctly 
predicted seven out of eight Oscar winners in the top categories and thus seems to work 
almost perfectly (Lamare, 2007). For the 2000 Oscars, the HSX has beaten the 
individual and average forecasts of five experts (Pennock et al., 2001a).  
 
Figure 15: Prediction accuracy of HSX (Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2004) 
Another stream of research proposes the use of prediction markets for long-term 
forecasting (Hanson, 1992). The Foresight Exchange was already presented as a market 
for predicting long-term developments in science, technology, and other fields of public 
interest in Section 2.3.3. Contracts traded in this market range from technical to socio-
political issues. Pennock et al. (2001a) show that prices of the Foresight Exchange also 
correlate well with observed outcome frequencies.  
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To sum up, prediction markets work well compared to alternative forecasting methods 
in various fields of application. In addition to these empirical findings on the accuracy 
of prediction markets in various fields of application, Sunstein (2006) theoretically 
compared the characteristics of prediction markets to those of the statistical mean of 
individual judgments and of group judgments generated through deliberation. Sunstein 
(2006) concludes that prediction markets have substantial advantages to both 
approaches because deliberation suffers from some serious problems. One of these 
problems is that group members may not reveal their knowledge due to social 
pressures. This argumentation is of particular interest since deliberation is widespread 
and oftentimes considered to be the best way of eliciting information held by groups. 
4.1.2. Sports Prediction Markets 
Over the past years, prediction markets were also employed in the field of sports 
forecasting. To test how much extra accuracy can be obtained by using real-money 
versus play-money prediction markets, Servan-Schreiber et al. (2004) compare the 
trading prices of the real-money market TradeSports and the play-money market 
NewsFutures across 208 NFL games. Interestingly, there is no significant difference in 
the prediction accuracy of play-money versus real-money markets. If two teams are 
playing against each other, the team with the higher trading price can be considered the 
favorite. 65.9% of TradeSports’ favorite teams won compared to 66.8% of 
NewsFutures’ favorite teams. For both markets, there is a close correspondence 
between trading prices and the observed frequency of victory in the field (see Figure 
16). This shows that the trading prices can be interpreted as probability estimations of 
the actual outcomes. Rosenbloom and Notz (2006) also find that both markets, 
TradeSports and NewsFutures,  provide accurate probability forecasts.  
Moreover, Servan-Schreiber et al. (2004) compare the trading prices of the two 
prediction markets to the accuracy of predictions from 1,947 individual experts in a 
popular Internet prediction contest, namely the ProbabilityFootball contest32. They find 
that at the end of the season the markets were ranked 6th (play-money) and 8th (real-
money), therewith both falling within the top ten among almost two thousand experts. 
For comparison, the average expert was ranked 39th and thus still outperforming the 
                                                 
32 http://ProbabilityFootball.com 
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majority of individual experts, but not performing as well as the two prediction 
markets.  
 
Figure 16: Prediction accuracy for NFL games (Servan-Schreiber et al., 2004) 
In a similar study, Chen et al. (2005) find that prediction markets on NFL games offer 
as accurate predictions as experts’ assessments at the same point of time prior to the 
matches. Furthermore, by analyzing data from 34 soccer prediction markets for the 
2002 FIFA World Cup and 18 basketball games from the 2002 USA National 
Basketball Association (NBA) championship, Debnath et al. (2003) show that on 
average trading prices approach the actual outcome over time and that information on 
game events is rather quickly reflected in trading prices.  
The first soccer prediction markets to be reported in literature date back to 1994 and 
1998 (Schmidt and Werwatz, 2002). In their working paper, Schmidt and Werwatz 
(2002) analyze a 2000 European Championship market to find out whether prediction 
markets outperform a random predictor and betting odds across 21 matches. Market-
generated probabilities are therefore compared to professional betting odds and a 
random predictor. The random predictor performed worse than the markets’ 
predictions. Also, relative to the prediction markets, forecasts by expert bookmakers in 
fixed-odds betting were slightly less accurate.  
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Overall, there are only few studies on the accuracy of prediction markets in the field of 
sports forecasting. These studies, though, suggest that markets should also work well in 
the domain of sports.  
4.2. Description of the Data 
This section describes the different data sources which are later used to predict the 
outcome of the 2006 FIFA World Cup and to compare the prediction accuracy of 
markets to other forecasting methods. The data includes the relevant STOCCER 
championship and match markets as well as betting odds from two major betting 
companies, the FIFA world ranking, and a random predictor. The comparison based on 
this data differs from the study by Schmidt and Werwatz (2002) in several respects.  
One of the key features of the soccer prediction markets studied by Schmidt and 
Werwatz (2002) was the real-money investment which was required: every trader had 
to deposit a certain amount of money (up to 50€) and thus could suffer losses. As such, 
these markets were similar to the Iowa Electronic Markets, which have proven to be 
accurate in the past. In the STOCCER play-money markets, however, traders were not 
required to make any real-money investments. Traders could therefore neither lose nor 
win any money by revealing their expectations. Another difference is that the 
STOCCER prediction markets were more liquid than the markets described by Schmidt 
and Werwatz (2002). Moreover, in addition to comparing the markets’ predictions to 
betting odds and random predictors as done by Schmidt and Werwatz (2002), the 
following sections also investigate whether the STOCCER prediction markets 
outperform forecasts that are based on historic soccer data and to what extent 
predictions based on different types of contracts diverge.  
4.2.1. STOCCER Match Markets 
As already described in Section 3.2.1 there were 16 match markets in STOCCER which 
focused on predicting the outcome of matches in the final rounds. There were three 
contracts per match. Either one of the two national teams won or there was a draw after 
the second half. The contract corresponding to the outcome that actually occurred was 
valued at 10 virtual currency units while the other two contracts became worthless. The 
matches, the outcome of the matches, and the trading prices of the three possible 
outcomes are depicted in Table 6. 
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The trading prices shown in Table 6 are prices of the last trade before kick-off. 
According to the efficient market hypothesis, these prices incorporate all relevant 
information available to the traders at this time. For the comparison of forecasting 
methods in Section 4.3.1, the predicted outcome of a match in case of the match 
markets is the one with the highest trading price out of the three possible outcomes. In 
9 out of the 16 matches, the contract with the highest trading price corresponded to the 
actual outcome.  
Table 6: Trading prices of STOCCER match markets 
Match Last Price Result 
(Team 1 – Team 2) Team 1 Draw Team 2 (Team 1 – Team 2) 
Germany – Sweden 9.00 0.30 1.60 2-0 
Argentina – Mexico 8.28 2.79 1.91 1-1 
England – Ecuador 8.75 3.89 2.00 1-0 
Portugal – Netherlands 5.40 1.00 4.40 1-0 
Italy – Australia 8.90 0.99 1.99 1-0 
Switzerland – Ukraine 7.53 1.50 2.40 0-0 
Brazil – Ghana 9.50 0.70 0.70 3-0 
Spain – France 3.50 1.30 4.99 1-3 
Germany – Argentina 6.00 3.75 3.50 1-1 
England – Portugal 3.76 2.70 4.05 0-0 
Italy – Ukraine 6.70 2.35 1.04 3-0 
Brazil – France 6.16 3.22 3.67 0-1 
Germany – Italy 5.10 2.28 3.50 0-0 
Portugal – France 2.50 3.49 4.92 0-1 
Germany – Portugal 5.90 2.50 2.16 3-1 
Italy – France 4.50 3.19 3.91 1-1 
 
4.2.2. STOCCER Championship Market 
Another set of predictions for all the matches can be derived from the contract prices of 
the competing teams in the STOCCER championship market, which was also described 
in more detail in Section 3.2.1. Contracts of all 32 national soccer teams were traded in 
this market. The matches, the outcome of the matches, and the trading prices of the two 
teams playing the corresponding match are depicted in Table 7.  
Again, the trading prices shown in Table 7 are prices of the last trade before kick-off. 
These prices should incorporate all relevant information available to the traders at this 
time. 
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Table 7: Trading prices of the STOCCER championship market 
Match Last Price Result 
(Team 1 – Team 2) Team 1 Team 2 (Team 1 – Team 2) 
Germany - Costa Rica 19.99 2.17 4-2 
Poland - Ecuador 5.47 2.85 0-2 
England - Paraguay 13.48 2.93 1-0 
Trinidad & Tobago - Sweden 1.15 7.97 0-0 
Argentina - Ivory Coast 16.30 4.30 2-1 
Serbia & Montenegro - Netherlands 2.61 11.84 0-1 
Mexico - Iran 7.15 2.20 3-1 
Angola - Portugal 2.10 7.29 0-1 
Australia - Japan 3.26 4.20 3-1 
USA - Czech Republic 3.62 8.05 0-3 
Italy - Ghana 13.49 1.99 2-0 
South Korea - Togo 3.80 1.64 2-1 
France  - Switzerland 10.31 6.65 0-0 
Brazil - Croatia 31.35 4.88 1-0 
Spain - Ukraine 8.00 5.19 4-0 
Tunisia - Saudi Arabia 3.10 1.43 2-2 
Germany - Poland 19.95 2.22 1-0 
Ecuador - Costa Rica 5.35 2.00 3-0 
England - Trinidad & Tobago 14.20 1.10 2-0 
Sweden - Paraguay 6.61 3.51 1-0 
Argentina - Serbia & Montenegro 17.05 1.75 6-0 
Netherlands - Ivory Coast 11.20 5.20 2-1 
Mexico - Angola 7.45 0.65 0-0 
Portugal - Iran 7.62 0.31 2-0 
Czech Republic - Ghana 12.10 1.25 0-2 
Italy - USA 13.40 0.70 1-1 
Japan - Croatia 1.40 5.50 0-0 
Brazil - Australia 30.94 4.97 2-0 
France - South Korea 10.15 4.85 1-1 
Togo - Switzerland 0.85 7.45 0-2 
Saudi Arabia - Ukraine 0.96 5.18 0-4 
Spain - Tunisia 13.75 0.86 3-1 
Ecuador - Germany 6.41 20.99 0-3 
Costa Rica - Poland 0.04 1.00 1-2 
Sweden - England 6.50 13.50 2-2 
Paraguay - Trinidad & Tobago 0.03 2.70 2-0 
Portugal - Mexico 8.02 5.00 2-1 
Iran - Angola 0.06 1.82 1-1 
Netherlands - Argentina 11.25 25.10 0-0 
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Match Last Price Result 
(Team 1 – Team 2) Team 1 Team 2 (Team 1 – Team 2) 
Ivory Coast - Serbia & Montenegro 0.06 100.00 3-2 
Czech Republic - Italy 7.70 11.20 0-2 
Ghana - USA 3.82 2.00 2-1 
Japan - Brazil 0.72 29.35 1-4 
Croatia - Australia 5.15 4.94 2-2 
Saudi Arabia - Spain 0.05 11.55 0-1 
Ukraine - Tunisia 6.00 2.30 1-0 
Togo - France 0.80 6.50 0-2 
Switzerland - South Korea 7.70 4.29 2-0 
Germany – Sweden 23.00 5.34 2-0 
Argentina – Mexico 28.40 5.04 1-1 
England – Ecuador 14.00 5.63 1-0 
Portugal – Netherlands 8.37 11.60 1-0 
Italy – Australia 18.10 6.20 1-0 
Switzerland – Ukraine 13.00 7.18 0-0 
Brazil – Ghana 30.20 5.70 3-0 
Spain – France 13.95 9.99 1-3 
Germany – Argentina 28.45 23.00 1-1 
England – Portugal 16.20 16.00 0-0 
Italy – Ukraine 19.92 12.85 3-0 
Brazil – France 31.01 15.29 0-1 
Germany – Italy 41.09 25.65 0-0 
Portugal – France 27.00 39.99 0-1 
Germany – Portugal 19.79 19.79 3-1 
Italy – France 42.00 40.00 1-1 
 
For the analysis in Section 4.3.1, the predicted winner of a match is the team with the 
higher trading price before kick-off. A draw is predicted whenever the trading prices of 
two teams are equal. In 38 out of the 64 matches, the team with the higher trading price 
was the actual winner of the match.  
4.2.3. Betting Odds 
In fixed-odds betting, one or several professional experts of a betting company set fixed 
quotes which are usually not adjusted over time (e.g. Forrest et al., 2005). Bettors then 
accept or reject those bets at some time before the beginning of the respective event. 
Essentially, in fixed-odds betting information from potentially knowledgeable bettors is 
not accounted for when determining the odds. Numerous studies have shown that fixed-
odds betting markets are efficient (Gandar et al., 1998, Pope and Peel, 1989). For 
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instance, Pope and Peel (1989) develop a linear probability model which incorporates 
the probabilities of the actual occurrences of the outcomes and the probabilities 
implicitly quoted by the odd-setters. They then derive several betting strategies and 
show that no strategy leads to expected positive returns. Nevertheless, some 
inefficiencies such as the favorite-longshot bias were detected (e.g. Cain et al., 2000, 
Thaler and Ziemba, 1988). This means that favorites are undervalued and long shots, 
i.e. outcomes which are very unlikely, are overvalued. For a recent summary of the 
history of sports wagering see Vlastakis et al. (2006).  
In order to avoid losses, betting companies are required to make accurate predictions 
(Forrest et al., 2005). With large sums of money at stake, the monetary incentive to 
predict accurately is pronounced and presumably much stronger than in any prediction 
market since there is no money at stake in play-money markets and usually little money 
at stake in real-money markets. Forrest et al. (2005, p. 552) emphasize the importance 
of accurate forecasts for bookmakers in fixed-odds betting markets: “If bets are 
mispriced, the financial consequences for bookmakers may be serious”. Although a 
commission fee of 15-25% is usually charged (Woodland and Woodland, 1994) and 
can palliate possible losses in the short run, under competition, betting companies 
setting the quotes have a strong incentive to generate accurate quotes. Moreover, one of 
the bookmakers’ aims is to set the quotes in a way that the bettors’ investments 
distribute evenly on all three outcomes because the bookmakers do then not take any 
risk (Schmidt and Werwatz, 2002).  
In the following sections, betting odds of two major German sports betting providers, 
namely ODDSET and wetten.de, are used as a benchmark for the STOCCER prediction 
markets. ODDSET33 is Germany's largest betting institution and is run by the state-
owned lottery. Wetten.de34 is a popular sports betting provider that is privately held. 
Both bookmakers offered fixed quotes which bettors could wager against at the time of 
the FIFA World Cup 2006. A typical betting screen of wetten.de is depicted in Figure 
17.  
                                                 
33 www.oddset.de 
34 www.wetten.de 
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Figure 17: Typical screen of a fixed-odd betting site 
For each of the 64 World Cup matches, bets could be placed on a win of the first team 
(1), a draw (0), and a win of the second team (2). All bets are referring to the score after 
regular playing time. Extra time and penalty shootouts in the final rounds are not 
considered. Matches that are not decided within regular time are considered a draw. 
Betting quotes are stated in decimal odds – a bet quoted with 3.5 pays out 3.5 times the 
wagering amount in case the corresponding event actually occurs. As bookmakers 
follow a commercial interest and try their best to avoid short-term losses, the odds 
include a commission fee. This means that wagering the same amount of money on all 
three possible outcomes would lead to a 15-25% loss. Since soccer is a popular sport in 
Germany, one can assume that a considerably large amount of money has been betted 
on outcomes of matches during the FIFA World Cup 2006. 
The matches, the outcomes of the matches, and the quotes from wetten.de are depicted 
in Table 20 (see Appendix A). Respectively, the data from ODDSET is depicted in 
Table 21 (see Appendix A). For the comparison in Section 4.3.1, the predicted outcome 
of a match is the one with the lowest quote because according to the quotes this is the 
most likely outcome. For wetten.de, the outcome with the lowest quote corresponded to 
the actual outcome of the match in 43 out of the 64 matches. For ODDSET, the actual 
outcome was predicted for 37 out of the 64 matches. 
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4.2.4. FIFA Ranking 
The FIFA world ranking35 is a ranking system for men’s national soccer teams. The 
teams of the member nations of the FIFA (Fédération Internationale de Football 
Association) are ranked according to their match results. The most successful team is 
ranked highest. In the following, the FIFA world ranking is used as another benchmark 
since it is based on historic data only. Thus, one can investigate whether the STOCCER 
prediction markets outperform predictions derived from historic data only and hence do 
not consider up-to-date information about the current status of the national soccer 
teams such as players dropping out due to medical reasons or due to disqualification.  
The FIFA world ranking from May 2006 which is used as a benchmark in the following 
takes into account the history of the last eight years before May 2006. The ranking is 
based on the teams’ performance, with more recent and more important matches being 
weighted more heavily in order to reflect the state of the team. It considers the 
following factors:  
• Outcomes of past matches 
• Importance of past matches 
• Strength of opponents 
• Regional strength 
• Results in home and away matches 
• Number of goals scored 
All international “A” matches are relevant for the calculation of the ranking. For each 
individual factor, points are assigned which are then aggregated to an index value. In 
case of most factors complex calculations are used to determine the actual state and 
strength of the national teams36. 
The matches, the outcomes of the matches, and the ranks of the competing teams in the 
FIFA world ranking from May 2006 are depicted in Table 22 (see Appendix A). For 
the analysis in Section 4.3.1, a win is predicted for the team that has the better position 
                                                 
35 http://www.fifa.com/worldfootball/ranking/ 
36 The calculation of the ranking is rather complex. Due to its complexity the calculation procedure was 
changed in the meanwhile. More information on the calculation of the ranking can be found at 
http://www.fifa.com/mm/document/fifafacts/rawrank/ip-590_10e_wrpointcalculation_8771.pdf.  
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in the ranking. This prediction corresponds to the actual outcome for 30 out of the 64 
matches.  
4.2.5. Random Draws 
Forecasts are worthless if they are not better than randomly drawing one of the possible 
outcomes. Thus, a random predictor is used as another benchmark to evaluate the 
prediction accuracy of the STOCCER markets. Since one can observe three possible 
outcomes per match, an uninformed, random guess would correctly predict 33.33% of 
the matches. Empirical data supports the hypothesis that the three possible outcomes of 
a match are equally likely to occur (Schmidt and Werwatz, 2002). 
4.3. Results 
This section compares the prediction accuracy of the STOCCER markets to a random 
predictor, predictions derived from the FIFA world ranking, and betting odds. First of 
all, the results of this comparison are given in Section 4.3.1. Since prediction markets 
should work well if they are efficient, Section 4.3.2 discusses one specific facet of 
market efficiency. It addresses the question whether pure arbitrage opportunities across 
contracts existed in the STOCCER championship market. Finally, Section 4.3.3 
analyzes whether traders try to exploit the illiquidity of prediction markets by taking on 
the role of market makers.  
4.3.1. Evaluation of the Prediction Accuracy  
Predictions based on a random predictor, the FIFA world ranking, and betting odds 
from two major betting companies are used as benchmarks for the STOCCER 
prediction markets in order to compare markets to an uninformed guess, to predictions 
based on historic data only, and to expert predictions by bookmakers. Prediction market 
prices and thus also the corresponding predictions are, in contrast, driven by the 
information and the expectations of traders (Spann and Skiera, 2003). Beside historic 
data, traders also consider current information that is available to them and ongoing 
developments during the tournament. 
In order to compare the prediction accuracy of markets to the other forecasting 
methods, the hit rate was calculated for each method. The hit rate is the number of 
correctly predicted matches relative to the total number of predicted matches. How an 
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outcome for a match is predicted in each of the data sets has already been explicated in 
the last section. Other common evaluation criteria such as the root mean squared error 
or the mean absolute error for the deviation between the final value of a contract and 
the last trading price before kick-off cannot be used for comparing the predictions due 
to the characteristics of the data sets. It is, for instance, impossible to derive 
probabilities for outcomes of matches from the FIFA world ranking or the trading 
prices in the championship market. Thus, the hit rate is used as an evaluation criterion 
which can be employed for all the data sets.  
Table 8 compares the hit rate of the different forecasting methods for the whole sample 
of 64 matches. In case of the STOCCER championship market, a win is predicted for 
the team with the higher trading price. For the betting odds, the predicted outcome is 
the one with the lowest quote. The FIFA world ranking predicts a win for the higher-
ranked team and in case of the random predictor all three possible outcomes of a match 
are equally likely to occur.  
Table 8: Comparison of prediction accuracy (all matches) 





Championship market 64 59,38%     
Wetten.de odds 64 67,19% -11,62% 0,203 
ODDSET odds 64 57,81% 2,72% 0,799 
FIFA world ranking 64 46,88% 26,66% 0,042 
Random draw 64 33,33% 78,14% < 0,001 
 
The comparison of the hit rates of the championship market, the betting odds, the FIFA 
world ranking, and the random predictor for all 64 matches shows that the 
championship market indeed yields a higher hit rate than the FIFA world ranking and 
the random draw model. The difference in the hit rate of the prediction market and 
these two other forecasting methods is significant in both cases (Pearson's chi-square 
test, p-value < 0.05)39. The predictions can thus be improved when using a prediction 
                                                 
37 Percentage of improvement of championship market over alternative forecasting method 
38 Chi-square test for difference to hit rate of championship market 
39 For more information on Pearson's chi-square test see e.g. Cowan (1998) 
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market instead of these two methods. Table 8 shows the percentage of improvement 
when one replaces the respective alternative method with a prediction market.  
With regard to the hit rate, the betting odds from wetten.de and ODDSET perform 
similarly well as the predictions derived from trading prices before kick-off in the 
championship market. Wetten.de slightly outperforms the championship market 
whereas ODDSET performs almost equally well compared to the market. The 
difference in the hit rate, however, is not significant in both cases. This can be 
considered as a success for the prediction market because the prediction accuracy 
obviously is similarly good as in case of betting odds. This is even more astonishing as 
the market was a play-money market and was also used to predict the course of the 
entire tournament instead of focusing on the prediction of the outcome of individual 
matches.  
Moreover, the likelihood of draws is systematically underestimated in the 
championship market. Based on the trading prices in the championship market, a draw 
would only be predicted if the prices of the competing teams were exactly the same – 
which is rather unlikely. This also holds for the FIFA world ranking where a draw 
would only be predicted if two teams were ranked equally.  
For this reason, Table 9 compares the prediction accuracy of the various forecasting 
methods for only those matches out of the total 64 matches which did not end in a 
draw. In this case, there are only two possible outcomes. 
Table 9: Comparison of prediction accuracy (all matches without draws) 





Championship market 47 80,85%     
Wetten.de odds 47 89,36% -9,52% 0,138 
ODDSET odds 47 78,72% 2,71% 0,711 
FIFA world ranking 47 63,83% 26,66% 0,003 
Random draw 47 50,00% 61,70% < 0,001 
 
                                                 
40 Percentage of improvement of championship market over alternative forecasting method 
41 Chi-square test for difference to hit rate of championship market 
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The betting odds were adjusted to ignore the probability of a draw by predicting the 
winner based on which team had the lower odds for it winning the match. However, 
this does not change the results compared to Table 8. Although again not statistically 
significant, wetten.de still performs a little better than the championship market while 
ODDSET is marginally beaten by the market. Also, the championship market still has a 
much higher hit rate than the FIFA world ranking and the random draw model.  
In STOCCER, there were match markets for the 16 matches in the final rounds of the 
FIFA World Cup 2006. In case of the match markets, the outcome with the highest 
trading price out of the three possible outcomes is the predicted outcome. Table 10 
compares the predictions of these 16 match markets to the predictions of the other 
forecasting methods.  
Table 10: Comparison of prediction accuracy (final rounds) 





Match markets 16 56,25%     
Championship market 16 37,50% 50,00% 0,131 
Wetten.de odds 16 43,75% 28,57% 0,313 
ODDSET odds 16 43,75% 28,57% 0,313 
FIFA ranking 16 25,00% 125,00% 0,012 
Random draw 16 33,33% 68,77% 0,044 
 
For the last 16 matches of the tournament, the hit rate of the match markets is 
significantly higher than the hit rate of the FIFA world ranking and of the random draw 
model. Interestingly, the hit rate is higher in case of the match markets than it is when 
predicting a win for the team with the higher trading price in the championship market. 
One reason for this tendency could again be the fact that the likelihood of draws is 
underestimated in the championship market. Furthermore, traders in match markets can 
focus on the outcome of one match at a time instead of trying to predict the course of 
the entire tournament. In the final rounds, the match markets also seem to outperform 
the betting odds of wetten.de and ODDSET – although the difference is not statistically 
                                                 
42 Percentage of improvement of championship market over alternative forecasting method 
43 Chi-square test for difference to hit rate of championship market 
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significant. Moreover, with only one hit fewer, the prediction accuracy of the 
championship market is again very close to the prediction accuracy of the betting odds.  
Altogether, the STOCCER markets are about as accurate as betting odds and more 
accurate than the FIFA ranking and a random predictor. At first sight, it is somewhat 
surprising that the hit rate for the championship market, the betting odds, and the FIFA 
world ranking is on average lower for the last 16 matches than it is when taking into 
account all 64 matches. However, this is plausible since it should be easier to predict 
the outcome of matches at the beginning of the tournament than at the end. At the 
beginning, there are numerous underdogs and clear favorites whereas towards the end 
of the tournament the performance of teams will not differ that much. Thus, it is 
presumably much more demanding to predict the outcome of matches taking place in 
the last rounds compared to earlier matches.  
4.3.2. Arbitrage Opportunities 
In case of STOCCER the markets predicted the outcome of the matches quite 
accurately. Prediction markets should work well if they are efficient. In efficient 
markets, in turn, one does not expect arbitrage opportunities to be persistent. This 
section therefore investigates whether pure arbitrage opportunities existed in one 
specific market, namely the STOCCER championship market. This market was chosen 
for the following analysis since it was the most liquid market and the only market 
which was running continuously over a time period of several weeks. Other aspects of 
market efficiency such as how fast newly arriving information is incorporated into 
trading prices are not considered here.  
In the STOCCER championship market, there are two combinations of trades that can 
potentially yield arbitrage profits: Firstly, buying all the 32 contracts traded in the 
market and selling a basic portfolio or, secondly, buying a basic portfolio and selling all 
the contracts separately in the market. In the first case, one gets paid off on exactly one 
contract with certainty. If the total of the ask prices on all the contracts is less than 200 
currency units at any point in time, an arbitrage opportunity is available. Instead of 
selling a basic portfolio a trader can also hold the shares until the end. In the second 
case, the arbitrage opportunity is present if the sum of all the 32 bid prices is more than 
200 currency units.  
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Figure 18 shows the movement of the sum of bid and ask prices in the STOCCER 
championship market over time. Most of the time the ask prices sum up to more than 
200 currency units. Contrariwise, the sum of the bid prices is in the majority of cases 
lower than 200 currency units. As was already mentioned above, an arbitrage 
opportunity exists if the sum of bid prices exceeds or the sum of the ask prices falls 
below 200 currency units. However, extremely small arbitrage opportunities are 
presumably not of interest for traders because they do not yield any profit worth 
mentioning in comparison with the effort which is required to trade a portfolio and 32 
contracts.  
 
Figure 18: Sum of bid/ask prices in championship market over time 
When tolerating arbitrage opportunities of up to one percent of the value of a basic 
portfolio, i.e. two currency units, there were a total of 229 instances in which an 
arbitrage opportunity was present between May 15th and July 9th. The arbitrage chances 
lasted, on average, for about 47 minutes. When tolerating arbitrage opportunities of up 
to ten percent of the value of a basic portfolio, the number of instances in which an 
arbitrage opportunity is present declines to seven instances which lasted for 11 minutes 
on average. Thus, with increasing sums of money at stake the number of arbitrage 
opportunities declines and substantial arbitrage opportunities are quickly corrected.  
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Given that trading in this market was relatively thin compared to financial stock 
markets, it is interesting that the arbitrage opportunities were rather quickly corrected 
by the traders – provided that a substantial amount of (virtual) money was at stake. All 
in all, the STOCCER championship market appears to have been efficient in the sense 
that there were few substantial arbitrage opportunities available by trading basic 
portfolios or simply holding shares until the outcome was known.  
4.3.3. Market-Making Traders 
Market liquidity can also become an issue in prediction markets since trading is in 
many cases relatively thin compared to financial stock markets. If markets are rather 
illiquid, however, new information is not immediately reflected in trading prices and 
traders might in consequence lose interest in the markets. One observation worthy of 
note in case of STOCCER is the emergence of market making traders, i.e. traders who 
provide liquidity by offering to buy and sell a substantial number of shares of a specific 
contract at the same time. Market makers add to the liquidity and hope to make profit 
due to the spread between the buying and selling price.  
In the following, the threshold for the number of shares which have to be offered on the 
buy and sell side at the same time in order to qualify as a market-making trader is 50. 
Furthermore, taking into account whether the corresponding buy and sell orders were 
submitted within a given time frame can be seen as an additional constraint. Short time 
frames imply that traders acted as market makers on purpose. To give an example, it is 
very unlikely that a trader forgot about a sell order or has completely different 
information when he submits a buy order for the same contract only a little later.  
Table 11 depicts the number of active traders who ever traded a specific contract as 
well as the number of market-making traders per contract in the STOCCER 
championship market44. On average, there are 622 active traders and 72 market-making 
traders per contract. The number of market makers decreases if corresponding buy and 
sell orders have to be submitted within a shorter time frame in order to qualify as a 
market maker. 
 
                                                 
44 This section again relies on data from the championship market since it was the most liquid market and 
the only market which was running continuously. 
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Table 11: Number and share of market-making traders per contract 
Contract # Active #MM #MM #MM #MM (1h)/ 
Angola 759 67 62 45 5.93% 
Argentina 728 82 69 59 8.10% 
Australia 665 77 70 54 8.12% 
Brazil 765 88 76 56 7.32% 
Costa Rica 679 67 55 45 6.63% 
Cote d’Ivoire 684 62 54 41 5.99% 
Croatia 567 74 64 47 8.29% 
Czech Republic 624 70 61 39 6.25% 
Ecuador 608 75 65 42 6.91% 
England 661 84 69 53 8.02% 
France 630 108 97 77 12.22% 
Germany 735 102 90 81 11.02% 
Ghana 616 81 74 50 8.12% 
Iran 628 42 38 25 3.98% 
Italy 633 84 72 59 9.32% 
Japan 597 58 49 32 5.36% 
Korea Republic 547 74 69 47 8.59% 
Saudi Arabia 587 55 52 36 6.13% 
Mexico 560 72 65 50 8.93% 
Netherlands 611 82 71 51 8.35% 
Paraguay 570 61 51 36 6.32% 
Poland 609 60 51 37 6.08% 
Portugal 547 77 64 49 8.96% 
Serbia & Montenegro 597 55 49 32 5.36% 
Spain 556 82 72 59 10.61% 
Sweden 565 77 68 45 7.96% 
Switzerland 599 68 54 46 7.68% 
Togo 602 49 45 32 5.32% 
Trinidad & Tobago 624 67 58 43 6.89% 
Tunisia 567 67 57 36 6.35% 
Ukraine 571 69 63 54 9.46% 
USA 612 69 63 44 7.19% 
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From now on, this time frame is one hour to be considered a market-making trader. In 
this case, 7.6 per cent of the active traders are regarded as market makers on average 
across contracts.  
In total, there are 289 different market makers. Some traders are acting as market 
makers for multiple contracts. Six traders, for instance, qualify as market making 
traders for more than 25 and up to 31 out of the 32 contracts. Table 12 shows the 
number of traders who are acting as market makers for multiple contracts. All in all, 
buying and selling the same contract at the same time seems to be a common trading 
pattern for some of the traders.  
Table 12: Traders acting as market makers for multiple contracts 
#Contracts 1-5 6-10 11-15 16-20 21-25 > 25 
#MM (1h) 203 42 20 13 5 6 
 
Market-making traders are on at least one side of the trade in 81 per cent of the total 
contracts traded and account for 85 per cent of the trading volume45. The number of 
trades as well as trading volumes per contract increase with the number of traders who 
qualify as market makers for a specific contract46. Figure 19 shows the correlation 
between the number of market makers and the number of trades. The correlation 
coefficient of 0.827 indicates a high correlation between those two numbers47. With a 
correlation coefficient of 0.875, the correlation between the number of market-making 
traders and trading volumes which is depicted in Figure 20 is similarly high48.  
Hence, both correlation coefficients are high and could reflect the fact that additional 
market-making traders increase liquidity. However, an alternative explanation could be 
that the factor which generates trading interest also encourages market makers to trade 
in the corresponding market. 
                                                 
45 The market makers’ share of trades and trading volume per contract can be found in Table 23 (see 
Appendix A).  
46 The number of market makers, the number of trades as well as trading volumes per contract can be 
found in Table 24 (see Appendix A). 
47 Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient, p-value < 0.001. For more information on Spearman’s rank 
correlation coefficient see Hotelling and Pabst (1936) 
48 Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient, p-value < 0.001 
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Figure 19: Correlation between number of market makers and number of trades 
 
Figure 20: Correlation between number of market makers and trading volume 
Without much doubt market makers expect to make profits with their trading strategy 
of buying and selling specific contracts at the same time. Table 14 shows the market-
making as well as the other traders’ deposit value, i.e. the sum of the cash and the value 
of the contracts they hold, at the time when the FIFA World Cup was over and the 
market had been closed. The average deposit value of market makers is 183,976.52 
Empirical Evidence of Prediction Accuracy 70 
currency units compared to 135,073.69 currency units for all the remaining traders. The 
difference between the two groups of traders with regard to the deposit value is 
significant (Mann-Whitney U test, p-value = 0.003)49. Market makers thus are more 
successful than the remaining traders with respect to their deposit value.  
Table 13: Trading activity and trading success of market makers50 
 MM Non-MM p-value51 











As shown in Table 13, market-making traders are also trading a lot more than other 
traders. On average, market makers trade about 414 times whereas other traders only 
make about 43 trades. Again, the difference in the number of trades is significant. 
Market makers obviously try to profit from illiquidity. Thus, they play an important 
role in prediction markets by providing liquidity and consequently allowing for 
continuous trading.  
4.4. Discussion of Results 
The results reported in Section 4.3.1 provide evidence that the STOCCER prediction 
markets in fact outperformed predictions derived from the FIFA world ranking, i.e. 
historic data, as well as a random predictor in terms of prediction accuracy. What is 
more, the differences between prediction markets and betting odds were not statistically 
significant with respect to hit rates. Overall, quotes from wetten.de tend to be a little 
more accurate than quotes from ODDSET. Predictions based on the championship 
market were about as accurate as the betting odds although the probability of draws is 
underestimated by this market and the focus was not on predicting the outcome of 
individual matches. As a consequence, the match markets should perform a little better. 
Differences in the hit rate between the match markets and the betting odds are, 
however, also not statistically significant.  
                                                 
49 For more information on the Mann-Whitney U test see Mann and Whitney (1947) 
50 The numbers in parentheses are standard deviations. 
51 The p-values are obtained from a Mann-Whitney U test.  
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Yet, when keeping in mind that betting odds have shown to be extremely good 
predictors and that similar forecasting methods are mostly non-existent in other fields 
of application beyond sports forecasting, the results confirm that prediction markets 
indeed are a very promising forecasting method.  
In play-money prediction markets traders cannot suffer any losses whereas professional 
bookmakers depend on accurate predictions due to the high monetary investments that 
are at stake. In the end, betting companies with inaccurate quotes would not survive. By 
demonstrating the competitiveness of the STOCCER prediction markets compared to 
sports betting odds, the results align with those attained by Schmidt and Werwatz 
(2002) where markets even slightly outperformed betting odds. However, their markets 
used real money as an incentive and traders hence were punished financially in case of 
a poor performance. Play-money prediction markets as the ones analyzed here, 
however, are much easier to set up and to operate than real-money prediction markets 
due to legal and technical reasons. It is thus crucial to find out whether prediction 
accuracy decreases when using play money instead of real money.  
In addition to the comparison of prediction markets and alternative forecasting 
methods, the analysis of arbitrage opportunities in Section 4.3.2 also gives evidence 
that the markets are performing well. The championship market appears to be efficient 
in the sense that there are few substantial pure arbitrage opportunities available. 
Besides, Section 4.3.3 demonstrates the importance of market-making traders who 
provide liquidity and consequently allowing for continuous trading in otherwise rather 
illiquid markets. They seem to play a central role in prediction markets since they are 
on the buy or sell side in a large proportion of all trades.  
4.5. Summary 
This chapter provided evidence of markets’ prediction accuracy. Earlier empirical 
research was used to demonstrate the predictive power of markets relative to traditional 
forecasting methods such as expert opinions or polls in general as well as for sports 
forecasting in particular. Data collected from the play-money prediction market 
STOCCER was then employed to compare the prediction accuracy of sports prediction 
markets to alternative forecasting methods. After a short description of the data sets, the 
prediction accuracy of the STOCCER markets was analyzed by comparing the 
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predictions to a random predictor, predictions derived from the FIFA world ranking, 
and betting odds from two German betting companies.  
The results showed that the play-money prediction market STOCCER for the FIFA 
World Cup 2006 was about as accurate as betting odds. Betting odds, in turn, are 
known to be very accurate predictors. Moreover, the markets clearly outperformed 
predictions based on the FIFA world ranking as well as the random predictions. The 
chapter contributes to the literature by providing the first empirical comparison of play-
money prediction markets and predictions based on historic data or betting odds in the 
field of sports forecasting. 
An analysis of the championship market documented that prediction markets also 
appear to be efficient in the sense that there are few substantial arbitrage opportunities 
available. Furthermore, it was shown that market markers play an important role in 
prediction markets. They serve as liquidity providers and allow for continuous trading.  
The chapter concluded with a discussion of the results regarding the prediction 
accuracy of the STOCCER markets. In consideration of these results and related 
empirical research, one can ascertain that prediction markets in many cases perform at 
least as well as alternative forecasting methods. Quite often they even outperform well-
established methods such as polls in the field of political elections.   
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5. Incentive Schemes for Play-Money Prediction 
Markets 
In comparison to most alternative forecasting methods, prediction markets provide a 
rather sophisticated incentive scheme as traders can be rewarded based on their 
performance which is a good indicator for the quality of their contributions. So far, 
market operators have employed various kinds of incentive schemes in order to 
motivate people to participate in such markets and to reveal their expectations. Typical 
incentive schemes include prizes for the top performers of a market, lotteries among all 
traders, rankings published on the World Wide Web or even real-money exchanges 
where traders have to invest some of their own money. In real-money prediction 
markets you “put your money where your mouth is” (Hanson, 1990a). This is 
advantageous with respect to opinion weighting since traders will put more money on 
predictions they are more confident about. Furthermore, it is reasonable to expect that 
the prospect of gaining or losing money will motivate traders to seek accurate 
information. However, real-money prediction markets are illegal or at least highly 
regulated in most countries. Even in countries that offer betting licenses to prediction 
market operators, setting up a real-money market incurs huge technical and regulatory 
costs. System failures or attempts to defraud can become business-critical. Real-money 
markets thus are hard to realize. Moreover, potential traders might be unwilling to 
invest their own money in prediction markets.  
Previous research in the field of prediction markets as well as the results described in 
the preceding chapter have shown that play-money as well as real-money markets can 
predict future events at a remarkable degree of accuracy. In play-money prediction 
markets, though, well-designed incentive schemes are oftentimes needed to encourage 
participation and information revelation. The popularity of several play-money markets 
demonstrates that such incentives can motivate intense trading (Robinson, 2001). 
Presumably, the embodiment of the incentive scheme has a huge impact on market 
efficiency and the accuracy of predictions.  
In this chapter, three different monetary incentive schemes for play-money prediction 
markets are compared with regard to their impact on the accuracy of predictions. In 
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order to do so, predictions from three groups of traders corresponding to three 
treatments with different incentive schemes are studied in a field experiment. Subjects 
of the first group received a fixed amount of money, subjects of the second group were 
paid according to their ordinal rank, and the third group the subjects’ payment 
depended linearly on their deposit value in the prediction market. Studying these 
incentive schemes is of special interest when traders need to be paid for taking part in a 
prediction market, e.g. in the case of an internal market for company-specific 
predictions. In such a market it is improbable that employees risk some of their own 
money in order to generate better company forecasts. Based on the results of the field 
experiment, advice on engineering incentive schemes for prediction markets is given.  
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.1 discusses prior 
studies on the comparison of real-money and play-money prediction markets as well as 
related work on incentives schemes in the field of experimental economics. Section 5.2 
then describes the field experiment that was conducted during the FIFA World Cup 
2006 in addition to the public STOCCER markets described in Chapter 3. 
Subsequently, Section 5.3 presents the results of the field experiment concerning the 
impact of the three above-mentioned incentive schemes on the accuracy of predictions. 
Section 5.4 discusses these results and gives an outlook on possible implications for 
designing incentive schemes of public and intra-enterprise prediction markets. Finally, 
Section 5.5 briefly summarizes the main findings of the chapter. 
5.1. Related Work 
Despite the importance of designing suitable incentive schemes, there are so far only 
two research papers studying different incentive schemes for prediction markets and 
these compare real-money and play-money markets. The results of both studies are 
described in Section 5.1.1. Related experimental studies on financial incentive schemes 
beyond the field of prediction markets are presented in Section 5.1.2.  
5.1.1. Real-money vs. Play-money Prediction Markets 
Servan-Schreiber et al. (2004) compare predictions of the real-money market 
TradeSports to those of the play-money market NewsFutures regarding American 
Football outcomes of 208 matches during the 2003-2004 NFL season in order to 
examine how much extra prediction accuracy can be obtained by using real money 
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instead of play money. Both markets among others trade contracts which are valued at 
100 if a team wins and 0 if it loses. The real-money market TradeSports requires an 
initial investment when joining the market and charges a transaction fee on each trade. 
In contrast, registration in NewFutures is free and each trader initially receives a fixed 
amount of play money. Very successful traders can use their play money to bid on real 
prizes. The number of traders per contract under study was known for NewsFutures but 
not for TradeSports. Servan-Schreiber et al. (2004) assumed that this number “is of the 
same order of magnitude” in both markets.  
In their study, Servan-Schreiber et al. (2004) find that there is no statistically significant 
difference between the real-money market TradeSports and the play-money market 
NewsFutures. “Both types of markets exhibited significant predictive powers” and had 
almost the same prediction accuracy (Servan-Schreiber et al., 2004). Their trading 
prices correlated well with actual outcome frequencies. This result raises the question 
how the draw between play-money and real-money prediction markets can be 
explained. First of all, there is supposedly intrinsic interest in NFL football and no 
reason not to trade truthfully except team biases. Additionally, the weights given to the 
traders’ opinions reflect the amount of money they are willing to put on their 
predictions in real-money markets. This is most likely affected by their wealth levels 
rather than by their trading success in prediction markets. In play-money markets, in 
contrast, the traders’ wealth depends on a history of accurate predictions and opinion 
weights should thus be more efficient.  
In a second study on the comparison of play-money and real-money prediction markets, 
Rosenbloom and Notz (2006) analyzed sports events such as baseball games, basketball 
games, hockey games, tennis matches, or golf tournaments and also predictions on the 
direction of financial markets and political events such as whether John Edwards will 
be chosen as the vice presidential candidate in the 2004 United States presidential 
elections. Overall, the correlation between TradeSports probabilities and NewsFutures 
probabilities was 0.955. In case of team sports such as NFL games, Rosenbloom and 
Notz (2006) produced conclusions consistent with those from Servan-Schreiber et al. 
(2004), i.e. they did not find any statistically significant difference between real-money 
and play-money markets for NFL games in particular and team sports in general. In 
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spite of this, Rosenbloom and Notz (2006) found TradeSports to be slightly but 
significantly more accurate than NewsFutures for all the other events. They conclude 
dthat predicting the outcome of matches in case of team sports might be different from 
other events. Rosenbloom and Notz (2006) speculated that traders are getting cues from 
other sources such as betting odds in case of team sports. This might influence their 
assessment of the probabilities.  
In consideration of both studies, the impact of real money vs. play money on the 
accuracy of predictions is not completely understood and clarified. Moreover, there 
exists far more than one design alternative only for play-money markets – and also for 
real-money markets. The strength of both studies is the large data set from real-world 
online experiments that both studies rely on. However, both studies do not consider any 
other differences apart from the use of real money or play money in their comparison of 
the two markets. Although the markets they compare are quite similar, they are far 
from identical. Without doubt, a key difference between the two markets is that one 
uses real money while the other does not. But how did other aspects influence 
prediction accuracy?  
It remains an open question how, for example, the number of traders and their trading 
activity influence the market and thus also the accuracy of predictions. This seems to be 
an interesting question since the number of traders per contract was not available to 
Servan-Schreiber et al. (2004) in case of TradeSports. Rosenbloom and Notz (2006) 
report that in their case there were far more traders in NewsFutures than in 
TradeSports. The number of contracts traded in NewsFutures ranged from 95 to 
157,891 contracts with a mean of 7,600 contracts. In TradeSports it ranged from 1 
contract to 21,771 contracts with a mean of 201 contracts. Thus, the real-money market 
TradeSports performed better despite the lower volume. 
Furthermore, TradeSports also levies a small fee on each transaction. How does this 
impact trading behavior and thus also trading prices? The two markets – TradeSports 
and NewsFutures – were not identical in all respects and it therefore remains an open 
question how other factors have influenced the results described by Servan-Schreiber et 
al. (2004) and by Rosenbloom and Notz (2006).   
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5.1.2. Experimental Studies on Monetary Incentives 
Beyond prediction markets, financial incentives are also employed to improve the 
performance of employees in companies or subjects in economic experiments. 
Monetary incentives are supposed to motivate people to exert additional effort and 
should thus improve task performance. Many experimental economists would in all 
probability insist that monetary risk is required to obtain valid conclusions about 
economic behavior (Servan-Schreiber et al., 2004). In a survey of 31 experimental 
studies, Smith and Walker (1993) found that increased monetary incentives indeed 
bring the behavior closer to the predictions of economic theory with rational agents. 
Monetary incentives also reduce the variance of the data around the outcome predicted 
by rational models. This can presumably be explained by the fact that subjects in an 
experiment balance monetary incentives against decision costs and thus rather deviate 
from rational predictions in case of lower incentives. Regarding monetary incentives in 
companies, recent evidence suggests that employees perform better when using 
performance-based compensation schemes for which the payment is closely related to 
performance (Prendergast, 1999). Although incentive plans are sometimes criticized 
because they do not alter the employees’ attitudes and might make them less 
enthusiastic about their work (Kohn, 1993).  
On the other hand, there is empirical evidence indicating that monetary and 
performance-related incentives do not necessarily increase performance. In several 
experiments Gneezy and Rustichini (2000), for example, find that offering money does 
not always improve performance. For small monetary incentives they observed a 
decrease in performance compared to treatments with zero compensation. However, if 
money was offered, a larger amount of money resulted in a higher performance. 
Possible explanations could be that subjects follow social norms or are intrinsically 
motivated independent of any monetary incentive. The level of intrinsic motivation 
most likely depends on the task at hand and on individual interests. One of the 
experiments conducted by Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) was a donation experiment 
where subjects collected donations from the public. If subjects have to conduct such a 
useful task, one would expect a rather high level of intrinsic motivation. Gneezy and 
Rustichini (2000) speculate that the introduction of a monetary incentive displaces 
intrinsic motivation.  
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It is indeed a frequently discussed issue in psychology and education that monetary 
incentives decrease intrinsic motivation. So far, a consensus has not been reached in 
experimental psychology. However, a recent meta-analysis of incentives and intrinsic 
motivation suggests that, in general, monetary incentives are not harmful to subjects’ 
motivation to perform a task (Cameron et al., 2001). Cameron et al. (2001) state that 
intrinsic motivation increases or does not differ from a control group without any 
monetary incentive if monetary incentives are performance-based.  
Overall, meta-studies such as the one by Camerer and Hogarth (1999) show that the 
presence and amount of monetary incentives seem to affect average performance in 
many tasks. Even in cases where incentives do not change average behavior 
substantively, the variance of responses often decreases. However, the effects of 
monetary incentives on performance are mixed and complicated. On the one hand, they 
depend on the tasks to be performed (Camerer and Hogarth, 1999). Incentives affect the 
performance of subjects in particular if increased effort improves performance. On the 
other hand, the effects of monetary incentives depend on the type of incentive schemes 
which is employed. In a review of 131 laboratory experiments, Bonner et al. (2000) 
studied the relation between the type of incentive scheme and subjects’ task 
performance. On the whole, their review reveals that monetary incentives improve 
performance in about half of the experiments. Furthermore, Bonner et al. (2000) find 
that not all incentive schemes elicit the same level of effort. Piece-rate schemes, for 
instance, have a higher likelihood of positive incentive effects than tournament 
schemes which are in turn followed by fixed-rate schemes.  
Earlier research in the field of labor contracting also confirms that employees perform 
better in case of performance-based compensation schemes compared to fixed rates 
(Prendergast, 1999). Concerning the comparison of tournaments and piece rates, Lazear 
and Rosen (1981) theoretically demonstrate that rank-order tournaments are often 
efficient and yield an allocation of resources identical to that generated by piece rates. 
Under some circumstances, risk-averse employees should actually prefer to be paid on 
the basis of rank, i.e. according to their ordinal rank in the organization rather than their 
output level. Which compensation scheme is preferred by the employees depends on 
the utility function and the amount of luck involved (Lazear and Rosen, 1981). In an 
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experimental study on the comparison of tournament and piece rates, Bull et al. (1987) 
find that the mean effort levels chosen by the subjects converged to their theoretical 
equilibrium levels for both compensation schemes. However, there was a large variance 
of behavior across identical tournaments in case of the rank-order tournament whereas 
the variance was quite small in case of the piece-rate scheme. Bull et al. (1987) 
attribute this difference to the fact that rank-order tournaments require strategic 
behavior whereas piece rates simply induce maximizing behavior.  
Beyond these thoughts on how to design suitable incentive schemes, Bewley (1995) 
notes that managers in real-life know from experience that one should not rely on 
monetary incentives alone to motivate employees. Employees – especially those who 
have contact with the public – should for instance be happy, and happiness cannot be 
achieved with monetary incentives alone.  
5.2. A Field Experiment on Monetary Incentives in Prediction 
Markets 
Studying the impact of different monetary incentive schemes on the prediction 
accuracy of markets is an open and interesting object of investigation. A field 
experiment was conducted to analyze alternative monetary incentive schemes in a 
prediction market. These incentive schemes could for instance be used in internal 
markets for company-specific predictions. Traders can then be rewarded for joining a 
market and contributing to accurate forecasts.  
This section describes the setup of a field experiment which was conducted in parallel 
to the public STOCCER markets during the FIFA World Cup 2006. Firstly, the basic 
setup of the field experiment is presented. Secondly, the three monetary incentive 
schemes that were compared with regard to their prediction accuracy are described and 
it is explained why exactly those three incentive schemes were chosen for the study. 
Thirdly, based on previous research the expected results of the experiment are 
discussed.  
5.2.1. Basic Setup 
The underlying events used for the field experiment were the outcomes of soccer 
matches. Similar to the match markets in the public STOCCER markets (see Section 
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3.2.1) there were 20 markets for the last 20 matches of the FIFA World Cup 2006. 
Contracts traded in the markets were the possible outcomes of all the matches. There 
were three possible outcomes for every match – either one of the two national soccer 
teams won or there was a draw after the second half, i.e. at the end of the regular 
playing time. The third contract “draw” was traded although there were no draws 
possible in 16 out of the 20 matches. The reason was that the outcome of overtimes and 
penalty shootouts was considered to be more or less unpredictable. The contract 
corresponding to the event that actually occurred during the World Cup was valued at 
100 currency units after the match; the other two assets were worthless.  
In total, 60 undergraduate students from the Universität Karlsruhe (TH), Germany, 
were taking part in the field experiment in June and July 2006. The operational 
principle of prediction markets was briefly explained in a lecture and students could 
then volunteer for the field experiment. After registering for the experiment they 
received subsequent instructions via e-mail52. Moreover, the students were asked to 
complete a short pre-experiment questionnaire in order to collect demographic data and 
information about the students’ risk attitude. All the markets opened two days before 
the corresponding match and closed at the end of the match53. Traders were able to buy 
and sell basic portfolios comprising the three contracts traded in a market at 100 
currency units at any time. This way, contracts were placed into circulation. The 
trading mechanism was a standard continuous double auction (CDA) with an open 
order book and limit orders. Short selling was not permitted. The trading software used 
for the experiment was the same one as in case of the public STOCCER markets (cp. 
Section 3.3). 
5.2.2. Incentive Schemes 
The 60 students were randomly assigned to three groups of 20 students each. At the end 
of the FIFA World Cup 2006 the traders were paid in real money according to their 
group’s incentive scheme. This allows for studying the impact of three different 
                                                 
52 See Instruction 1 in Appendix B (in German) for the instructions which were sent to the subjects via e-
mail when trading started for the first time. Depending on the incentive scheme the text of this e-mail 
slightly varied.  
53 See Instruction 2 in Appendix B (in German) for the instructions which were sent to the subjects via e-
mail when the first match markets were launched. Subsequently, the subjects were informed via e-mail 
whenever new match markets were launched. 
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monetary incentive schemes by comparing the prediction accuracy of the three groups 
of traders, corresponding to three treatments with different incentive schemes. The 
subjects of the first group were paid a fixed amount of 50 Euro irrespective of how 
successful they traded in the markets (from now on referred to as fixed payment, FP). 
In the second group, individuals were paid according to their ordinal rank (rank-order 
tournament, RO). The trader ranked first within the group was paid 500 Euro, the 
second 300 Euro, and the third 200 Euro. All the other traders in this group did not 
receive any payment at all. Although the average payment is also 50 Euro per person, 
in this case, few traders win big prizes. Subjects in the third group were promised what 
was called a performance-compatible payment, also with an average amount of 50 Euro 
(deposit value, DV). Performance-compatible means that the payment linearly 
depended on the traders’ success, i.e. the deposit value in the prediction market (deposit 
value divided by 10.000), and was therefore directly influenced by every transaction a 
trader carried out. 
These three incentive schemes were chosen for the field experiment because they are 
closely related – although they admittedly are not exactly the same – to incentives that 
can nowadays typically be observed in public as well as corporate prediction markets. 
In case of public markets, there are usually markets without any payment or prizes to 
win, markets with rank-order tournaments, and real-money markets. Similarly, 
comparing the three monetary incentive schemes is also of interest for operators of 
internal markets for company-specific predictions. Companies are oftentimes willing to 
reward their employees’ effort and so far used various incentives such as rankings 
demonstrating the expertise of successful traders, rank-order tournaments with big 
winners, and real-money markets where the employees’ investments are subsidized by 
the company. These incentive schemes are again similar to the ones investigated in this 
field experiment and consequently the question arises which incentive scheme is the 
most suitable.  
For every group, the 20 markets on 20 soccer matches of the FIFA World Cup were run 
separately, i.e. the same market existed three times. Aside from the difference in the 
incentive schemes, the market environment was identical across groups. This facilitates 
a more reliable test of the effect of incentives in prediction markets than has been 
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reported in any of the related literature. Since subjects who did not trade at all should 
also not receive any payment, a relatively small minimum trading volume was imposed 
on all traders. The minimum weekly trading volume corresponded to 5 Euro in real 
money, i.e. 10 per cent of the initial deposit value. The weekly trading volume was 
displayed in the trading screen and subjects consequently always knew how much they 
had to trade in order to reach the minimum trading volume. Especially in the case of the 
fixed payment group subjects might otherwise have considered not trading at all or 
simply could have forgotten to participate in the online experiment. 
5.2.3. Expected Results 
Based on earlier research on monetary incentives it is to be expected that the 
performance-compatible group performs best and the fixed payment group performs 
worst in terms of prediction accuracy. In the following the intuition behind these 
expectations is explained.  
On the one hand, no extrinsic motivation is given to subjects of the fixed payment 
group to reveal their expectations or to be among the top performers of the group. 
Basically, there is no incentive for them to trade more than the minimum required 
trading volume per week. One would thus expect a rather low trading activity 
compared to the other incentive schemes. On the other hand, one should not forget 
about the traders’ intrinsic motivation and also their interest in soccer. Traders 
receiving a fixed payment independent of their performance should not display a 
reduction in intrinsic motivation compared to unrewarded groups of traders (Gneezy 
and Rustichini, 2000, Cameron et al., 2001). They may also consider it a duty to 
perform well in exchange for receiving the payment of 50 Euro. Furthermore, traders 
do not risk any money and risk aversion thus does not come into play. Nevertheless, it 
can be suspected that the fixed payment scheme performs worse than the other two 
incentive schemes since it is known that the presence of performance-based monetary 
incentives does enhance average performance in many tasks (Camerer and Hogarth, 
1999, Prendergast, 1999).  
Members of the third group receive a performance-compatible payment, meaning that 
every transaction directly influences the payment they receive. Traders are paid 
according to their individual output level and should consequently be motivated to try 
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their best. Due to their risk aversion, traders probably try to avoid losing money and 
consider very carefully what and how to trade. One can for this reason expect that 
traders from this group trade less and at slightly lower prices. Their increased effort, 
however, should improve their performance (Camerer and Hogarth, 1999) and 
therefore also prediction accuracy. In short, traders with the incentive scheme DV have 
to “put their money where their mouth is” (Hanson, 1999) and consequently predictions 
are expected to be rather accurate. In contrast to e.g. rewarding corporate executives, 
where it is difficult to observe an individual’s output, this is straightforward in case of 
traders’ performance and hence not a downside of the performance-compatible 
payment.  
For the rank-order tournament one can expect a result somewhere in between the other 
two groups. On the one hand, traders have a strong incentive to be among top three 
traders of their group because they will not receive any payment otherwise. This should 
lead to a rather high trading activity. Moreover, rank-order tournaments have also been 
considered as a promising payment scheme in other contexts such as labor contracting 
(Bull et al., 1987, Lazear and Rosen, 1981). On the other hand, the rank-order 
tournament provides an incentive to take higher risks compared to traders receiving the 
performance-compatible payment. Strategic behavior comes into play because the 
margin of winning does not affect payments (Lazear and Rosen, 1981). Also, traders 
might start betting on unlikely events because they consider this the best or maybe even 
only way to outperform their competitors. At least, traders falling behind are likely to 
take risky strategies to catch up with competing traders (Prendergast, 1999). Also, 
traders could stop trading as soon as they assume that they do not have any chance of 
becoming one of the top three traders of their group.  
All in all, one could expect that the performance-compatible incentive scheme 
outperforms the rank-order tournament which in turn does better than the fixed 
payment. This would also be consistent with findings from laboratory studies which 
examined the effect of different incentive schemes on performance. In a review on 
comparable incentive schemes, Bonner et al. (2000) conclude that piece-rate schemes 
have a higher likelihood of positive incentive effects than tournament schemes which 
are in turn followed by fixed-rate schemes.  
Incentive Schemes for Play-Money Prediction Markets 84 
5.3. Experimental Results 
This section describes the results from the field experiment on monetary incentives. 
Firstly, the trading activity of the three treatments is compared in order to find out how 
the different incentive schemes affect trading activity. Secondly, the distribution of 
trading prices in the three treatments is analyzed. Finally, the impact of the three 
different incentive schemes on the accuracy of predictions which are derived from 
trading prices is examined.  
5.3.1. Trading Activity 
As was already described in Section 5.2.3, one could probably influence the level of 
trading in a prediction market by choosing a certain incentive scheme. In case of a 
fixed payment there is no monetary incentive to trade more than the minimum trading 
volume whereas a competitive incentive scheme such as the rank-order tournament 
should stimulate trading. Table 14 shows the total and mean number of trades as well 
as the standard deviation in the three treatments of the field experiment.  
Table 14: Trading activity in the three treatments 




# trades  
(std dev) 
FP (fixed payment) 1520 76 69.08 
RO (rank-order tournament) 962 48.1 42.58 
DV (deposit value) 1319 65.95 47.74 
 
Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, with a total of 1,520 the number of trades is highest in 
case of the treatment with the fixed payment and lowest in case of the rank-order 
tournament with a total of 962 trades. In the third treatment in which payments are 
linearly based on the traders’ success, the number of trades lies between the other two 
treatments. Relative to the treatments with performance-based incentive schemes (RO 
and DV) the trading activity is higher than expected in the group with a fixed payment. 
The differences in trading activity between the three groups, however, are not 
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statistically significant (Kruskal-Wallis test, p-value = 0.355)54, 55. Despite the relatively 
high trading activity in case of the FP treatment, there was not a single trade in four 
markets. In the RO treatment, there were still two markets with no trading activity. This 
is of course undesirable because it is then impossible to derive any predictions from 
trading prices. The only treatment with trading activity in all markets was the DV 
treatment.  
5.3.2. Trading Prices 
In total, every group traded 60 contracts in 20 different markets. Figure 21 illustrates 
how many contracts were traded within certain price ranges in each of the three 
treatments. The prices under examination here are the last trading prices before the 
corresponding match started. Contracts are grouped into five price ranges and, for each 
treatment, the share of contracts with trading prices in each of the price ranges is 
depicted. The very first column, for example, shows that before the match started 32% 
of the contracts were traded at prices between 0 and 20 virtual currency units in the first 
treatment with a fixed payment. Accordingly, in the RO treatment 19% of the contracts 
were traded within this price range.  
When comparing the three treatments one can see that a relatively high number of 
contracts were traded at prices between 60 and 100 currency units in the rank-order 
tournament treatment. Moreover, a relatively small number of contracts were traded at 
prices between 0 and 20 currency units in this treatment. Subjects are obviously willing 
to take some risk in treatment with the rank-order tournament and buy contracts even at 
rather high prices. In case the trading prices are good predictors the likelihood of the 
underlying events should be similarly high as the prices.  
Subjects in the performance-compatible payment group, in contrast, do not trade any 
contract at a price between 80 and 100 currency units and almost no contract in the 
price range from 60 to 80. Obviously, traders with the payment scheme DV are 
                                                 
54 The null hypothesis of the Kruskal-Wallis test states that there is no difference between the mean 
trading activities of the groups. The null hypothesis cannot be rejected here. For more information on the 
Kruskal-Wallis test see Kruskal and Wallis (1952). 
55 Although the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test shows that distributions in each of the groups are normal, an 
analysis of variance cannot be used in this case because the variance of the data in the groups is not the 
same. The Bartlett’s test was used to test for equal variances. For more information on the Bartlett’s test 
see Bartlett (1937). 
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unwilling to take the risk of buying contracts at such a high price although there is no 
reason why their expectations about specific outcomes of the matches should differ 
from the traders’ expectations in the other two treatments. At the other extreme, 52% of 
the contracts are traded for less than 20 currency units in the DV treatment.  
 
Figure 21: Distribution of trading prices in the three treatments56 
On average, trading prices for the same matches are lowest in the DV treatment and 
highest in the RO treatment. One possible explanation for the cautious behavior of 
traders in the third treatment could be their risk aversion. Due to their risk aversion, 
traders seem to trade contracts at lower prices compared to the other two treatments. 
Obviously, they are unwilling to buy contracts at prices similar to the ones in the other 
treatments and at the same time are willing to sell contracts at rather low prices. 
Traders in the RO treatment, however, are willing to take some risk in order to 
outperform the competing subjects of their group. The FP treatment does not impose 
any monetary risk at all and risk aversion thus should not matter. The following section 
discusses how this trading behavior impacts the prediction accuracy of the three 
treatments.  
                                                 
56 The exact shares of contracts traded within the five price ranges in each of the treatments are given in 
Table 25 of Appendix B.  
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5.3.3. Prediction Accuracy 
Overall, 35% of the contracts with the highest trading price out of the three contracts 
per match actually corresponded to the observed outcome in case of the fixed payment. 
This can also be referred to as hit rate of the markets as it was defined earlier in this 
work for the match markets of STOCCER which were open to the public (see Section 
4.3.1). The average pre-game trading price of the contract corresponding to the 
outcome was 40.83 virtual currency units. In the rank-order tournament, the most likely 
outcome according to the trading prices actually occurred in 45% of the cases and the 
average pre-game trading price of the contract corresponding to the outcome was 51.65 
currency units. Finally, in case of the performance-compatible payment, the most likely 
outcome according to the trading prices occurred in merely 20% of the cases and the 
average pre-game trading price of the contract corresponding to the outcome was 26.64 
currency units. When interpreting the trading prices as probabilities the third group 
predicted the outcome of a match even worse than the treatment with a fixed payment. 
The rank-order tournament, in contrast, seems to work quite well with regard to the hit 
rate and average pre-game trading price. This is rather surprising and contrary to the 
expected results discussed in Section 5.2.3. However, the differences between the 
average pre-game trading prices of the three treatments are not statistically significant 
(Kruskal-Wallis test, p-value = 0.156)57. Concerning the hit rate, there can only be 
found a statistically significant difference between the RO and the DV treatment 
(Pearson's chi-square test, p-value = 0.024)58, 59.  
Section 5.3.2 already described that trading prices seemed to be rather low in case of 
the performance-compatible payment compared to the other treatments. This can also 
be seen when calculating the sum of the three contract prices corresponding to the three 
possible outcomes of a match. These prices should sum up to about 100 virtual 
currency units since the probability that one of the three events occurs is 100%. In case 
of the performance-related incentive scheme the average price of such a so called basic 
                                                 
57 The null hypothesis of the Kruskal-Wallis test cannot be rejected here and differences between the 
trading prices are thus not statistically significant.  
58 For more information on Pearson's chi-square test see e.g. Cowan (1998). 
59 Although there was no trading activity in 4 markets in case of the FP treatment and in 2 markets in 
case of the RO treatment, the hit rate was calculated as the number of correctly predicted matches 
relative to the total number of matches. The hit rate of those two treatments would otherwise be a little 
higher. Nevertheless, this is not desirable since markets with no trades at all are also not useful for 
making predictions about the outcome of matches.  
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If the markets are efficient, a plot of trading prices vs. observed outcome frequencies 
should approximate the 45-degree line which represents perfect accuracy. One should 
thus observe that contracts traded, for example, at a price of 30 currency units 
correspond to the actual outcome with a probability of 30% on average. The size of the 
circles, diamonds, and triangles indicates how many trading prices fall into the 
corresponding price range in case of the different incentive schemes. The larger a 
circle, diamonds, or triangle is, the more contracts were assigned to this price range. 
A first glance at Figure 22 already shows that the trading prices and outcome 
frequencies seem to correspond rather well in case of the rank-order tournament. The 
correlation between the relative frequency of outcome and the trading prices serves as 
an indicator for the accuracy of predictions 61 . For the rank-order tournament, the 
correlation coefficient is 0.845 which indicates a high correlation between outcome 
frequencies and trading prices. While there still is a medium correlation of 0.509 in 
case of the DV group, the correlation is not statistically significant for the predictions 
from the FP group 62 . Thus, trading prices from the RO group reach the highest 
correlation with outcome frequencies compared to the other two incentive schemes. 
Once again, the rank-order tournament seems to outperform the other incentive 
schemes. In contrast to the expected results discussed in Section 5.2.3, the prediction 
accuracy here is found to be better in case of the rank-order tournament than in case of 
the payment based linearly on the trading success in the DV treatment. The FP 
incentive scheme performs very poor as the correlation between trading prices and 
outcome frequency did not reach significance.  
As was already discussed earlier, on average the sum of the three trading prices 
corresponding to the three possible outcomes of a match was only 53.30 virtual 
currency units in case of performance-compatible incentive scheme. Due to the low 
trading prices in the DV treatment there is no triangle in the price range between 80 and 
100 currency units of Figure 22. This might also explain why the prediction accuracy of 
the treatment with the rank-order tournament is higher. When dividing all the trading 
prices by the average price of a basic portfolio, in the DV treatment, the correlation 
                                                 
61 Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient is employed to measure the correlation. For more information 
on this correlation coefficient see Hotelling and Pabst (1936). 
62 p-value < 0.001 for RO and DV; p-value = 0.082 in case of FP 
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coefficient between the relative frequency of outcome and the trading prices after all 
increases to 0.65363. Still, the correlation coefficient is higher in the RO treatment 
without any need for normalization. This also makes the interpretation of trading prices 
as probabilities much easier in the RO treatment.  
5.4. Discussion of Results 
One can only speculate about possible reasons for this result, i.e. in particular the good 
performance of the rank-order tournament. Traders are obviously not only driven by 
monetary incentives since they do not stop trading as soon as they reach the minimum 
weekly trading volume in the FP treatment. Also, in case of the rank-order tournament, 
traders continue to trade even if winning becomes extremely unlikely for them. This 
explains why even the markets of the FP group work to some extent. Nevertheless, 
there was no trading activity for four matches and also no significant correlation 
between trading prices and outcome frequencies in case of the FP treatment. A fixed 
payment consequently does not seem to be a well-suited incentive scheme to 
remunerate traders in a play-money prediction market.  
Still, intrinsic motivation does not explain the higher prediction accuracy of the RO 
treatment compared to the DV treatment since there is no obvious reason why intrinsic 
motivation should be different in these treatments. Both incentive schemes are 
performance-based but differ with respect to the accuracy of predictions. The traders’ 
risk aversion could be one reason for the good performance of the rank-order 
tournament relative to the payment which depends linearly on the traders’ success.  
Before the field experiment on monetary incentives started, a lottery choice experiment 
as known from Holt and Laury (2002) was conducted in order to measure the traders’ 
degree of risk aversion. Similar to Figure 23, subjects were presented a menu of 
choices which permits measurement of the degree of risk aversion64. The probabilities 
were explained in terms of throws of a ten-sided dice. The amounts of money, however, 
were fifty times the ones shown in Figure 23. The choices thus involved large cash 
prizes that were paid to the subjects. The payoffs for Option A are less variable than the 
payoffs of the risky Option B. When the probability of the high-payoff outcome 
                                                 
63 Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient, p-value < 0.001 
64 The screen which was presented to subjects can be found in Figure 30 of Appendix B (in German).  
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increases enough subjects should cross over from Option A to Option B. A risk-neutral 
subject would choose Option A four times before switching to Option B.  
 
Figure 23: Ten paired lottery-choice decisions (Holt and Laury, 2002) 
50 out of the 60 subjects from the field experiment also participated in the lottery 
choice experiment. Only 7 subjects ever switched back from B to A. Figure 24 depicts 
the average proportion of safe choices in the experiment as well as the risk neutral 
prediction for each of the ten decisions. One can see that the series of choice 
frequencies lies to the right of the risk neutral prediction. Across the three groups, 
nearly 75% of the subjects chose more than four safe choices and thus exhibited risk 
aversion. These results are in line with those reported in the literature (Holt and Laury, 
2002, Harrison et al., 2007, Holt and Laury, 2005).  
In case of the fixed payment, traders can neither win nor lose money, so they just play 
for fun and their risk aversion should not matter. Moreover, traders will take quite a lot 
of risk in the rank-order tournament because they have to be among the top performers 
within their group to receive the relatively large cash prize. Thus, the incentives over-
ride risk aversion. Only in case of the performance-compatible incentive scheme, 
traders receive an endowment of 50 Euro and could potentially lose money with every 
trade they make. As a result, buyers are obviously extremely cautious and not willing to 
spend too much money on any contract. But why are sellers willing to give up contracts 
at prices below their average worth? Subjects had to trade in order to reach the 
minimum transaction volume. Once sellers have started to partially sell their basic 
portfolios they are probably willing to sell at rather low prices to avoid the risk of 
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market are risk-seeking. In such a situation a performance-compatible payment scheme 
might potentially produce much better predictions than in the case of the field 
experiment which is discussed here.  
5.5. Summary 
This chapter analyzed the impact of different incentive schemes on the accuracy of 
prediction markets. The only two articles dealing with incentives in the field of 
prediction markets compare play-money to real-money markets while in the field 
experiment different incentive schemes of play-money markets were compared. 
Subsequent to a brief discussion of previous experimental studies on monetary 
incentives beyond prediction markets, the field experiment studying three commonly-
used incentive schemes of play-money prediction markets was presented.  
The results show that rank-order tournaments are a suitable incentive scheme in case of 
risk-averse traders. A lottery choice experiment was utilized to measure the traders’ 
degree of risk aversion. The competitive environment in the corresponding treatment 
overrides risk aversion and in doing so leads to the best results in terms of prediction 
accuracy. Due to the risk aversion average trading prices were by far too low in case of 
the performance-compatible incentive schemes. The fixed payment scheme was also 
found to be ill-suited since there was no trading activity for several events and also no 
significant correlation between trading prices and outcome frequencies.  
The chapter concluded with a discussion of the results. Those are highly relevant for 
the question of how to remunerate traders in internal corporate prediction markets but 
cannot be directly transferred to public real-money prediction markets.  
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6. Traders' Biases in Prediction Markets 
According to the early work by Hayek (1945) and Fama’s (1970b) efficient market 
hypothesis, market prices aggregate and reveal the information traders have. Research 
in behavioral economics and behavioral finance, however, provides evidence of 
anomalies in individual behavior. It has been demonstrated that individuals exhibit 
substantial information processing or judgment biases. Markets which require 
probabilistic calculations and forecasts of future outcomes are particularly challenging 
with regard to the traders’ information processing capabilities. Traders’ biases may thus 
also affect their trading behavior in prediction markets and in doing so influence 
predictions based on trading prices. In the first place the question arises whether such 
biases can actually be observed in prediction markets. If so, it is interesting to study 
whether markets still work well even if traders do not behave as economic theory 
assumes.  
In the field of political stock markets, Forsythe et al. (1992) for the first time 
demonstrated that traders are buying and selling contracts of US presidential candidates 
in a manner which is correlated with their preferences, i.e. supporters of a candidate 
buy more contracts of this candidate than they sell. This is contradictory to the 
assumption that rational traders should not trade according to their individual 
preferences but according to the expected election outcome. Their preferences, 
however, seem to affect their expectations and traders might unconsciously support 
their preferred candidate or party. Forsythe et al. (1992) attribute the observed biases to 
failures in the traders’ information-processing capabilities. However, manipulation 
should be considered as an alternative explanation for the traders’ behavior in political 
stock markets.  
So far, empirical results on price manipulation in prediction markets are mixed. In an 
experimental study, Hanson et al. (2006) find that manipulators are unable to distort 
prediction accuracy. In contrast to standard prediction markets, subjects in this 
experiment knew that there were manipulators in the market trying to bull the market. It 
therefore remains an open question whether the experimental results also hold for 
prediction markets in general. Hanson (2006) even argues that manipulative trading 
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should usually improve prediction accuracy. Earlier research on manipulation which 
has been conducted in the field of political stock markets, on the other hand, provides 
evidence of manipulation. Hansen et al. (2004) discuss the effect of manipulation under 
the preconditions of indecisive voters and mass media coverage. Under such 
circumstances, traders might try to influence voters via the predictions which are 
published in the media. Indeed, Hansen et al. (2004) conclude that political stock 
markets are vulnerable to manipulation and that trading prices can be manipulated 
effectively. In a market on the Swedish referendum about joining the European Union, 
Bohm and Sonnegard (1999) also find that it is possible for a group of traders to distort 
trading prices at least for a certain period of time.  
Overall, the impact of manipulation on the performance of prediction markets is 
without doubt an open question (Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2005). Attempts of 
manipulation could also explain why traders in political stock markets are buying and 
selling contracts in a manner which is correlated with their preferences. In political 
elections, traders might try to influence other voters and hence also the outcome of the 
election. As a consequence, it appears reasonable to study the impact of traders’ biases 
on their trading behavior in a field of application where traders cannot influence the 
outcome of the corresponding event.  
Sports tournaments are such a domain. Traders in STOCCER, for example, in all 
likelihood cannot influence the outcome of soccer matches or the performance of their 
national soccer team. This chapter examines whether traders in the sports prediction 
market STOCCER exhibit any systematic biases resulting from their nationality. It 
studies the impact of the traders’ nationality on their holdings and their trading 
behavior. If trading is correlated with preferences, traders should buy more and sell 
fewer contracts of their national team than other traders.  
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 6.1 outlines related work 
on biases in financial and prediction markets. Subsequently, Section 6.2 describes the 
STOCCER data which is used to study the correlation between the traders’ nationality 
and their trading behavior. The results of the study are presented in Section 6.3. Firstly, 
the correlation between nationality and shareholdings is examined. Secondly, the 
impact of the traders’ nationality on their trading behavior is analyzed. Thirdly, 
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differences in trading prices of prediction markets which focus on specific target 
groups are studied. Section 6.4 discusses the results and their implications for the 
selection of traders in prediction markets. Finally, Section 6.5 briefly summarizes the 
main findings of this chapter.  
6.1. Related Work 
Biases such as the home bias which describes the tendency of investors to allocate a 
large fraction of their portfolio to domestic assets are well-known phenomena in 
financial markets. Section 6.1.1 addresses earlier research on the home bias since it is 
closely related to the bias studied in this chapter. The home bias in financial markets 
deals with the impact of investors’ nationality on asset holdings whereas the study 
discussed in this chapter examines how the traders’ nationality influences 
shareholdings and trading behavior in prediction markets. Earlier research on biases in 
prediction markets is presented in Section 6.1.2. So far, prediction market researchers 
focus on the favorite-longshot bias and partisanship in political stock markets.  
6.1.1. Home Bias in Financial Markets 
Investing abroad may improve an investor’s risk-return portfolio profile because 
foreign assets do not always move together with domestic assets. Usually, there is a 
relatively high degree of correlation within an economy (Levy and Sarnat, 1970). 
Depending on the correlation of returns across different countries, investors in 
consequence may benefit from an internationally diversified portfolio. Although this 
has been known for decades, there is strong evidence that investors allocate only a 
small fraction of their portfolio to foreign investments (e.g. French and Poterba, 1991, 
Cooper and Kaplanis, 1994, Tesar and Werner, 1995, Kang and Stulz, 1997). Investors 
in the United States, for example, allocate only about eight percent of their holdings to 
foreign assets although the optimal weight is about 40 percent (Pástor, 2000) 65 . 
Actually, “investors should put much more of their wealth into foreign assets” 
(Glassmann and Riddick, 2001, p. 35).  
Nevertheless, underweighting of foreign assets may be due to rational reasons. Several 
possible explanations for this underdiversification, which is often referred to as home 
                                                 
65 The sample period ended in 1996. A more recent publication states that investors in the United States 
in the meanwhile allocate about 12 percent of their holdings to foreign assets. See(Ahearne et al., 2004) 
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bias, have been discussed in the academic literature. First, institutional factors such as 
taxes or greater transaction costs for foreign assets may reduce returns from investing 
abroad and thus make home assets more attractive (Glassmann and Riddick, 2001, 
French and Poterba, 1991). However, obstacles to international portfolio investment 
have decreased dramatically over the years because of, for instance, international tax 
accords (Kang and Stulz, 1997). At the same time, the home bias has also decreased 
substantially. Nevertheless, it still remains high (Ahearne et al., 2004).  
Institutional factors are of second-order importance in the meanwhile. Thus, other 
explanations for the home bias have been put forth. The imperfect diversification could 
as well be caused by information asymmetries and differences in the investors’ 
expectations. French and Poterba (1991) argue that investors expect returns in their 
domestic asset market to be higher than returns in other markets. Shiller et al. (1991) 
report survey data which indicates that domestic investors are more optimistic about 
domestic market returns than foreign investors are. Moreover, investors may attribute a 
higher risk to foreign investments because they know more about the domestic market 
and try to bypass political risks which are associated with foreign investments. If the 
perceived risk of foreign assets increases they become less desirable, thus generating a 
home bias (Glassmann and Riddick, 2001).  
Information asymmetries could also explain the findings of Kang and Stulz (1997) who 
studied foreign equity ownership in Japan. They observed that foreign investors in 
Japan did not hold the market portfolio. In fact, investors preferred to hold shares of 
large and well-known manufacturing companies as well as companies with good 
accounting performance. Information asymmetries are most likely smaller for these 
companies compared to small and unknown companies. Large companies, for instance, 
are more likely to sell their products abroad and are thus known by consumers and 
potential shareholders in foreign countries. Merton (1987) argues that investors hold 
shares they know about. This may explain why investors did not hold the Japanese 
market portfolio. Due to this bias, investors’ return in Japan was more volatile 
compared to holding the market portfolio (Kang and Stulz, 1997).  
Across countries, information asymmetries which result from low credibility and poor 
financial information in some countries can be overcome, for instance, by cross-listing 
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the shares of a company in countries with reputable accounting standards and 
regulatory environments (Ahearne et al., 2004). Even within countries, then again, 
investors prefer to invest in local companies (Coval and Moskowitz, 1999). 
Asymmetric information between local and non-local investors could also explain this 
preference for geographically close-by investments. After all, local investors may 
obtain important information about a company from employees, suppliers, and the local 
media. This can be considered an information advantage compared to other investors.  
Overall, most of the explanations of the home bias are based on compelling intuitions 
but it is an empirical question to determine which explain observed behavior. None of 
them individually has succeeded in resolving the home bias puzzle (Kang and Stulz, 
1997). The home bias can most likely only be explained by a combination of the above-
mentioned factors. 
While institutional factors are irrelevant when studying traders’ behavior in a specific 
prediction market, information asymmetries as well as differences in traders’ 
expectations might indeed play a role in prediction markets. Within the scope of the 
study discussed in this chapter, the traders’ nationality may influence their standard of 
knowledge about national soccer teams and their expectations.  
6.1.2. Biases in Prediction Markets 
Research on biases in the field of prediction markets focuses on the favorite-longshot 
bias and partisanship in political stock markets. The favorite-longshot bias is well-
known from racetrack betting data (e.g. Thaler and Ziemba, 1988, Ali, 1977, Hausch et 
al., 1981). According to this bias, betting odds provide biased estimates of probabilities. 
Bettors tend to overvalue longshots and undervalue favorites in betting markets. For 
this reason, betting on favorites yields higher returns than betting on longshots. As 
shown by betting data from horse races between 1992 and 2001 in Figure 25, the loss 
of betting on odds of 100/1 is about 61 percent while betting the favorites yields losses 
of only around 5.5 percent (Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2006b).  
Although betting markets are generally efficient, bettors’ misperceptions of probability 
drive the favorite-longshot bias (Snowberg and Wolfers, 2007). The favorite-longshot 
bias may thus be considered the result of market inefficiency (Woodland and 
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Woodland, 1994). A similar mispricing has also been found in prediction markets. 
Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2004), for instance, study financial variables which are traded 
on Tradesports prediction markets. They find that extremely unlikely outcomes are 
relatively overpriced on TradeSports. Moreover, Leigh et al. (2007) provide evidence 
of a modest favorite-longshot bias in political stock markets. Overall, the favorite-
longshot bias is well-documented in betting as well as prediction markets. Since this 
chapter examines whether traders in the STOCCER prediction market exhibit any 
systematic biases resulting from their nationality, the favorite-longshot bias is not 
studied in more detail in the following.  
 
Figure 25: Rate of return at different odds (Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2006b) 
Another behavioral bias observed in prediction markets reflects the tendency of traders 
to trade according to their desires. Forsythe et al. (1992) demonstrated that traders are 
buying and selling contracts in a political stock market in a manner which is correlated 
with their party identification. This is also a common phenomenon beyond prediction 
markets. Political scientists have observed a tendency to overestimate the preferred 
candidate’s or party’s chances of victory (e.g. Bartels, 1987).  
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Most likely traders’ preferences over parties and candidates influence their perception 
of reality as well as the interpretation of news and information about the likelihood of 
the outcome occurring. Furthermore, Table 15 demonstrates that individuals 
overestimate the extent to which their views are representative for all voters. 
Respondents were asked for which candidate they intend to vote and which candidate 
they expect to win. The supporters of a candidate are most of the time quite convinced 
that their candidate is going to win the election. A typical example was the US 
presidential election in 1980. While 87 percent of the Democrats expected a Democrat 
to win, merely 19.6 percent of the Republicans expected a Democrat to win.  
Table 15: Preferences and expectation in elections (Forsythe et al., 1992) 
 
Forsythe et al. (1992) provide evidence that biases affected trading behavior on average 
by matching individual trading data to political preferences. Supporters of a candidate 
buy more contracts of the candidate than they sell. This is also referred to as the wishful 
thinking effect (Forsythe et al., 1999). Despite these judgment biases, the market 
worked extremely well. Forsythe et al. (1992) explain the success of the market with 
the so called marginal trader hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, average traders 
are biased but prices are determined by marginal traders. Marginal traders here are 
defined as traders who submit limit orders at prices close to trading prices. These 
traders invested more and traded more actively. Indeed, Forsythe et al. (1992) find that 
marginal traders did not suffer from judgment bias in their trades. They are presumably 
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motivated by profits rather than partisanship. Nevertheless, there is not direct test for 
this assumption.  
Forsythe et al. (1999) reproduce the wishful thinking effect which was found in 
political stock markets in laboratory markets. Most probably, there is a tendency to 
overestimate the probability of desirable events beyond political stock markets. Traders 
increased prices correlated with things they wanted to happen in the laboratory markets 
(Forsythe et al., 1999). Beside prices, biases also affected the distribution of holdings 
across traders.  
Oliven and Rietz (2004) also provide evidence of irrational trader behavior in a 
political stock market which cannot be explained by traders’ biases. Traders are buying 
and selling at prices that are not the best available and are violating arbitrage 
restrictions. Despite this irrational behavior, markets are found to be remarkably 
efficient. Oliven and Rietz (2004) find dramatic differences in mistake rates between 
market-making and price-taking traders. Market-making traders are far less mistake-
prone and in the end determine prices. This explains why markets can be efficient 
despite irrational trader behavior. Market makers profit from the other traders’ mistakes 
and thus have an incentive to set efficient prices. Such erroneous actions, however, are 
not discussed in the following.  
6.2. Description of the Data 
This section describes the data which is used to study the correlation between the 
traders’ nationality and their trading behavior. First of all, the analysis focuses on the 
STOCCER championship market which was already described in detail in Section 
3.2.1. Contracts of all 32 national soccer teams were traded in this market. It was 
chosen for the following analysis because it was the most liquid market and the only 
market which was running continuously for several weeks. Furthermore, it is well 
suited to study the influence of the traders’ nationality on their shareholdings and 
trading behavior since contracts of all national teams were traded in this market and the 
payoff of contracts depended on the overall performance of the teams. If biases related 
to the traders’ country of origin existed, they should thus be observed in this market.  
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Every action of traders was recorded in the STOCCER championship market. Full 
information about the trading activity, i.e. orders and trades, and traders’ shareholdings 
is available or can be calculated for any point in time. Moreover, the traders’ 
nationality is known since they provided information about their country of origin 
during the registration process. As described in Section 3.2.4, traders originated from 
72 different countries around the world. Countries with a substantial number of traders 
were Germany, Switzerland, USA, Belgium, Austria, UK, China, and Italy. The 
number of traders from other countries is too small to allow for a meaningful analysis 
of traders’ biases. Out of the eight aforementioned countries, the following analysis is 
restricted to countries which were taking part in the FIFA World Cup 2006. Hence, 
data on shareholdings as well as trading activity is analyzed to study biases of traders 
coming from Germany, Switzerland, USA, UK, and Italy.  
Beyond the STOCCER championship market, trading prices of two other prediction 
markets which also traded contracts on national teams were collected during the FIFA 
World Cup 2006. The first market, Ballstreet, was operated in Germany and focused on 
German traders. Since the web pages of Ballstreet were not translated it is quite 
unlikely that traders from other countries were joining this market. The second market, 
TradeSports, is targeted at traders coming from the US and UK. Trading prices from 
these two markets and STOCCER are compared to examine whether prices differ 
across prediction markets if the predominant majority of traders originates from 
different countries. 
6.3. Results 
Traders in STOCCER are expected to be overly optimistic about their national team’s 
likely success and to interpret news with respect to their national team more favorably 
than other traders. Thus, they should overestimate the likely success of their national 
team and make larger investments (number of contracts held) in their national team. 
Section 6.3.1 describes how the traders’ nationality affected their shareholdings in the 
STOCCER championship market. Subsequently, Section 6.3.2 shows the influence of 
the trader’s nationality on their trading behavior. Prediction markets which focus on 
traders coming from one country can also be expected to exhibit a bias in favor of the 
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corresponding country. Section 6.3.3 therefore contrasts trading prices of three 
prediction markets with different target groups of traders.  
6.3.1. Traders’ Nationality and Shareholdings 
Similar to investors in financial markets who commonly allocate a large fraction of 
their portfolio to domestic investments, traders in the STOCCER championship market 
should hold more contracts of their country’s national soccer team if they overestimate 
its likely success. Table 16 shows the average number of contracts held by traders 
originating from Germany, Switzerland, USA, UK, and Italy in the corresponding 
national teams at the market close on July 9th 200666. Swiss traders, for instance, hold 
an average of about 1,153 contracts of the Swiss national team. They hold fewer 
contracts in the other four countries. On average across all 32 contracts traded in the 
market, Swiss traders hold only about 471 contracts.  
Table 16: Traders’ nationality and shareholdings in teams (July 9
th
 2006) 
    AVERAGE NUMBER OF CONTRACTS 



















Germany 401.97 214.02 326.26 323.84 324.75 311.74 
Switzerland 189.39 1153.06 592.93 262.11 396.83 471.30 
USA 218.86 95.39 387.39 377.06 268.29 213.18 
UK 70.00 73.33 60.00 1347.60 543.87 446.30 
Italy 79.69 114.54 226.08 79.92 1406.54 277.71 
 
As a matter of fact, traders from all of these countries on average hold more shares in 
their own national team than in any of the other five teams. They also hold more 
contracts of their national team compared to the average team out of the 32 national 
soccer teams participating in the FIFA World Cup.  
Figure 26 further highlights this bias by contrasting the average number of contracts 
held in the team of the traders’ home country with the average number of contracts held 
across all teams on July 9th 2006 67 . It can be seen that traders from Germany, 
                                                 
66 The biases which are observed here are not specific for this point in time. Table 27 in Appendix C, for 
example, contrasts the traders’ nationality and shareholdings on June 23rd 2006, i.e. before the final 
rounds of the tournament started.  
67 Figure 31 in Appendix C shows the same comparison with data from June 23rd 2006, i.e. before the 
final rounds of the tournament started.  
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Switzerland, USA, UK, and Italy indeed hold more contracts of their national team than 
of other teams. On average, the 1,306 traders coming from these five countries held 
about 546 contracts of their own national team compared to 336 contracts across all 32 
teams 68 . The difference between the number of contracts held by traders in their 
national team and the number of contracts held across all teams is significant (Mann-
Whitney U test, p-value < 0.001)69.  
 
Figure 26: Shareholdings in home country and across all teams (July 9
th
 2006) 
As a consequence, traders were biased in terms of holding more contracts of their own 
national soccer team than of other teams in the STOCCER championship markets. This 
can presumably be attributed to traders overestimating the likely success of their 
national team. If traders are more optimistic about their team than other traders, they 
should be willing to buy contracts at higher prices and thus also hold more contracts of 
their team than other traders. 
                                                 
68 The standard deviation is 1503.72 for the contracts of the home country and 797.44 for all contracts.  
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6.3.2. Traders’ Nationality and Trading Behavior 
Biases observed in the traders’ shareholdings result from their trading behavior. This 
section therefore studies how biases resulting from the traders’ nationality impact their 
trading behavior in the STOCCER championship market. Since traders hold more 
contracts of their own national team there should be a larger proportion of net buyers 
among traders coming from the corresponding country compared to the proportion of 
net buyers among traders coming from other countries.  
Table 17 shows the number and proportion of traders who purchased the contracts of 
the soccer teams from Germany, Switzerland, USA, UK, and Italy. For each contract, 
the traders are split up into two groups. The first group of traders comprises all traders 
coming from the country corresponding to the respective contract while the second 
group comprises all remaining traders. To give an example, there were 540 German 
traders who traded the contract “Germany”. 413 out of these 540 traders bought at least 
one contract, i.e. the 127 remaining active traders only sold the contract. The proportion 
of German traders who bought the contract “Germany” thus is about 76 per cent 
whereas only about 57 per cent of non-German traders bought contracts of the German 
national team.  













Germany 540 413 76.48% 
<0.001 
Other 188 107 56.91% 
Switzerland 
Switzerland 122 112 91.80% 
<0.001 
Other 471 243 51.59% 
USA 
USA 16 12 75.00% 
0.006 
Other 591 245 41.46% 
UK 
UK 9 6 66.67% 
0.584 
Other 646 482 74.61% 
Italy 
Italy 7 7 100.00% 
0.102 
Other 619 448 72.37% 
 
For four out of five contracts under investigation, the proportion of traders who 
purchased a contract was higher among traders coming from the corresponding country 
                                                 
70 Chi-square test for difference in proportion of traders who purchased the corresponding contract 
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compared to the remaining traders. Merely in case of the UK, the proportion of traders 
who purchased is a little higher among non-UK traders than among UK traders. The 
difference in the proportion of traders is statistically significant for the contracts of 
Germany, Switzerland, and the United States of America (Pearson's chi-square test, see 
last column of Table 17)71. However, for the two contracts with a very small number of 
traders coming from the corresponding countries, i.e. UK and Italy, this difference is 
not statistically significant.  
Table 18 follows the same idea but now shows the number and proportion of traders 
who sold the contracts of the five soccer teams. Again, the traders per contract are split 
up into the same two groups. For all five contracts, the proportion of traders who sold a 
contract was lower among traders coming from the corresponding country compared to 
the remaining traders. The difference in the proportion of traders is once more 
statistically significant for the contracts of Germany, Switzerland, and the United States 
of America (Pearson's chi-square test, see last column of Table 18). However, for the 
two contracts with a very small number of traders coming from the corresponding 
countries, i.e. UK and Italy, this difference is also not statistically significant.  




# active  
traders 
# traders  
who sold 
% of traders 
who sold p-value72 
Germany 
Germany 540 343 63.52% 
0.001 
Other 188 132 70.21% 
Switzerland 
Switzerland 122 58 47.54% 
<0.001 
Other 471 385 81.74% 
USA 
USA 16 8 50.00% 
<0.001 
Other 591 530 89.68% 
UK 
UK 9 4 44.44% 
0.207 
Other 646 417 64.55% 
Italy 
Italy 7 3 42.86% 
0.170 
Other 619 416 67.21% 
 
Overall, the traders’ nationality seems to influence the proportion of traders who are 
buying and selling contracts. The proportion of traders buying a contract at all is larger 
among traders coming from the corresponding country compared to other traders and, 
                                                 
71 For more information on Pearson's chi-square test see e.g. Cowan (1998) 
72 Chi-square test for difference in proportion of traders who sold the corresponding contract 
Traders’ Biases in Prediction Markets 107 
vice versa, the proportion of traders selling a contract is lower among traders coming 
from the corresponding country compared to other traders.  
Yet, the number of net buyers among the two groups of traders is even more worthy of 
note than the number of traders who are buying and selling contracts at all. Table 19 
therefore compares the proportion of traders with net purchases among traders coming 
from the corresponding country to the proportion of traders with net purchases from 
other countries for each of the five contracts.  




# active  
traders 
# traders with  
net purchases 
% of traders with 
net purchases p-value73 
Germany 
Germany 540 301 55.74% 
<0.001 
Other 188 83 44.15% 
Switzerland 
Switzerland 122 93 76.23% 
<0.001 
Other 471 148 31.42% 
USA 
USA 16 10 62.50% 
<0.001 
Other 591 127 21.49% 
UK 
UK 9 6 66.67% 
0.345 
Other 646 329 50.93% 
Italy 
Italy 7 5 71.43% 
0.308 
Other 619 323 52.18% 
 
As can be seen in Table 19, there is indeed a larger proportion of net buyers among 
traders coming from the corresponding country compared to the proportion of net 
buyers among traders coming from other countries for all the contracts under 
investigation. The difference in the proportion of traders with net purchases is once 
more statistically significant for the contracts of Germany, Switzerland, and the United 
States of America (Pearson's chi-square test, see last column of Table 19). For the two 
contracts UK and Italy with a very small number of traders coming from the 
corresponding countries the difference is again not statistically significant.  
All in all, the traders’ nationality influences their trading behavior. The differences in 
the proportion of net buyers can most likely be attributed to traders overestimating the 
likely success of their national team. They are more optimistic about their team than 
                                                 
73 Chi-square test for difference in proportion of traders with net purchases 
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other traders and thus are more likely to become net buyers of contracts related to their 
national soccer team. 
6.3.3. Target Groups and Trading Prices
Beyond biases observed within one prediction market, one can also expect to find 
differences in trading prices between different prediction 
specific target groups, i.e. traders coming from different countries
World Cup 2006. Trading prices should be biased in favor of a soccer team if the 
predominant majority of traders 
trading prices from Ballstreet, which is targeted at German traders, and TradeSports, 
which is targeted at traders coming from the US and UK, are compared to trading 
prices of STOCCER in order to examine how prices differ across these prediction 
markets.  
Figure 27 depicts the development of the rank at which the German soccer team is seen 
according to trading prices in STOCCER, Ballstreet
Ballstreet traders, for instance, expect Germany to become the World Champion most 
of the time while Germany is expected to perform much worse by TradeSports traders. 
In the end, Germany did not win the World Cup but made the third place. 
Figure 27: Trading prices of contract “Germany”
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Traders’ biases could explain these dif
almost all of the traders are supposed to be Germans and they are thus relatively 
optimistic about the success of the German soccer team. Trading in TradeSports, in 
contrast, is not dominated by Germans and 
regard to the German soccer team. In STOCCER, a 
Germans but other traders may have 
would explain why the rank
between Ballstreet and TradeSports. 
Similar to the bias towards Germany 
bias towards the UK soccer team in case of TradeSports where trading is most likely 
dominated by British and American traders. The development of the rank at which the 
UK soccer team is seen according to trading prices over time shows less 
towards the UK team in markets which are dominated by German traders.
however, STOCCER most of the time ranks the UK team even lower than Ballstreet 
although there are German traders only in Ballstreet and at least few traders from the 
UK in the STOCCER championship market. 
Figure 28: Trading prices of contract “UK”
If biases were observed beyond the German and the UK team in the above
prediction markets, they could rather not be explained by the national
dominating group of traders. However, such noticeable biases cannot be found for other 
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countries. One example is given in 
rank at which the French soccer team was seen according to trading prices in 
STOCCER, Ballstreet, and TradeSports
much from one prediction market to another market. A similarly close corresponden
between predictions based on trading prices of STOCCER, Ballstreet, and TradeSports 
can be found for almost all other contracts which are not expected to exhibit any biases. 
Figure 29: Trading prices of contract “France”
Differences in trading prices between prediction 
groups are consequently indeed found here. A study based on a larger number of 
contracts traded, though, would be required to examine such differences between 
prediction markets in more depth. 
6.4. Discussion of R
The results reported in this chapter provide evidence that traders were biased in the 
STOCCER championship market. 
behavior. Traders held more contracts of their 
a different nationality. Furthermore, the 
under investigation was found to be larger among traders coming from the 
corresponding country compared to the proportion of n
from other countries.  
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These results are in line with earlier findings in the field of political stock markets. 
Forsythe et al. (1992) found that traders are buying and selling contracts of US 
presidential candidates in a manner which is correlated with their preferences, i.e. 
supporters of a candidate buy more contracts of this candidate than they sell. Forsythe 
et al. (1992) attributed the observed biases to failures in the traders’ information-
processing capabilities. However, attempts of manipulation could also have explained 
the traders’ behavior in political stock markets. The results reported in this chapter 
contribute to the literature by demonstrating that such biases can also be found in field 
of application where traders cannot influence the outcome. In case of STOCCER, 
traders cannot influence the outcome of soccer matches or the performance of their 
national soccer team. Thus, manipulation cannot serve as an explanation for the traders’ 
behavior in the STOCCER championship market. Failures in the traders’ information-
processing capabilities for that reason can in fact be seen as a plausible explanation for 
the trading behavior which was found in STOCCER.  
Interestingly, the predictions of the STOCCER championship market were found to be 
very accurate (cp. Chapter 4) despite the biases which were found when looking at 
traders individually. Presumably, biases of a group of traders such as the traders 
coming from a certain country can be compensated by the remaining traders as long as 
the proportion of traders with biases in favor of the same contract is not too large. 
Similar to this, Hanson et al. (2006) found that subjects in an experimental market 
compensated for the bias in offers from manipulators who were submitting higher price 
offers by setting a different threshold at which they were willing to accept trades. As a 
result, the distortionary effects of manipulation were cancelled out in the experiment.  
This also has important implications for selecting traders of prediction markets. 
Traders’ biases most likely do not distort prediction accuracy if other traders are 
compensating for these biases. Prediction market operators thus have to ensure that not 
all traders exhibit the same bias. Otherwise, traders’ biases could indeed distort trading 
prices and thereby also the prediction accuracy. The results reported in Section 6.3.3 
suggest that the proportion of traders with the same bias was rather large in Ballstreet 
and TradeSports.  
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6.5. Summary 
This chapter provided evidence of traders’ biases in prediction markets. Earlier 
research on the home bias in financial markets and biases in political stock markets 
suggests that traders in prediction markets should exhibit substantial biases. Data from 
the STOCCER championship market is employed to study the influence of the traders’ 
nationality on their shareholdings and trading behavior. Moreover, trading prices from 
Ballstreet and TradeSports were collected and compared to STOCCER prices to 
examine whether prices differ across prediction markets if the predominant majority of 
traders originate from different countries.  
The results showed that the traders’ nationality indeed influenced their trading 
behavior. Traders held more contracts of their own national soccer team than traders of 
a different nationality. Furthermore, the proportion of net buyers for all the contracts 
under investigation was found to be larger among traders coming from the 
corresponding country compared to the proportion of net buyers among traders coming 
from other countries. In addition, trading prices of prediction markets which focus on 
specific target groups seem to differ due to differences in the traders’ biases.  
The chapter concluded with a discussion of the results and their implications for 
inviting and selecting traders of prediction markets to avoid that the traders’ biases 
distort prediction accuracy.  
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7. Conclusions and Future Work 
This chapter concludes the work at hand by firstly summarizing the work in Section 
7.1. Thereby, the research questions, the main contributions, and the implications of the 
results are reviewed. Then, Section 7.2 briefly outlines directions of future work which 
is closely related to the research questions addressed in the work at hand.  
7.1. Summary of Contributions and Review of Work 
The main objective of this work was to demonstrate the predictive power of markets in 
general and in the field of sports forecasting in particular. Moreover, the research which 
was presented concerning traders’ biases and incentive schemes is valuable for 
designing future prediction markets.  
The present work therefore makes the following contributions: 
1. It provides evidence of markets’ prediction accuracy and thereby contributes to 
the literature with the first empirical comparison of play-money prediction 
markets and predictions based on historic data or betting odds in the field of 
sports forecasting. 
2. It analyzes the impact of different incentive schemes on the accuracy of 
prediction markets. In a field experiment, a rank-order tournament outperforms 
the fixed payment as well as the performance-compatible incentive scheme in 
terms of prediction accuracy.  
3. It provides evidence of traders’ biases in prediction markets. In a sports 
prediction market, the traders’ nationality was found to influence their 
shareholdings as well as their trading behavior.  
The work has proceeded in several steps to present these contributions. Chapter 1 
motivated the work, raised the research questions which were addressed, and presented 
the structure of the work as well as related publications.  
Chapter 2 gave a definition of prediction markets and explained their operational 
principle as well as their theoretical foundations. It also discussed the key design 
elements of prediction markets which have to be considered by market engineers. 
Moreover, Chapter 2 presented current fields of application of prediction markets.  
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Chapter 3 then described a 2006 FIFA World Cup prediction market called STOCCER. 
Most of the data which was used to answer the research questions raised in the work 
comes from STOCCER. For this reason the FIFA World Cup 2006 itself, the contracts 
that were traded, the trading mechanisms, the incentive schemes, the group of traders, 
as well as the software platform were described in detail.  
Chapter 4 examined the accuracy of prediction markets in general and in the field of 
sports forecasting in particular, more precisely for predicting the outcomes of soccer 
matches during the FIFA World Cup 2006. The results showed that play-money 
prediction markets outperformed a random predictor and forecasts that are based on 
historic data about the success of national soccer teams. Moreover, prediction markets 
were found to be on a level with betting odds from professional bookmakers which are 
known to be very accurate. Beyond the comparison of prediction accuracy, Chapter 4 
also studied whether pure arbitrage opportunities existed in these markets and whether 
traders tried to exploit illiquidity by taking on the role of market makers in prediction 
markets.  
Chapter 5 studied the impact of different incentive schemes on prediction accuracy. It 
elaborated on the question whether or not prediction markets with performance-related 
incentives perform better than markets with flat payments and how these performance-
related incentives should be designed. The highest correlation between the relative 
frequency of outcome and trading prices was found in case of a rank-order tournament 
where the most successful traders were paid depending on their ordinal rank in a group 
of traders.  
Chapter 6 analyzed how the traders’ nationality influenced their shareholdings and their 
trading behavior in a FIFA World Cup 2006 prediction market. The results suggested 
that there was a correlation between the traders’ nationality and the number of contracts 
they held of different national teams. Moreover, Chapter 6 showed that the proportion 
of net buyers for all the contracts under investigation was larger among traders coming 
from the corresponding country compared to the proportion of net buyers among 
traders coming from other countries. In spite of these results predictions from these 
markets were surprisingly accurate.  
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Based on the results reported in this work, the three research questions which were 
posed in the introduction can be answered briefly as follows.  
(I) How well do markets predict the future? 
Earlier empirical research on prediction markets is used to substantiate their predictive 
power in several fields of application. In this work, data collected from prediction 
markets for the FIFA World Cup 2006 demonstrates their predictive power in the field 
of sports forecasting. The results show that the play-money prediction market 
STOCCER for the FIFA World Cup 2006 was about as accurate as betting odds. 
Betting odds, in turn, are known to be very accurate predictors. Moreover, the markets 
clearly outperformed predictions based on the FIFA world ranking as well as the 
random predictions. Overall, prediction markets can thus be considered an extremely 
accurate forecasting method.  
(II) How to design incentive schemes for play-money prediction markets? 
Well-designed incentive schemes are needed to encourage participation and 
information revelation in play-money prediction markets. In this work, three widely-
used incentive schemes were compared with regard to their impact on the accuracy of 
predictions in a field experiment. The results show that rank-order tournaments are a 
suitable incentive scheme in case of risk-averse traders. The competitive environment 
in the corresponding treatment overrides risk aversion and in so doing leads to the best 
results in terms of prediction accuracy. Due to the risk aversion average trading prices 
were by far too low in case of the performance-compatible incentive schemes. The 
fixed payment scheme was also found not to be too well-suited since there was no 
trading activity for several events and also no significant correlation between trading 
prices and outcome frequencies.  
 (III) How do traders’ biases impact their trading behavior? 
Prediction markets aggregate and reveal the information traders have. Individuals, 
however, exhibit substantial information processing or judgment biases. This work 
studied how the traders’ nationality influenced their shareholdings and their trading 
behavior in a FIFA World Cup 2006 prediction market. The results show that the 
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traders’ nationality in fact influenced their trading behavior. Traders held more 
contracts of their own national soccer team than traders of a different nationality. 
Furthermore, the proportion of net buyers for all the contracts under investigation was 
found to be larger among traders coming from the corresponding country compared to 
the proportion of net buyers among traders coming from other countries. Furthermore, 
trading prices of prediction markets which focus on specific target groups seem to 
differ due to differences in the traders’ biases.  
All in all, this work provides further evidence of the predictive power of markets. The 
markets work extremely well despite traders’ biases. This once more substantiates the 
impressive robustness of prediction markets. Moreover, this work emphasizes the role 
of incentive schemes for the successful operation of prediction markets.  
7.2. Future Work 
Prediction markets have continuously gained importance in academia and industry over 
the last couple of years. Nevertheless, it is a rather new field of research and numerous 
open questions still need to be tackled. Several interesting streams of research are 
closely related to the work at hand. 
Fields of application 
The work at hand provided evidence of markets’ prediction accuracy in the field of 
sports forecasting. So far, most of the research comparing the accuracy of prediction 
markets to other forecasting methods focused on field of application where information 
is dispersed among a large group of traders. Thus, it is interesting to extend this stream 
of research to other fields of application where relevant information is only available to 
a limited number of experts and to study how well prediction markets work under such 
circumstances. This would also allow for examining whether adding uninformed 
traders to a market with few well-informed experts distorts trading prices and thus 
harms prediction accuracy.  
Incentive schemes 
Concerning incentive schemes of play-money prediction markets, the explanation 
which was given in this work for the poor performance of the performance-compatible 
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payment was the traders’ risk aversion. In order to study the impact of risk-aversion on 
the performance of different incentive schemes, one could conduct a similar field 
experiments as the one described in this work with risk-seeking traders. Moreover, it 
would be extremely relevant for transferring the results into practice to study the 
traders’ risk attitude in prediction markets where traders are self-selected. If traders are 
similarly risk averse as in the field experiment, the results from this work should be 
taken into consideration when designing incentive schemes for play-money markets. 
Traders’ biases 
This work provided evidence of traders’ biases in a prediction market for the FIFA 
World Cup 2006. First of all, future research is required to investigate whether similar 
biases can also be found in fields of application where biases are less obvious 
compared to sports and political elections. Furthermore, field and lab experiments have 
to be conducted to study when and to which extent traders’ biases influence trading 
prices. For example, one has to find out what proportion of non-biased traders or how 
many traders with other biases are required in order to correct for the majority’s biases. 
Thereby, it does not matter whether biases result from political preferences, nationality, 
manipulation, or the traders’ nescience.  
Combining prediction markets with established forecasting methods 
The track record of prediction markets suggests that markets may help to better foresee 
future developments and trends. Yet, other forecasting methods should not always be 
replaced by prediction markets. Markets can rather be thought of as a supplement to 
existing forecasting methods since they can be seen as a tool for continuous monitoring 
of developments. Moreover, prediction markets are useful to motivate creative thinking 
and idea generation as well as to identify knowledgeable traders which can afterwards 
be recruited as experts for alternative forecasting methods such as the Delphi technique.  
Prediction markets can also be combined with voting mechanisms or crowd-based 
innovation. The “Open Innovation Markets” developed by Xpree74, for example, make 
use of the wisdom of crowds to facilitate crowd sourcing, crowd ranking, and crowd 
analysis of innovations. The idea is to brainstorm as a community, vote on the ideas to 
                                                 
74 http://www.xpree.com 
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rank them, and then forecast key metrics using a prediction market. Such combinations 
of several forecasting methods should be considered when aiming at improving a 
company’s foresight capabilities.  
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Table 20: Betting odds from wetten.de 
Match Odds Result 
(Team 1 – Team 2) 1 0 2 (Team 1 – Team 2) 
Germany - Costa Rica 1.26 5.45 13.00 4-2 
Poland - Ecuador 1.90 3.35 4.40 0-2 
England - Paraguay 1.62 3.55 6.45 1-0 
Trinidad & Tobago - Sweden 14.00 5.45 1.25 0-0 
Argentina - Ivory Coast 1.55 3.75 7.05 2-1 
Serbia & Montenegro - Netherlands 4.45 3.30 1.90 0-1 
Mexico - Iran 1.55 3.80 6.85 3-1 
Angola - Portugal 10.00 4.70 1.35 0-1 
Australia - Japan 2.60 3.20 2.80 3-1 
USA - Czech Republic 4.45 3.30 1.90 0-3 
Italy - Ghana 1.58 3.50 7.35 2-0 
South Korea - Togo 2.00 3.25 4.05 2-1 
France  - Switzerland 1.70 3.35 6.00 0-0 
Brazil - Croatia 1.40 4.50 8.50 1-0 
Spain - Ukraine 1.85 3.30 4.75 4-0 
Tunisia - Saudi Arabia 1.83 3.35 4.80 2-2 
Germany - Poland 1.55 3.85 6.70 1-0 
Ecuador - Costa Rica 1.82 3.55 4.50 3-0 
England - Trinidad & Tobago 1.20 6.50 15.00 2-0 
Sweden - Paraguay 1.85 3.40 4.55 1-0 
Argentina - Serbia & Montenegro 1.55 3.50 6.50 6-0 
Netherlands - Ivory Coast 1.80 3.50 4.70 2-1 
Mexico - Angola 1.45 4.35 7.45 0-0 
Portugal - Iran 1.35 4.50 8.50 2-0 
Czech Republic - Ghana 1.60 3.65 5.75 0-2 
Italy - USA 1.45 3.80 7.80 1-1 
Japan - Croatia 5.60 3.60 1.60 0-0 
Brazil - Australia 1.25 5.20 11.00 2-0 
France - South Korea 1.40 4.10 8.00 1-1 
Togo - Switzerland 8.75 4.00 1.30 0-2 
Saudi Arabia - Ukraine 8.75 4.35 1.35 0-4 
Spain - Tunisia 1.30 4.50 10.00 3-1 
Ecuador - Germany 7.50 4.25 1.40 0-3 
Costa Rica - Poland 4.00 3.30 1.75 1-2 
Sweden - England 3.65 2.30 2.55 2-2 
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Match Odds Result 
(Team 1 – Team 2) 1 0 2 (Team 1 – Team 2) 
Paraguay - Trinidad & Tobago 1.90 3.55 3.30 2-0 
Portugal - Mexico 2.40 2.50 3.50 2-1 
Iran - Angola 2.55 3.30 2.45 1-1 
Netherlands - Argentina 3.40 3.10 2.05 0-0 
Ivory Coast - Serbia & Montenegro 1.95 3.40 3.40 3-2 
Czech Republic - Italy 3.55 2.80 2.15 0-2 
Ghana - USA 2.20 3.30 2.90 2-1 
Japan - Brazil 11.25 5.50 1.20 1-4 
Croatia - Australia 2.10 3.30 3.10 2-2 
Saudi Arabia - Spain 12.00 5.50 1.18 0-1 
Ukraine - Tunisia 1.60 3.60 5.00 1-0 
Togo - France 11.00 5.00 1.20 0-2 
Switzerland - South Korea 1.90 2.95 3.85 2-0 
Germany – Sweden 1.60 3.45 5.50 2-0 
Argentina – Mexico 1.40 4.00 8.00 1-1 
England – Ecuador 1.50 3.60 7.00 1-0 
Portugal – Netherlands 3.00 3.05 2.35 1-0 
Italy – Australia 1.45 3.75 7.50 1-0 
Switzerland – Ukraine 2.40 3.00 2.90 0-0 
Brazil – Ghana 1.25 5.15 10.00 3-0 
Spain – France 2.35 3.05 3.00 1-3 
Germany – Argentina 2.60 3.10 2.60 1-1 
England – Portugal 2.15 3.10 3.35 0-0 
Italy – Ukraine 1.55 3.45 6.35 3-0 
Brazil – France 1.75 3.20 4.75 0-1 
Germany – Italy 2.20 3.00 3.30 0-0 
Portugal – France 3.65 3.05 2.05 0-1 
Germany – Portugal 1.75 3.40 4.40 3-1 
Italy – France 2.50 2.80 3.00 1-1 
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Table 21: Betting odds from ODDSET 
Match Odds Result 
(Team 1 – Team 2) 1 0 2 (Team 1 – Team 2) 
Germany - Costa Rica 1.20 4.00 9.00 4-2 
Poland - Ecuador 1.75 2.85 3.40 0-2 
England - Paraguay 1.45 2.90 5.45 1-0 
Trinidad & Tobago - Sweden 9.00 4.00 1.20 0-0 
Argentina - Ivory Coast 1.50 2.85 5.00 2-1 
Serbia & Montenegro - Netherlands 3.60 2.85 1.70 0-1 
Mexico - Iran 1.40 3.20 5.20 3-1 
Angola - Portugal 7.50 3.50 1.25 0-1 
Australia - Japan 1.80 2.90 3.15 3-1 
USA - Czech Republic 3.45 2.80 1.75 0-3 
Italy - Ghana 2.25 2.75 2.45 2-0 
South Korea - Togo 1.30 3.40 6.50 2-1 
France  - Switzerland 1.55 2.85 4.50 0-0 
Brazil - Croatia 1.40 3.10 5.50 1-0 
Spain - Ukraine 1.75 2.80 3.50 4-0 
Tunisia - Saudi Arabia 1.75 2.80 3.50 2-2 
Germany - Poland 1.40 3.10 5.50 1-0 
Ecuador - Costa Rica 1.80 2.80 3.30 3-0 
England - Trinidad & Tobago 1.15 5.00 10.00 2-0 
Sweden - Paraguay 1.75 2.85 3.40 1-0 
Argentina - Serbia & Montenegro 1.50 3.00 4.60 6-0 
Netherlands - Ivory Coast 1.65 2.80 4.00 2-1 
Mexico - Angola 1.30 3.55 6.00 0-0 
Portugal - Iran 1.30 3.55 6.00 2-0 
Czech Republic - Ghana 1.35 3.25 6.00 0-2 
Italy - USA 1.50 3.00 4.60 1-1 
Japan - Croatia 1.20 4.00 8.25 0-0 
Brazil - Australia 3.60 2.85 1.70 2-0 
France - South Korea 1.35 3.25 6.00 1-1 
Togo - Switzerland 5.00 3.30 1.40 0-2 
Saudi Arabia - Ukraine 1.25 3.50 7.50 0-4 
Spain - Tunisia 6.00 3.55 1.30 3-1 
Ecuador - Germany 6.00 3.55 1.30 0-3 
Costa Rica - Poland 4.00 3.10 1.55 1-2 
Sweden - England 3.00 2.35 2.20 2-2 
Paraguay - Trinidad & Tobago 1.70 3.25 3.10 2-0 
Portugal - Mexico 3.00 2.85 1.90 2-1 
Iran - Angola 1.85 2.90 3.00 1-1 
Netherlands - Argentina 2.10 2.40 3.10 0-0 
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Match Odds Result 
(Team 1 – Team 2) 1 0 2 (Team 1 – Team 2) 
Ivory Coast - Serbia & Montenegro 2.40 2.90 2.20 3-2 
Czech Republic - Italy 3.25 2.60 1.90 0-2 
Ghana - USA 2.00 2.80 2.80 2-1 
Japan - Brazil 7.50 4.20 1.20 1-4 
Croatia - Australia 2.00 2.75 2.85 2-2 
Saudi Arabia - Spain 10.00 4.25 1.15 0-1 
Ukraine - Tunisia 1.90 2.60 3.25 1-0 
Togo - France 10.00 4.25 1.15 0-2 
Switzerland - South Korea 1.50 3.00 4.60 2-0 
Germany – Sweden 1.60 3.00 4.00 2-0 
Argentina – Mexico 1.35 3.25 6.00 1-1 
England – Ecuador 1.35 3.25 6.00 1-0 
Portugal – Netherlands 2.70 2.80 2.05 1-0 
Italy – Australia 1.40 3.00 6.00 1-0 
Switzerland – Ukraine 2.20 2.80 2.50 0-0 
Brazil – Ghana 1.20 4.00 8.25 3-0 
Spain – France 2.15 2.75 2.60 1-3 
Germany – Argentina 2.35 2.75 2.35 1-1 
England – Portugal 1.95 2.75 3.00 0-0 
Italy – Ukraine 1.45 3.00 5.10 3-0 
Brazil – France 1.60 2.85 4.15 0-1 
Germany – Italy 1.95 2.75 3.00 0-0 
Portugal – France 3.15 2.70 1.90 0-1 
Germany – Portugal 1.65 2.90 3.75 3-1 
Italy – France 2.30 2.60 2.60 1-1 
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Table 22: Positions of competing teams in the FIFA ranking (May 2006) 
Match Rank Result 
(Team 1 – Team 2) Team 1 Team 2 (Team 1 – Team 2) 
Germany - Costa Rica 19 26 4-2 
Poland - Ecuador 29 39 0-2 
England - Paraguay 10 33 1-0 
Trinidad & Tobago - Sweden 47 16 0-0 
Argentina - Ivory Coast 9 32 2-1 
Serbia & Montenegro - Netherlands 47 3 0-1 
Mexico - Iran 4 23 3-1 
Angola - Portugal 57 7 0-1 
Australia - Japan 42 18 3-1 
USA - Czech Republic 5 2 0-3 
Italy - Ghana 13 48 2-0 
South Korea - Togo 29 61 2-1 
France  - Switzerland 8 35 0-0 
Brazil - Croatia 1 23 1-0 
Spain - Ukraine 5 45 4-0 
Tunisia - Saudi Arabia 21 34 2-2 
Germany - Poland 19 29 1-0 
Ecuador - Costa Rica 39 26 3-0 
England - Trinidad & Tobago 10 47 2-0 
Sweden - Paraguay 16 33 1-0 
Argentina - Serbia & Montenegro 9 47 6-0 
Netherlands - Ivory Coast 3 32 2-1 
Mexico - Angola 4 57 0-0 
Portugal - Iran 7 23 2-0 
Czech Republic - Ghana 2 48 0-2 
Italy - USA 13 5 1-1 
Japan - Croatia 18 23 0-0 
Brazil - Australia 1 42 2-0 
France - South Korea 8 29 1-1 
Togo - Switzerland 61 35 0-2 
Saudi Arabia - Ukraine 34 45 0-4 
Spain - Tunisia 5 21 3-1 
Ecuador - Germany 39 19 0-3 
Costa Rica - Poland 26 29 1-2 
Sweden - England 16 10 2-2 
Paraguay - Trinidad & Tobago 33 47 2-0 
Portugal - Mexico 7 4 2-1 
Iran - Angola 23 57 1-1 
Netherlands - Argentina 3 9 0-0 
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Match Rank Result 
(Team 1 – Team 2) Team 1 Team 2 (Team 1 – Team 2) 
Ivory Coast - Serbia & Montenegro 32 47 3-2 
Czech Republic - Italy 2 13 0-2 
Ghana - USA 48 5 2-1 
Japan - Brazil 18 1 1-4 
Croatia - Australia 23 42 2-2 
Saudi Arabia - Spain 34 5 0-1 
Ukraine - Tunisia 45 21 1-0 
Togo - France 61 8 0-2 
Switzerland - South Korea 35 29 2-0 
Germany – Sweden 19 16 2-0 
Argentina – Mexico 9 4 1-1 
England – Ecuador 10 39 1-0 
Portugal – Netherlands 7 3 1-0 
Italy – Australia 13 42 1-0 
Switzerland – Ukraine 35 45 0-0 
Brazil – Ghana 1 48 3-0 
Spain – France 5 8 1-3 
Germany – Argentina 19 9 1-1 
England – Portugal 10 7 0-0 
Italy – Ukraine 13 45 3-0 
Brazil – France 1 8 0-1 
Germany – Italy 19 13 0-0 
Portugal – France 7 8 0-1 
Germany – Portugal 19 7 3-1 
Italy – France 13 8 1-1 
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Table 23: Trading activity of market makers relative to all traders 
Contract #MM #MM-TX / #TX (%) MM-TradVol / TradVol (%) 
Angola 45 76.19% 89.51% 
Argentina 59 83.34% 82.42% 
Australia 54 77.70% 77.33% 
Brazil 56 84.26% 87.41% 
Costa Rica 45 76.28% 91.46% 
Cote d’Ivoire 41 79.21% 87.57% 
Croatia 47 83.54% 89.96% 
Czech Republic 39 82.04% 86.63% 
Ecuador 42 82.66% 87.61% 
England 53 85.83% 85.77% 
France 77 83.74% 81.98% 
Germany 81 81.74% 80.43% 
Ghana 50 80.01% 78.31% 
Iran 25 76.61% 83.00% 
Italy 59 84.62% 83.38% 
Japan 32 78.92% 81.28% 
Korea Republic 47 81.59% 87.14% 
Saudi Arabia 36 79.48% 86.24% 
Mexico 50 82.88% 82.12% 
Netherlands 51 86.73% 89.22% 
Paraguay 36 80.21% 90.10% 
Poland 37 79.68% 88.66% 
Portugal 49 85.25% 81.73% 
Serbia & Montenegro 32 80.16% 90.84% 
Spain 59 84.20% 82.56% 
Sweden 45 84.98% 87.79% 
Switzerland 46 83.03% 85.54% 
Togo 32 78.87% 88.60% 
Trinidad & Tobago 43 77.54% 81.92% 
Tunisia 36 82.02% 94.56% 
Ukraine 54 82.24% 82.12% 
USA 44 80.55% 82.04% 
 
#MM:   Number of market makers 
#TX:   Number of trades 
TradVol:  Trading volume 
#MM-TX:  Number of trades by market makers 
MM-TradVol: Trading volume of market makers  
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Table 24: Number of market makers and trading activity per contract 
Contract # MM # TX Trading Volume 
Angola 45 2822 2906207.80 
Argentina 59 3397 16518302.03 
Australia 54 2628 5669446.43 
Brazil 56 3456 21245499.70 
Costa Rica 45 2188 1768325.72 
Cote d’Ivoire 41 2491 3101242.95 
Croatia 47 2284 4051174.70 
Czech Republic 39 2311 5415731.57 
Ecuador 42 2538 5698810.33 
England 53 2633 10684352.88 
France 77 3524 19028177.09 
Germany 81 3494 19461286.03 
Ghana 50 2756 6698774.88 
Iran 25 2129 1911784.25 
Italy 59 2809 15022296.44 
Japan 32 2182 2658963.66 
Korea Republic 47 2173 3822122.80 
Saudi Arabia 36 2071 1588805.83 
Mexico 50 2576 7509094.91 
Netherlands 51 2404 7744212.78 
Paraguay 36 1971 2717072.52 
Poland 37 2224 3173347.09 
Portugal 49 2658 13111409.97 
Serbia & Montenegro 32 2142 2919919.26 
Spain 59 2772 11381556.92 
Sweden 45 2150 5552289.44 
Switzerland 46 2151 5149225.96 
Togo 32 2087 1550324.84 
Trinidad & Tobago 43 2297 2770702.86 
Tunisia 36 2124 3124018.13 
Ukraine 54 2528 7253846.15 
USA 44 2432 4209720.01 
 
#MM:   Number of market makers 
#TX:   Number of trades 
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Instruction 1: Instructions sent to subjects via e-mail when trading started 
(incentive scheme: rank-order tournament) 
Hallo «Vorname» «Nachname», 
 
es ist soweit: Die Handelsplattform für unser Experiment steht Ihnen unter der Adresse 
http://exp.iw.uni-karlsruhe.de/ zur Verfügung. Hier können Sie virtuelle Aktien 
handeln und echtes Geld verdienen! Wie Sie entlohnt werden finden Sie nachfolgend 
unter „Entlohnung der Experimentteilnehmer“. 
 
Ausgangssituation 
Zu Beginn haben Sie einen Geldbestand von «Erstausstattung_Geld» Stoccer-Euro und 
besitzen Aktien im Wert von «Erstausstattung_Turnieraktien» Stoccer-Euro. Während 
des Experiments werden Sie weitere Aktien im Wert von «Erstausstattung_Spielaktien» 
Stoccer-Euro erhalten. Wir werden Sie in jedem Fall noch genauer per Email 
informieren, wenn sich neue Aktien in Ihrem Depot befinden. 
 
Anmeldung 
Der Handel findet ausschließlich auf unserer speziellen Handelsplattform statt, die 
unter der folgenden Adresse erreicht werden kann: http://exp.iw.uni-karlsruhe.de/ 
 
Bitte loggen Sie sich mit Ihrem Benutzernamen und Passwort ein: 




Direkt nach der Anmeldung können Sie den Markt auswählen, in dem Sie handeln 
wollen. Anfangs ist nur der Markt „Fußball-Weltmeister“ aktiv. Nach und nach werden 
wir weitere Märkte zu den einzelnen Spielen starten. 
 
Auszahlungsregel  
Die Aktien der 32 WM-Mannschaften werden bis zum 9. Juli 2006 gehandelt. Nach 
dem Finale der Fußball-WM 2006 werden die Aktien abhängig von Turniererfolg der 





Ausscheiden im Halbfinale 20 
Ausscheiden im Viertelfinale 10 
Ausscheiden im Achtelfinale 5 
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So wird die Aktie des Weltmeisters z.B. nach Ende der WM 50 STOCCER-Euro wert 
sein, die Aktie einer Mannschaft, welche die Vorrunde übersteht, dann aber im 




Handeln können Sie unter dem Menüpunkt "Aktien handeln". Dort finden Sie neben 
den Orderbüchern mit je drei aktuellen Geboten anderer Händler auch Ihren aktuellen 
Depotbestand und die Maske zur Erteilung von Aufträgen zum Kauf- und Verkauf von 
Anteilen. Zu Beginn handeln Sie mit Aktien der 32 WM-Mannschaften. Die Preise 
Ihrer Kauf- und Verkaufaufträge sind abhängig von Ihren Erwartungen. Liegt bspw. der 
aktuelle Marktpreis von Brasilien bei 27 und Sie gehen davon aus, dass Brasilien 
mindestens das Finale erreichen wird, so würden Sie gemäß obiger Auszahlungsregel 
sofort Aktien von Brasilien kaufen, da Brasilien Ihrer Meinung nach mindestens Vize-
Weltmeister wird.  
Zur eigentlichen Durchführung eines Kaufs oder Verkaufs wählen Sie eine Mannschaft 
und tragen die gewünschte Stückzahl und den Preis ein. Der Auftrag wird dann zu dem 
von Ihnen gewählten Preis oder einem für Sie besseren Preis ausgeführt, sobald es eine 
entsprechende Order auf der Marktgegenseite gibt. Selbstverständlich kann Ihr Auftrag 
nur ausgeführt werden, wenn Sie genügend Aktien zum Verkauf beziehungsweise 
genügend Geld zum Ankauf haben. Zusätzlich können Sie die Gültigkeitsdauer Ihrer 
Order bestimmen. Eventuell auftretende Fehler bei der Auftragserteilung werden im 
Log-Bereich des Handelsbildschirms angezeigt. Eine ausführliche Anleitung finden Sie 
auf der Webseite unter http://www.stoccer.de/index.php?id=36.  
 
Entlohnung der Experimentteilnehmer 
Sie handeln in einer Gruppe mit insgesamt 20 Teilnehmern. Am Ende des Experiments 
wird auf Basis des Depotwerts eine Rangfolge bestimmt und es werden folgende 
Geldbeträge ausgezahlt:  
500€ für den ersten Platz (höchster Depotwert), 300€ für den zweiten Platz und 200€ 
für den dritten Platz unter allen 20 Händlern. 
 
Bitte beachten Sie, dass ein Mindesttransaktionsvolumen von 
«Mindesttransaktionsvolumen» Stoccer-Euro pro Woche besteht. Sollten Sie weniger 
als dieses Volumen (Anzahl * Preis) handeln, wird am Ende des Experiments eine 
Gebühr von 15,00€ für jede Woche (jeweils Freitag bis Donnerstag) erhoben, in der das 
Mindesttransaktionsvolumen nicht erreicht wurde. Die Gebühr wird von Ihrer 
Experimentauszahlung abgezogen – die Auszahlung kann natürlich nicht negativ 
werden. Bitte beachten Sie, dass sich das Transaktionsvolumen aus allen ausgeführten 
Transaktionen unterschiedlicher Händler errechnet und Geschäfte, in denen Sie mit sich 
selbst handeln, nicht berücksichtigt werden. 
  
Transaktionen und offene Aufträge  
Im Menüpunkt "Aufträge und Transaktionen" finden Sie sowohl bereits ausgeführte als 
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Handel von Portfolios  
Alternativ zum oben beschriebenen Handel einzelner Anteile mit anderen 
Marktteilnehmern können Sie unter dem Menüpunkt "Portfolios handeln" sog. 
Basisportfolios kaufen und verkaufen. Im Markt "Fußball-Weltmeister" beinhaltet ein 
Portfolio eine Aktie von jeder Mannschaft. Im Dialog geben Sie bitte an, ob Sie kaufen 
oder verkaufen möchten und tragen die Anzahl an Portfolios ein, die Sie handeln 
möchten. Wenn Sie genügend Aktien zum Verkauf beziehungsweise genügend Geld 
zum Ankauf haben, wird der Auftrag ausgeführt.  
Der Preis für ein Portfolio ist marktabhängig und liegt bei 200 STOCCER-Euro. Damit 
entspricht der Preis exakt der Summe der Auszahlungen der einzelnen 
Mannschaftsaktien. In den Märkten zu einzelnen Spielen wird der Portfoliopreis bei 
100 STOCCER-Euro liegen.  
 
Berechnung des Depotwerts  
Ihre Platzierung innerhalb Ihrer Gruppe ist abhängig vom Depotwert. Dieser ergibt sich 
aus der Summe Ihres Geldbestands und des aktuellen Werts aller von Ihnen gehaltenen 
Aktien. Nach Marktschluss werden die Aktien entsprechend der Auszahlungsregel 
(siehe "Auszahlungsregel) bewertet.  
 
 
Sollten Sie Fragen zum Ablauf des Experiments haben, zögern Sie nicht, die 
Experimentleitung unter Matthias.Burghardt@iism.uni-karlsruhe.de oder 
Stefan.Luckner@iism.uni-karlsruhe.de zu kontaktieren. 
 





IISM Universität Karlsruhe (TH) 
www.iw.uni-karlsruhe.de 
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Instruction 2: Instructions sent to subjects when the first match markets were 
launched 
Hallo «Vorname» «Nachname», 
 
neben dem Markt „Fußball-Weltmeister“ gibt es im Experiment weitere Märkte zu den 
einzelnen Spielen. In jedem dieser „Spielmärkte“ werden drei verschiedene Aktien 
gehandelt: 
 
1. Team 1 gewinnt  
2. Team 2 gewinnt  
3. Unentschieden 
 
Die Auszahlung für die Aktie des eintretenden Ereignisses beträgt 100 STOCCER-
Euro, für alle anderen Aktien 0 STOCCER-Euro. Demnach kostet ein Portfolio 100 
STOCCER-Euro. Erwarten Sie also bspw., dass Brasilien gegen Ghana mit 90%iger 
Wahrscheinlichkeit gewinnen wird, so kaufen Sie Brasilien Aktien bis zu einem Preis 
von 90 STOCCER-Euro und verkaufen Sie zu Preise über 90 STOCCER-Euro. 
Die Märkte enden direkt nach dem Ende der 2. Halbzeit. Die Basis zur Bewertung ist 
der Spielstand nach Ende der 2. Halbzeit (d.h. 90 min. Spielzeit + Nachspielzeit), 
also ohne Verlängerung/Elfmeterschießen!  
 
---  
1. Beispiel: Beim Spiel Deutschland gegen Schweden gewinnt Deutschland regulär mit 
dem Abpfiff der 2. Halbzeit mit 2:0. Dann ist die Aktie "Deutschland gewinnt" 100 
STOCCER-Euro wert, die Aktien "Schweden gewinnt" und "Unentschieden" sind 0 
STOCCER-Euro wert.  
2. Beispiel: Es steht es 1:1 nach Ende der 2. Halbzeit, d.h. das Spiel geht in die 
Verlängerung. Da die Aktien nach Ende der 2. Halbzeit bewertet werden, ist die 
Auszahlung für die Aktie "Unentschieden" 100 STOCCER-Euro, für die Aktien 
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Table 25: Distribution of trading prices in the three treatments 
Trading price FP RO DV 
0-20 0.32 0.19 0.52 
20-40 0.27 0.29 0.22 
40-60 0.20 0.17 0.22 
60-80 0.07 0.21 0.04 
80-100 0.14 0.14 0.00 
 
FP: Fixed payment 
RO: Rank-order tournament 
DV: Deposit value 
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Table 26: Relative frequencies of outcome of contracts 
FP 
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Figure 30: Lottery-choice decisions in the field experiment 
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Appendix C 
 
Table 27: Traders’ nationality and shareholdings in teams (June 23
rd
 2006) 
    AVERAGE NUMBER OF CONTRACTS 



















Germany 405.24 244.73 391.85 333.58 330.94 330.10 
Switzerland 180.16 1027.52 294.40 270.05 372.06 442.67 
USA 219.56 97.30 395.14 350.08 307.26 235.18 
UK 75.00 71.43 64.29 946.86 372.50 446.76 
Italy 87.36 78.27 260.09 87.36 1900.55 299.22 
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